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THE DEVELOPMENT

OF THE

LOGICAL METHOD IN ANCIENT CHINA

先秦名學史

BY

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PREFACE

The object and scope of the present study I have indicated in the introductory chapter. I wish only to state here the methods of treatment employed in this essay and its main points of departure from traditional scholarship in China.

Since the present essay is intended to be an historical study, the first problem it has had to face is the choice of source-material. It is impossible for an occidental reader to imagine the tremendous burden of tradition which I have found necessary to overthrow in writing this work. Throughout I have made it a principle not to accept a book, nor to quote a passage from an accepted work, without sufficient ground. Of the so-called "Five Classics" of Confucianism, I have accepted only the *Book of Poetry* in its entirety, and have deliberately refrained from quoting anything from the *Book of History* and from the *Li Ki* excepting its second book which I regard as genuine. I have rejected the *Kwan Tze* (管子), the *An Tze Chun Chiu* (晏子春秋), and many other works of similar doubtful authenticity. In the case of works which contain later interpolations, I have been especially cautious in selecting quotations. I have, for example, made use of only a few chapters each in the *Chuang Tze* and the *Hsun Tze*.

Another problem of great importance is that of textual criticism and interpretation. In this regard, I have freely availed myself of the fruits of textual criticism and philological research which our scholars have accumulated during the last two hundred years. To those scholars I acknowledge my profound indebtedness. For it is through philological studies that we can free ourselves from the subjective biases of traditional commentators and arrive at a real understanding of what the ancients actually meant.

In determining the authenticity of our source-material, we have already had to resort to what has been called "Higher Criticism." Another phase of higher criticism is the determination of dates. Chinese historians have been very careless in assigning the dates of the philosophers dealt with in this essay. I

have accepted only one date without question,—that of Confucius. In all other cases, I have repudiated all uncritical assignments and have determined the dates only on grounds of internal evidence and contemporary testimony.

The most important and at the same time most difficult task in a work of this kind is, of course, the interpretation and construction or re-construction of the philosophical systems. In this aspect, however, I am more fortunate than the early commentators and critics in that I have received many fruitful suggestions from my study of the history of European philosophy. Only those who have had similar experiences in comparative studies,—for example, in comparative philology,—can truly appreciate the value of occidental philosophy in aiding my interpretation of ancient Chinese thought-systems.

As to the points of departure from traditional scholarship in my interpretation of these philosophies, I can only mention a few. In the first place, I believe my treatment of the *Book of Change* as a work of logical import furnishes a new point of view which seems to solve more difficulties in that book than any other previous treatment has ever succeeded to do. Secondly, the chapters which deal with books 32–37 of the *Moh Tze* will probably be found helpful to future students in this field of research.

June, 1917, on board S. S. Empress of Japan.

CONTENTS

	PAGE
Introduction : Logic and Philosophy	i–x
Part I : The Historical Background	1
Part II : The Confucian Logic	21
Biographical Note	21
Chapter I : The Problem of Confucius	22
Chapter II : The Book of Change	28
Chapter III : The Hsiang or "Ideas"	35
Chapter IV : The Tsi or Judgment	41
Chapter V : The Rectification of Names and Judgment	46
Part III: The Logic of Moh Tih and His School	53
Book I : Introductory	53
Book II : The Logic of Moh Tih	63
Chapter I : The Pragmatic Method	63
Chapter II : The Three Laws of Reasoning ...	72
Book III : The Logic of Neo-Mohism	83
Chapter I : The Neo-Mohist Texts	83
Chapter II : Knowledge	87
Chapter III : Cause, Form and Deduction	93
Chapter IV : Induction	99
Chapter V : Hui Sze and Kung-Sun Lung	109
Chapter VI : The Same (Concluded)	118
Part IV : Evolution and Logic	131
Chapter I : Theories of Natural Evolution	131
Chapter II : The Logic of Chuang Tze	140
Chapter III : Hsun Tze : i. Nature and Progress ...	149
Chapter IV : Hsun Tze : ii. His Logic	159
Chapter V : The Logic of Law	170
Epilogue	185

A NOTE

This work on the development of logical method in ancient China was written during my residence in New York City from September, 1915, to April, 1917. It was accepted by the Faculty of Philosophy of Columbia University as partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Since my return to China in July, 1917, I have continued my research work in the history of ancient Chinese philosophy and have embodied the results of my researches in the first volume of my *History of Chinese Philosophy* which has gone through seven editions and had a circulation of 16,000 copies in the course of two years. That volume, covering the same period as this dissertation, has made use of practically all the material contained in this earlier work in English. Continued research and maturer judgment as well as better facilities in books and expert consultation have enabled me to incorporate in my Chinese work many new materials which were inaccessible to me when I wrote this dissertation in America. During the last four years I have longed for an opportunity to make a thorough revision of this work. Pressure of work, however, has so far prevented me from fulfilling this wish. This accounts for the long delay in its publication. My English and American friends in China who have read this volume in the manuscript form, have repeatedly persuaded me to publish it as it was written four years ago. I have now decided to do so with much reluctance, but not without the consolation that the main position taken in this dissertation and the critical methods in the treatment of its source-materials have received the warm approval of Chinese scholars as is shown in the cordial reception accorded to my first volume of *History of Chinese Philosophy* which is essentially a Chinese version and expansion of this earlier work on what I consider to be the most essential part in every history of philosophy,—the development of logical method.

January, 1922,
The National University of Peking.

INTRODUCTION

Logic and Philosophy

That philosophy is conditioned by its method, and that the development of philosophy is dependent upon the development of the logical method, are facts which find abundant illustrations in the history of philosophy both of the West and of the East. Modern philosophy in Continental Europe and in England began with a *Discourse on Method* and a *Novum Organum*. But the history of modern philosophy in China furnishes a still more instructive illustration. When the philosophers of the Sung dynasty (960–1277 A.D.), especially Cheng Hao (1032–1085) and his brother Cheng Yi (1033–1108), sought to revive the Confucian philosophy, they discovered a little book entitled *Ta Hsuoh* ("The Great Learning") which had for over a thousand years remained one of the forty odd books in the collection known as the *Li Ki*. This little book of about 1750 words of unknown authorship, was then singled out from the *Li Ki* and later exalted to the enviable position of one of the "Four Books" of Confucianism. The reason for this interesting incident lies in the fact that these philosophers were looking for a Discourse on Method, and found in this little book the only work of the Confucian school which furnished what they considered a workable logical method. The main thesis in this book is summed up in the following passage:

> "When things are thoroughly investigated, knowledge will be extended to the utmost. When knowledge is extended to the utmost, our ideas will be made true. When our ideas are made true, our minds will be rectified. When our minds are rectified, our individual character will be improved. When our individual character is improved, our family will be well ordered. When the families are well ordered, the state will be well governed. When the states are well governed, the whole world will be in peace."

The most important part of this statement consists of the three opening sentences. The school of Sung, represented chiefly by the Cheng brothers and Chu Hsi (1129–1200), maintained that everything has a reason (理) and that "to investigate into things" means to find out the reason in the particular things. "The saying (in the *Ta Hsuoh*) that the extension of knowledge depends on the investigation of things, means that in order to extend our knowledge we must study everything and find out exhaustively its reason. For in every human soul there is knowledge, and in every thing there is a reason. It is only because we have not sufficiently investigated into the reason of things that our knowledge is so incomplete. Therefore, in the scheme of 'The Great Learning' (which was taken by the Sung philosophers to mean 'learning for adults') the student is asked first to study all the things under heaven, beginning with the known principles (reason) and seeking to reach the utmost. After sufficient labor has been devoted to it, the day will come when all things will suddenly become clear and intelligible. When that time has arrived, then we shall have penetrated into the interior and the exterior, the apparent and the hidden, principles of all things, and understood the whole nature and function of our minds."[1]

This method of beginning with accumulative learning and leading to the final stage of sudden enlightenment, continued to be the logical method of Neo-Confucianism until the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) when Wang Yang-ming (1472–1529) revolted against it. Said Wang Yang-ming: "In former years, I said to my friend Chien: 'If to be a sage or a virtuous man one must investigate everything under heaven, how can at present any man possess such tremendous power?' Pointing to the bamboos in front of the pavilion, I asked him to investigate them. Day and night, Chien entered into an investigation of the reasons in the bamboo. Having exhausted his mind and thought on it, he fell sick at the end of three days. At that time I thought it was

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[1] Chu Hsi's commentary on the fifth section of the *Ta Hsuoh*. Cf. Sun Chi Fung's *History of Rational Philosophy* (1667), vol. 2, p. 10 of the 1879 edition.

because his energy and strength were not equal to the task. So I myself undertook to carry on the investigation. Day and night I failed to understand the reason in the bamboo. I was so tired that I fell sick after seven days. In consequence we both confessed with a sigh that, without the great power and ability required to carry on the investigation of things, we were disqualified to become sages or virtuous men."[1]

Accordingly, Wang Yang-ming rejected the method of the Sung school and founded a new school on what he considered as the original text of the *Ta Hsuoh*. The new school holds that "the objects under heaven need not be investigated and the task of 'investigating things' can only be carried out in and with reference to the individual's character and mind."[2] Apart from the mind, there is neither reason nor thing. "The ruler of the body is the mind. That which proceeds from the mind is the idea. The nature (本體) of the idea is knowledge. That on which the idea rests is the thing. For instance, when the idea rests on serving one's parents, then serving one's parents is the thing."[3] Therefore, Wang Yang-ming holds that the word *kueh* (格) in the phrase *kueh wuh* (格物) does not mean "to investigate into" as the Sung philosophers had maintained. It means "to rectify" as in Mencius' saying, "The great man rectifies (格) the mind of his prince." The doctrine of *kueh wuh*, therefore, does not mean "to investigate into things," but "to remove from the mind that which is not right and to restore its original nature of rightness."[4] It is, in short, to bring forth the "intuitive knowledge" (良知) of the mind. "Knowledge is the nature of the mind. The mind is naturally capable of knowing. . . . Conquer the selfish passions and reinstate reason, and the intuitive knowledge of the mind will be freed from its impediments and will function to its full capacity.

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[1] Wang Yang-ming, *Records of Discourses*, translated by F. G. Henke in *The Philosophy of Wang Yang-ming*, pp. 177–8, which is a translation of the first volume of his selected works, first published by Sze Pong-yao in 1636 and republished by Fang Hsuoh-fu in 1906. I have here and in the following quotations revised Henke's translations.

[2] *Loc. cit.* translated Henke, p. 178.

[3] *Recorded Instructions for Practice*, p. 9. In Henke, p. 59.

[4] *Loc. cit.*

That is what is meant by 'the extension of knowledge to the utmost.' When knowledge is extended to the utmost, the ideas will be rectified." [1]

To sum up, the whole history of modern Chinese philosophy from the eleventh century to the present day has centered on the interpretation of a little book of 1750 words of unknown authorship. Indeed the whole controversy between the Sung school and the Ming school of Neo-Confucianism may be said to be a controversy over the question whether the two words *kueh wuh* should be interpreted as "to investigate into things" or as "to rectify the mind in order to have intuitive knowledge."

As I now look back on the history of Chinese philosophy of the last 900 years, I cannot but feel profoundly impressed by the conditioning influence of the logical method on the development of philosophy. The most important fact in this long period of controversy is that the philosophers in their search for a method have found a little treatise which gives an outline of a method, or what appears to be a method, without a concrete statement of its detailed operations. This enables the philosophers to read into it whatever procedure they were able to conceive of. It is clear that the interpretation which the Cheng brothers and Chu Hsi gave to the phrase *kueh wuh* comes very near to the inductive method: It begins with seeking the reason in things and aims at the final enlightenment through synthesis. But it is an inductive method without the requisite details of procedure. The story told above of Wang Yang-ming's attempt to investigate the principles of the bamboo, is an excellent instance of the barrenness of an inductive method without the necessary inductive procedure. This barrenness and futility have forced Wang Yang-ming to resort to the theory of intuitive knowledge which exalts the mind as coextensive with cosmic reason, thus avoiding the futile efforts to seek the reason in all things under heaven.

But both the Sung and the Ming philosophers agreed on one point. Both Chu Hsi and Wang Yang-ming agreed that the word *wuh* (things) meant "affairs" (*sze*).[2] This humanistic interpreta-

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[1] *Recorded Instructions for Practice*, p. 9. In Henke, p. 59.

[2] Chu Hsi, in his commentary on the opening chapter of the *Ta Hsuoh*, said: "'Things' is equivalent to 'affairs.'" Wang Yang-ming said: "Things are affairs." (See his "Inquiry Regarding the Great Learning," p. 45, translated by Henke, p. 213.)

tion of one word has determined the whole nature and scope of modern Chinese philosophy. It has limited philosophy to the realm of human "affairs" and relations. Wang maintained that the "investigation of things" can only be carried out in and with reference to the individual's character and mind. Even the Sung school which sought to know the reason in everything, did so only in so far as such investigation tends to "make our ideas true (sincere) and firm" and thereby to "rectify our minds."[1] Not equipped with a scientific method for the investigation of natural objects, they, too, confined themselves to the problems of moral and political philosophy. Thus neither the one nor the other of the two great epochs of modern Chinese philosophy has made any contribution to the development of the sciences. There may have been many other causes which account for the absence of scientific learning in China, but it is surely no exaggeration to say that the nature of the method of philosophy has been one of the most important causes.

This seemingly unnecessarily lengthy account of the development of methodology in modern Chinese philosophy is intended to be my excuse for undertaking to write the present essay on the development of the logical method in Ancient China. For I believe that it was most unfortunate that the great revival of philosophical speculation in the eleventh, twelfth, and sixteenth centuries was greatly hampered by the fact that the work which has been the *Novum Organum* of practically all the schools of modern Chinese philosophy, has chiefly consisted of a work of unknown authorship, probably written by some Confucian of the fourth or third century B. C., and which in setting forth the doctrine of extending one's knowledge to the utmost through the investigation of things, was probably unconsciously influenced by

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[1] See Huang Chung-hsi, *History of the Philosophical Schools of the Sung and Yuen Dynasties* (written in the seventeenth century, revised by Chuan Chu Wang (1704–1755), first published in 1838, and republished in 1879), vol. 10, pp. 18 and 46.

the scientific tendencies of that age.[1] But because the scientific influence was at most only unconsciously felt, because the scientific methods for the investigation of things which were developed by the non-Confucian schools of the era were never explicitly stated, and because the whole spirit of the *Ta Hsuoh*, as well as of the other standard Confucian works, was purely rationalistic and moralistic,—the development of philosophy and science in modern[2] China has greatly suffered for lack of an adequate logical method.

Now that China has come into contact with the other thought-systems of the world, it has seemed to some that the lack of methodology in modern Chinese philosophy can now be supplied by introducing into China the philosophical and scientific methods which have developed in the Western world from the time of Aristotle to this day. This would be sufficient if China were contented to regard the problem of methodology merely as a problem of "mental discipline" in the schools or even as one of acquiring a working method for the laboratories. But as I look at it, the problem is not really so simple. The problem as I conceive it is only one phase of a still larger and more fundamental problem which New China must face.

This larger problem is: How can we Chinese feel at ease in this new world which at first sight appears to be so much at variance with what we have long regarded as our own civilization?

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[1] If this assertion needs any proof, note the unconscious influence of a scientific age on such Confucians as Mencius, as is seen, for example, in the following quotations: "Having thoroughly employed the powers of their eyes, the sages have left behind them the try-square, the compasses, the level, and the tape-measure, which may be infinitely used for making squares and circles and for leveling and straightening. Having thoroughly employed the powers of their ears, they have left behind them the six tonal regulators for the infinite use in standardizing the five notes. Having thoroughly employed their mental powers, they have left behind them their benevolent policies in government in order that benevolence may extend to the whole empire" (Mencius, IV, Pt. I, 1). "High as the heavens are, distant as the stars seem, if we only seek their cause (故), the equinoxes of a thousand years can be calculated while sitting" (Bk. IV, Pt. II, 26; the equinoxes, of course, are those in a lunar calendar and fall on different dates in different years). Many similar passages could be cited.

[2] "Modern China" so far as philosophy and literature are concerned, dates back to the Tang dynasty (A. D. 618-906).

For it is perfectly natural and justifiable that a nation with a glorious past and with a distinctive civilization of its own making should never feel quite at home in a new civilization, if that new civilization is looked upon as part and parcel imported from alien lands and forced upon it by external necessities of national existence. And it would surely be a great loss to mankind at large if the acceptance of this new civilization should take the form of abrupt displacement instead of organic assimilation, thereby causing the disappearance of the old civilization. The real problem, therefore, may be restated thus: How can we best assimilate modern civilization in such a manner as to make it congenial and congruous and continuous with the civilization of our own making?

This larger problem presents itself in every phase of the great conflict between the old civilization and the new. In art, in literature, in politics, and in social life in general, the underlying problem is fundamentally the same. The solution of this great problem, as far as I can see, will depend solely on the foresight and the sense of historical continuity of the intellectual leaders of New China, and on the tact and skill with which they can successfully connect the best in modern civilization with the best in our own civilization.

For our present purpose the more specific problem is: Where can we find a congenial stock with which we may organically link the thought-systems of modern Europe and America, so that we may further build up our own science and philosophy on the new foundation of an internal assimilation of the old and the new? It is, therefore, no mere task of introducing a few school textbooks on logic. My own surmise of the problem is somewhat like this. Confucianism has long outlived its vitality. The new schools of Sung and Ming rejuvenated the long-dead Confucianism by reading into it two logical methods which never belonged to it. These two methods are: the theory of investigating into the reason in everything for the purpose of extending one's knowledge to the utmost, which is the method of the Sung school; and the theory of intuitive knowledge, which is the method of the school of Wang Yang-ming. While fully recognizing the merits of the philosophy of Wang Yang-ming, I cannot but think that his logical theory is

wholly incompatible with the spirit and procedure of science. The Sung philosophers were right in their interpretation of the doctrine of "investigating into things." But their logical method was rendered fruitless (1) by the lack of an experimental procedure, (2) by its failure to recognize the active and directing rôle played by the mind in the investigating of things, and (3) most unfortunate of all, by its construction of "things" to mean "affairs."

Aside from these two schools, Confucianism is long dead. I am firmly of the opinion that the future of Chinese philosophy depends upon its emancipation from the moralistic and rationalistic fetters of Confucianism. This emancipation cannot be accomplished by any wholesale importation of occidental philosophies alone. It can be achieved only by putting Confucianism back to its proper place; that is, by restoring it to its historical background. Confucianism was once only one of the many rival systems flourishing in Ancient China. The dethronement of Confucianism, therefore, will be assured when it is regarded not as the solitary source of spiritual, moral, and philosophical authority, but merely as one star in a great gallaxy of philosophical luminaries.

In other words, the future of Chinese philosophy would seem to depend much on the revival of those great philosophical schools which once flourished side by side with the school of Confucius in Ancient China. That this need is dimly and semiconsciously perceived by our thinking people, may be seen in the fact that, while the reactionary movement to constitutionally establish Confucianism either as the national religion or as the national system of moral education, is vigorously opposed by all the more thoughtful leaders both in and out of parliament, there is hardly a single periodical of any intellectual influence which has not printed in the last several years articles on the philosophical systems of the non-Confucian schools.

For my own part, I believe that the revival of the non-Confucian schools is absolutely necessary because it is in these schools that we may hope to find the congenial soil in which to transplant the best products of occidental philosophy and science. This is especially true with regard to the problem of methodology.

The emphasis on experience as against dogmatism and rationalism, the highly developed scientific method in all its phases of operation, and the historical or evolutionary view of truth and morality,—these which I consider as the most important contributions of modern philosophy in the Western world, can all find their remote but highly developed precursors in those great non-Confucian schools of the fifth, fourth, and third centuries B. C. It would therefore seem to be the duty of New China to study these long-neglected native systems in the light and with the aid of modern Western philosophy. When the philosophies of Ancient China are re-interpreted in terms of modern philosophy, and when modern philosophy is interpreted in terms of the native systems of China, then, and not until then, can Chinese philosophers and students of philosophy truly feel at ease with the new methods and instrumentalities of speculation and research.

I do not wish to be understood that my advocacy for the revival of the philosophical schools of Ancient China is prompted by a desire to claim for China the honor of *priority* in the discovery of those methods and theories which have hitherto been regarded as exclusively occidental in origin. I am the last man to take pride in priority as such. Mere priority in invention or discovery without subsequent efforts to improve and perfect the original crudities can only be a matter for regret, certainly not for vainglory. When I look at a mariner's compass and think of the marvelous discoveries which the Europeans have made therewith, I cannot but feel a sense of shame to recall the superstitious uses which I myself have seen made of this great invention of ancient Chinese genius.

My interest in the re-discovery of the logical theories and methods of Ancient China, as I have repeatedly said above, is primarily a pedagogical one. I have the strongest desire to make my own people see that these methods of the West are not totally alien to the Chinese mind, and that on the contrary, they are the instruments by means of which and in the light of which much of the lost treasures of Chinese philosophy can be recovered. More important still, I hope that by this comparative study the Chinese student of philosophy may be enabled to criticize these precursory theories and methods in the light of the more modern and more

complete developments, and to understand wherefore the ancient Chinese antecedents have failed to achieve the great results which their modern counterparts have achieved ; to see, for instance, wherefore the theories of natural and social evolution in Ancient China have failed to accomplish the revolutionary effect which the Darwinian theory has produced on modern thought. Furthermore, I hope that such a comparative study may save China from many of the blunders attendant upon an uncritical importation of European philosophy,—blunders such as wastefulness in teaching the old-fashioned textbooks of formal logic in Chinese schools, or the acceptance of Herbert Spencer's political philosophy together with the Darwinian theory of evolution.

Such, then, is my excuse in making the present study of the development of logical method in Ancient China. May this study, which is the first of its kind in any language not excepting the Chinese, serve to introduce to the Western world the great schools of thought in Ancient China!

PART I

The Historical Background

The present essay is an attempt to study the first period of Chinese philosophy with special reference to the development of the *method* of philosophy. The main thesis of this study consists, therefore, of a history of the rise and growth of logic in Ancient China, while the other phases of philosophy such as the theory of morals, politics, and education, are discussed only insofar as they serve to illustrate the practical implications of the theories of logic, and thereby to facilitate our understanding of their historical significance and worth.

The first period of Chinese philosophy (B. C. 600 to 210) which forms the subject of our study, is one of the most important and most glorious epochs in the history of human thought. It was the age of Lao Tze, Confucius, Moh Tih, Mencius, Hui Sze, Kung-Sun Lung, Chuang Tze, Hsun Tze, Han Fei, and many other philosophers of minor importance. Its vigor, its originality, its richness, and its far-reaching significance entitle it to a place in the history of philosophy comparable only with the place occupied by Greek philosophy from the Sophists to the Stoics. As the main body of the present study begins with the logic of Confucius, who lived from B. C. 551 to 479, it seems fitting to give here as an introductory chapter a description of the political, social, and intellectual conditions which prevailed at the opening of this remarkable period of philosophical productivity, and which, in my judgment, were to no small extent responsible for the rise of logic in Ancient China.

I

The great Chow Empire, founded in 1122 B. C., fell in 771 B. C., when the imperial domains were invaded by the Dog Barbarians, and the Emperor, Yu-Wang, was slain by the invaders. The next Emperor, Ping-Wang, fled to the Eastern capital in 770,

thus beginning the Eastern Chow dynasty which lasted until 256 B. C. In the glorious days of the Chow Empire, the Emperor reigned supreme over the several hundred vassal states or principalities into which China was then divided. The Emperor, or "Son of Heaven," was not only the temporal but also the spiritual head of the empire, ruling in the name of Heaven to which he alone was privileged to sacrifice, the vassal lords and their subordinates sacrificing only to the lesser deities. The feudal hierarchy, which comprised the Emperor as liege lord, the five ranks of vassal lords, the Grand Officers, the knights (sze), and the common people, was governed by rules prescribing inter-class and intra-class relations and duties with the minutest detail. This system seems to have worked remarkably well for several centuries. Then it began to decay. The Imperial government, under weak and wicked emperors, gradually declined in prestige and power until it finally succumbed to the barbarian invasion in 771. In the meantime, some of the vassal states had gradually increased both in territory and in prestige by conquering surrounding states and barbarian tribes which were then quite numerous. The Imperial government never recovered the lost authority and potency. In the early years of the Eastern dynasty, as, for instance, in 707, the Emperor was still able to send a punitive expedition against a disobedient vassal state. Such attempts, however, were futile. Several powerful states had arisen to assume the leadership of the states. One of them, the State of Chu, had, in 704, proclaimed itself a "kingdom."

There were alliances of states formed for defensive and aggressive purposes. Most of the important wars of the sixth and fifth centuries were fought between groups or alliances, each under the "presidency" of one leading power. Such wars occurred very frequently. Attempts at international conciliation and disarmament by agreement were made, e. g., in B. C. 546, by the pacifists of the time, but they were without success. It has been estimated that at the beginning of the Chow Empire, there were at least eight hundred vassal states. Many of these states were conquered and their territory annexed by the few great powers. About the end of the fifth century B. C., the numerous states had been reduced to seven powers with a few buffer states subsisting betwixt

them. Six of these seven were finally conquered by the State of Chin towards the last quarter of the third century B. C., the period of "contending states" thus passing into the Empire of Chin.

The numerous wars and frequent transfers of political allegiance had of course tremendous effects on the social and intellectual conditions of the time. They had brought about a gradual breakdown of the feudal hierarchy. The lords of the vanquished states were naturally degraded, while the needs of the time—the wars, the demand for diplomatic talents as well as for domestic statesmanship—elevated many a great talent from lowliness and obscurity. Peasants' sons, and even slaves not infrequently rose to Ministership of State, and a few ministers became so powerful as to overshadow their princes and afterwards actually to replace the ruling houses. Merchants—a class which had long been considered the lowest of all the classes of freemen—too began to play an important rôle in the politics of nations. In short, the rigid class demarcations characteristic of every feudal system were swept away by the rapid political and social upheavals and transformations.

Nowhere can we find more vivid descriptions of the social conditions of the age than in the popular songs and poems that have been edited and preserved to us by Confucius in the *Book of Poetry*. I shall now resort to this remarkable collection for contemporary testimonies of the conditions of social and intellectual life of the time.[1]

The reduction of many a ruling house to conditions of dependence and misery is seen in the following utterances of an officer who had followed his prince into exile after the downfall of his principality:

"Reduced! Reduced!
Why not return?

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[1] The authenticity of this collection of poetry as contemporary testimony of the age is beyond any doubt. One of the strongest proofs often used is the fact that an eclipse of the sun mentioned in one of the poems (Pt. II, Bk. IV, IX), with the specific date and month, has been verified by astronomers as having occurred on August 29, B. C. 776, the very date and month assigned to it in the text.

If it were not for your person, O Prince,
How should we be here in the mire?"
(Pt. I, Bk. III, XI.)

"Fragments and a remnant,
Children of dispersion are we!"
(XII)

The rise of the lowly and unprivileged class to wealth and positions of power is seen in the following complaint:

"The sons of boatmen
Are wrapped in furs of the bear and the grisly bear!
And sons of servitude
Form the officers in public employment!"
(Pt. II, Bk. V, IX.)

Of the misery and suffering attendant upon the frequent wars and expeditions and devastations, the Book of Poetry furnishes a wealth of vivid pictures. Here is a song of a soldier:

"How freely are the wild geese on their wings,
And the rest they find on the bushy yu trees!
But we, ceaseless toilers in the king's service,
Cannot even plant our millet and rice.
What will our parents have to rely on?
O thou distant and azure Heaven!
When shall all this end?"
(Pt. I, Bk. X, VIII.)

Here is another:

"What leaves are not yellow!
What day do we not march!
What man is not wandering,—
Serving in some corner of the kingdom!

"What leaves have not turned purple!
What man is not torn from his wife!
Mercy be on us soldiers:—
Are we not also men?"
(Pt. II, Bk. XII, X.)

And the inequality and the injustice of it all!

"Under the wide heaven,
All is the king's land;
Within the sea-boundaries,
All are his servants.
How unjust are those in power
Who made me toil so, as if I alone were worthy! . . .

"Some enjoy their ease and rest,
And some are worn out in serving the State!
Some lie and loll upon their couches,
And some never cease marching about!"

(Pt. II, Bk. VI, I.)

Glimpses of the economic life of the time may be gathered from the following songs:

"Shoes thinly woven of the dolichos fibre
May be used to walk on the hoarfrost!
And the delicate fingers of women
May be used to make clothes!
Sew the waistband and sew the collar!
And the good man wears them!"

(Pt. I, Bk. IX, I.)

This song is a condensed form of Thomas Hood's "Song of the Shirt." Women were exploited for the profit of the "good man," and labor was so ill-paid that thin dolichos shoes which were fit only for summer wear were used by the poor in frosty winter. Similar conditions prevailed in other parts of the empire:

"In the Eastern States, large or small,
The looms are empty;
And thin shoes of dolichos
Are worn in wintry days."

(Pt. II, Bk. V, IX.)

Here is another picture;

"By the side of the Ke
There is a fox well wrapt in long furs.
My heart is sad
That man has no clothes."

(Pt. I, Bk. V, IX.)

And another :

" The mother-wort of the valley
Is scorched everywhere.
There is a woman left homeless,
Ever flow her tears !
Ever flow her tears !
But of what avail is her lament?"
(Pt. I, Bk. VI, VI.)

And this exquisite plaintive lyric :

" The flowers of the bigonia
Are in glorious yellow,
But my heart is sad
I feel its wound.

" The flowers are now gone ;
There are only the leaves full green.
Ah ! Had I known it would be thus with me,
I had better not have been born.

" Hunger has swollen the ewes' heads ;
Nothing but the reflected stars in the fish-trap.[1]
If some men have aught to eat,
Few can get their fill."
(Pt. II, Bk. VIII, IX.)

II

Such miserable conditions of life could not fail to produce a state of intellectual unrest. In the poetry of the time there is clearly discernible the spirit of criticism, of protest, and even of despair. Listen first to the song of the wood-cutter :

" Kan ! Kan ! So sings my axe on the tan trees.
Here on the river's bank, I'll lay what I hew.

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[1] Cf. the following :
" In the South is the Sieve,
But it is of no use to sift.
In the North is the Ladle,
But it ladles out no liquor."
(Pt. II, Bk. V, IX.)

Ah, how clear the waters flow, and rippling!
You sow not nor reap:
Where do you get the produce of those three hundred farms?
You do not follow the chase:
How do we see the badgers hanging up in your hall?
And you are a gentleman,
And do not eat the bread of idleness!"
(Pt. I, Bk. IX, VIII.)

Other bards are as outspoken if less sarcastic. This, for example:

"Lofty is that southern hill,
With its masses of rocks!
Awe-inspiring are you, O grand Ministers of State
And the people all look at you!
A fire burns in our grieving hearts;
And in earnest are we.
The kingdom is verging to extinction:
Why are you still blind to this state of things?

"You awe-inspiring Ministers of State,
Why are you so unjust?
Heaven is multiplying its afflictions;
The people are grumbling,
And yet you do not correct nor bemoan yourselves!"
(Pt. II, Bk. IV, VII.)

The following indictment is still more outspoken:

"I look up to great Heaven,
But it shows no kindness.
It has long disquieted us,
And now great calamities befall us.
There is no peace in the country,
And the people are in distress.

* *

"Men had their land and farms,
But you have them now.

Men had their people and retainers,
But these you have taken from them.
Here is an innocent man,
But you have imprisoned him.
There is a guilty man,
But you have let him go free.

* * *

" When the people are going away,
The country is sure to go to ruin.'
(Pt. III, Bk. III, X.)

Here is a bard who, disgusted with corrupt government and heavy taxation, was leaving his own State with this bitter farewell :

" Large rats ! Large rats !
Do not eat our millet.
Three years we have tolerated you,
But you have shown no regard for us.
We will leave you,
And go to that happy land—
Happy land ! Happy land !
Where shall we find our peace."
(Pt. I, Bk. IX, VII.)

Others there were, who, in bitter distress and despair, comforted themselves by attributing their fate to the decree of Providence. This, for example :

" I go out at the North gate,
With my heart full of sorrow.
Straitened am I and poor,
And who cares for my distress?
So be it !
Heaven has done it :
Wherefore should I complain?"
(Pt. I, Bk. IV, XV.)

And this :

' The people are now in peril,
In vain they look to Heaven :

All is dark and dumb.
Let its determination be fixed
And there is none whom it will not overcome.
There is the great God—
Does He hate anyone?"
(Pt. II, Bk. IV, VIII.)

Such a fatalistic view as shown in the last two poems inevitably led to various forms of pessimism. We have already heard such pessimistic songs as

"Ah! Had I known it would be thus with me,
I had better not have been born."

Another poet voiced the same sentiment in these words:

"When I was young,
Peacefully did time pass.
But since my youthful days,
All these evils have befallen me.
I would I might sleep, and never wake more!"
(Pt. I, Bk. VI, VII.)

Other pessimists took a more epicurean view of life and offered this counsel:

"You have fine robes,
But you do not wear them.
You have horses and carriages,
But you do not drive them.
You will ere long die,
And others will enjoy them.

* * *

"You have spirits and viands,—
Why not daily play your lute,
To make yourself merry
And to prolong the day?
You will ere long die,
And others will enter your chamber."
(Pt. I, Bk. X, III.)

III

All the songs and poems quoted above were written in the eighth and seventh[1] centuries B. C., and I hope they have served to give a vivid picture of the life and thought of an age of great social upheaval and intellectual unrest. With the dawn of the sixth century B. C., China passed from the age of the Poets to the age of the Sophists. The age of the Poets and the age of the Sophists constituted the era of Enlightenment in Ancient China. The Poets and the Sophists were the precursors of those more systematic thinkers whose philosophies it is the purpose of the present essay to study. Without a preliminary understanding of the period of Enlightenment, the latter systems will appear to have suddenly descended from the heavens—which is of course an impossibility.

I have used the word "Sophists" merely for lack of a better term. The group of Chinese "Sophists" continued, on the one hand, the tradition of the Poets, and, on the other hand, merged into the more or less systematic philosophers as in the case of Lao-Tze. More closely resembling the pessimistic poets whose utterances we have quoted at the end of the preceding section, are the cynics who grew weary of the hopelessly corrupt conditions of society, and "fled the world" to "conceal" themselves as porters, farmers, laborers, or "madmen." Men of this type are frequently mentioned in the works of Confucius and Chuang-Tze. I take two examples from the eighteenth chapter of the *Lun Yu:*

"Chieh-Yü, the 'madman' of Chu, sang as he passed Confucius:

'Phœnix, O Phœnix!
How you have degenerated!
Let alone what you have been:
Think of what you will be!
Cease your toil! Cease your toil!
Peril awaits those now engaged in government.'

Confucius alighted and wished to speak to him. But the 'madman' hastened away" (XVIII, 5).

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[1] The latest poem in the *Book of Poetry* was written before 598 B.C.

The other incident is equally impressive:

"Ch'ang-tsu and Chieh-ni were at work in the field together, when Confucius passed by them and sent Tze-lu to inquire for the ford.

"Ch'ang-tsu said, 'Who is he that holds the reins in the carriage there?' Tze-lu said, 'It is Kung-Chiu.' 'Is it not Kung-Chiu of Lu?' 'Yes,' was the reply to which the other rejoined, 'He ought to have known the ford (since he has wandered about all these years).'

"Tze-lu inquired of Chieh-ni, who said to him, 'Who are you, Sir?' He answered, 'I am Chung-Yu.' 'Are you not a disciple of Kung-Chiu of Lu?' 'I am,' replied Tze-lu, and then Chieh-ni said to him: 'The world is one seething torrent, and who is he that can change it? Were it not better for you to follow a master who flees the world, than a master who merely flees from this man and that man?' With this he went on hoeing" (XVIII, 6).

Passive and resigned as these men may appear to us, they nevertheless represented the spirit of the age: the spirit of criticism and protest. They registered their protest against the deplorable conditions of the time by fleeing from them. And by thus living lives of simplicity and purity and freedom from strife, they tacitly suggested by example what they considered to be the remedy for the evils of the world.

But the name "Sophists" more correctly applies to a group of destructive thinkers or iconoclasts of that age. This group of men resembles more closely those Greek Sophists with whom we have been made familiar through the Platonic Dialogues. Unfortunately these Chinese Sophists, like their Greek counterparts, have left very little of their own writings and we have to depend on secondary sources for our portrayal and exposition of their character and thought.

It seems that during the sixth century there were in many of the States a class of men whose business it was to preach radical views on all matters of society and government and to give to the youths of the time instruction concerning private and public life and conduct, and the art of debating and pleading in courts. It is

probable that this class of men arose as a result of the demand of the age for practical talents in politics, diplomacy, and war. In the native State of Confucius we find such public teachers of immense popularity and influence. When Confucius became Minister of Justice, he put to death a man named Hiao-Cheng Mao. His indictment against him was "that he was capable of gathering about him large crowds of men; that his arguments could easily appeal to the mob and make perversity appear respectable; and that his sophistry was sufficiently recalcitrant to take a stand against the accepted judgments of right" (*Kung Tze Chia Yu*). These were the charges which Plato would probably have desired to prefer against many of the Sophists of his time!

The best known and perhaps the most interesting of the Sophists, however, is Teng Shih, who was put to death by Tze-Tsan, the statesman of Cheng. As the death of Tze-Tsan occurred in 522 B. C., Teng Shih must have flourished about the third quarter of the sixth century.[1] According to the Book of Lieh-Tze, Teng Shih "taught the doctrine of the relativity of right and wrong, and employed inexhaustible arguments" (*Lieh Tze*, VI). He wrote a code of penal law which was afterwards used by the government which had persecuted him. His persecution was caused by his persistent opposition to the government policies of Tze-Tsan. According to the Lü-Sze-Chun-Chiu (XVIII, chap. 4), Tze-Tsan prohibited the practice of hanging up "pamphlets" in public places—a practice which had become so prevalent as to cause disquiet on the part of the government. Teng Shih evaded the law by "delivering" the pamphlets. Thereupon, Tze-Tsan ordered the prohibition of delivering pamphlets, and again the order was evaded by Teng Shih's device to "smuggle" (倚) pamphlets among other articles. "The government ordinances were inexhaustible, but his devices to evade them were equally inexhaustible."

The government was further enraged by the great influence of Teng Shih over the people. He taught the people how to plead for themselves in law-courts; for which legal instruction he exacted

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[1]According to the Tso Chuan, however, the execution of Teng Shih occurred twenty years after Tze-Tsan's death, i. e., in 502 B. C.

pay according to the importance of the suit. Says the *Lü-Sze-Chun-Chiu:* "He could argue a right to be wrong, and a wrong to be right. With him right and wrong had no fixed standard, and 'yea' and 'nay' changed every day. What he wished to win was always won; and whom he desired to punish was always punished."

The Lü-Sze-Chun-Chiu, which is antagonistic to Teng Shih, tells this story of him: "A wealthy man of Teng's native State was drowned in the Wei River (洧), and his body was taken up by a man who demanded of the bereaved family a large sum of money for its redemption. The dead man's family sought Teng's counsel. "Wait," said the Sophist, "no other family will pay for the body." The advice was followed, and the man who held the corpse became anxious and also came to Teng Shih for advice. The Sophist gave the same counsel; "Wait: nowhere else can they obtain the body."

There has come down to us a little work attributed to Teng Shih, but it contains so many commonplace generalizations and inconsistencies that we must regard it as at best a piece of fabrication based on one or two genuine fragments. One fragment which can be reasonably attributed to him is this: "Nature is not kind to man. Government is not kind to the people. Nature is unable to withhold plague and pestilence and preserve those who die therefrom; nor does it always give longevity to those who do good. Therefore I say Nature is unkind to men. The people who commit burglary and practice fraud and deceit are compelled to do so by poverty and destitution. They are nevertheless ruthlessly punished by the government in accordance with the law. Therefore I say governments are unkind to the people." Little wonder that he championed the cause of the people and opposed the government at the price of his own martyrdom.

IV

But the greatest of all the Sophists was Lao-Tze, born about 590 B. C. He was the Protagoras of Ancient China. In him we find the embodiment of the spirit of the Age of Enlightenment. He

was most critical of his age, and his criticism was always destructive and iconoclastic. He was a philosophical nihilist. He held that "All things come from being; and being comes from non-being" (40).[1] This non-being was identified with empty space, as, for example, when he says: "When thirty spokes unite in one nave, the wheel's utility depends on that which is non-existent (i. e., the hole in the nave). When clay is moulded into a vessel, its utility depends on that which is non-existent (i. e., its hollowness)" (11). This non-being is conceived as the beginning of all things: "Before heaven and earth, it was. Alone it stands, and changes not; around it moves, and suffers not; it may be called the Mother of the World" (25).

This exaltation of the Non-being is the basis of his philosophy. By a kind of metaphysical analogy, he conceived of a "State of Nature" as a state of extreme simplicity and natural innocence, as a state of non-activity. Therefore he constructed his utopia as "a small country with few people" where, "though there be ships and carriages, there is no occasion to ride in them; and, though there be armor and weapons, there is no occasion to use them;" where "knotted cords are to be revived (in place of writing);" where the people shall be so content with their food, clothing, dwelling, and customs, that "though there be neighboring States within sight, and the voices of the cocks and dogs thereof be within hearing, yet the people might grow old and die before they ever visited one another" (80).

With such an ideal State in view, Lao-Tze vehemently attacked the existing order of social and political organization. He found them to be foolishly civilized and refined and artificial. "The five colors blind the human eye; the five notes (of music) deafen the human ear; the five tastes spoil the human mouth; racing and hunting madden the human mind; and highly prized treasures degrade human conduct" (12). "When the world knows beauty to be beauty, there is ugliness. When it knows goodness to be goodness, there is evil" (2). In other words, such distinctions as good and evil, right and wrong, beautiful and

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[1] References are to chapter numbers of Lao-Tzé's *Tao Teh King*.

ugly, etc., were the symptom, if not the cause, of the degeneration of the original innocence of mankind. "When naturalness is obliterated, there is 'benevolence' and 'righteousness.' When 'wisdom' and 'knowledge' appear, there is great hypocrisy. When natural relations do not harmonize, there is 'filial piety' and 'parental devotion.' When a nation is in disorder and misrule, there is 'loyalty' and 'allegiance' " (18). Therefore, "Abandon wisdom, put away sagacity. . . . Abandon benevolence, put away justice. . . . Abandon smartness, give up greed . . ." (19).

In short, he advised a return to nature. The way of nature is non-action. "The more restrictions and prohibitions there are in the world, the poorer grow the people. The more inventions and weapons the people have, the more troubled is the State. The more cunning and skill man has, the more startling events will happen. The more laws and mandates are enacted, the more there will be thieves and robbers. Therefore the wise man says: I practice non-action, and the people of themselves reform. I love quietude, and the people of themselves become righteous. I initiate no policy, and the people of themselves become rich. I desire nothing, and the people of themselves become simple" (57). "Diminish, and continue to diminish, until you arrive at the state of non-action. Do nothing, and nothing is not done" (48). That is the way of nature: "Nature does nothing and yet there is nothing that remains undone" (37).

Thus he preaches the philosophy of political non-interference or *laissez-faire*, of anarchism. "The people are difficult to govern, because the governments are meddlesome" (75). "There is always the Master Executioner who kills. To undertake executions for the Master Executioner is like hewing wood for the Master Carpenter. Whoever undertakes to hew wood for the Master Carpenter rarely escapes injuring his own hand" (74). The Master Executioner, of course, is Nature herself.

We have seen that Teng-Shih held that Nature was unkind to man. Lao-Tze, too, repudiated the benevolent and teleological view of Nature. His conception of Nature resembles that of Herbert Spencer. "Nature is not benevolent: it treats all beings as if they were mere grass and dogs." And he adds, by analogy:

"The wise ruler is not benevolent; he treats all people as if they were grass and dogs" (5).[1] This transition from the "stern discipline of nature" to a theory of political *laissez-faire*, is exactly what Herbert Spencer did. Spencer would have readily agreed with Lao-Tze that to undertake executions for the Master Executioner is like hewing wood for the Master Carpenter, with the almost inevitable result of injuring one's own hand, and that therefore "the best (kind of government) is that the existence of which is not even noticed by the people" (17).

V

Let these paragraphs suffice as a picture of the political social, and intellectual conditions on the eve of the birth of logic in Ancient China. We have seen that the rapid change of political allegiance had caused the breakdown of the feudalistic hierarchy; that wars and industrial changes had produced great misery and suffering which resulted in an age of intellectual unrest; that meanwhile there had arisen a demand for practical talents irrespective of the old class distinctions; that this demand naturally carried with it the need of public instruction in military and civil arts, and thereby gave rise to a class of public teachers some of whom were extremely radical in their teachings; that a spirit of criticism was pervading the age, and that the existing social and political institutions and traditional standards of truth and morality were subjected to ruthless criticism and attack; and that the intellectual leaders of the time were either driven to epicurean pessimism and irresponsible retirement, or aroused to a strong opposition to the existing order and violent advocacy of iconoclasm, anarchism, and nihilism.

But even in this seething torrent of intellectual anarchy, there were signs which heralded the arrival of a new age, the age of

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[1] Wang Pih, of the third century A. D. who wrote probably the best commentary on Lao-Tze's work, made this strikingly Spencerian statement: "Nature produces no grass *for* dogs, but dogs eat the grass. Nature produces no dogs *for* men, but men eat the dogs. Nature does nothing for anyone, but everyone seeks to be fit for his own purposes. When that is realized, all is well."

constructive thinking. Philosophy was already in the field, and was busying herself with the conditions and problems of the age. She was in search of the *tao*—a word which has been unnecessarily mystified by amateurish translators but which simply means a way or a method; a way of individual life, of social contact, of public activity and government, etc. In short, philosophy had set out in quest of a way or method of ordering the world, of understanding it and bettering it. And it is the search for the *tao* as I have defined it, which constituted the central problem of all the Chinese philosophers as well as, I believe, of all the great philosophers of the Occident. It was the quest for the *tao* which formed the central problem of Lao-Tze's philosophy. This *tao* he conceived to be non-action and non-being. And accordingly he wished to abolish all the artificial restraints and institutions set up by civilization, and to return to the state of nature.

But destructive and nihilistic as Lao-Tze was, there are in his philosophy certain things which transcend his iconoclasm and nihilism, and which may probably have furnished the foundations on which the later philosophers, especially Confucius, built up their constructive systems. The first of these constructive elements is to be found in his conception of time and change. We have quoted his statement that all things come from being and being comes from non-being. Behind this nihilistic position, there is discernible a conception of change as a continuous process. Consider this passage, for instance; "The world has its beginning which may be called its 'mother.' He who knows the mother and thereby understands her child, and who, having comprehended the child, still keeps to its mother,—he will be in no danger throughout his life" (52). The following is still more explicit: "Trace it (time) and you will not see its beginning. Follow it and you will not see its end. Comprehend the ways of the past, wherewith to master the things of the present, and you will be able to understand early beginnings. That is called the clue to the *tao* (way)" (14). To comprehend the ways of the past and therewith to master the present, may be called the earliest definition of what we now term the historical or genetic method. This conception is elaborated in many other passages. "The world's most difficult undertakings necessarily originate while easy, and

the world's greatest undertakings necessarily originate while small" (63). "A stout tree has originated from a tiny rootlet. A tower of nine stories is raised by accumulating bricks. A thousand-mile journey begins with a foot" (64).

Thus conceived, the complexities of change are no longer incapable of intellectual comprehension and control. "Contemplate a difficulty when it is easy. Manage a great thing when it is small" (63). "Meet things before they exist. Regulate things before disorder begins" (64). "What is still at rest is easily grasped. What has not as yet appeared is easily prevented. What is still feeble is easily broken. What is still scant is easily dispersed" (64).

It is true that Lao-Tze has himself obscured and even distorted this otherwise fruitful conception of change and history by his insistence on the possibility and desirability of abolishing the complex civilization of the present and returning to the original state of natural simplicity and non-activity. Such a conclusion has made his conception of change appear to be not so much one of a continuous unfolding from the "simple" and the "small" to the "complex" and "difficult" as one of a cyclic process capable of periodic reversals to the original and primitive conditions. But this conception—as we shall see later, probably influenced Confucius and formed a part of his constructive system.

The other constructive element in Lao-Tze's philosophy consists in his somewhat fragmentary theory of knowledge. Consistent with his nihilism, he seems to have held at times that knowledge and wisdom resulting from accumulated learning are of no avail so far as the true Way is concerned. True knowledge is attained only when one has so simplified or "diminished" his desires and wants as to have arrived at the goal of naturalness and non-assertion (48). When that state of perfection is attained, true knowledge comes of itself. Thus he said:

"The world may be known
Without ever crossing one's gate.
Nor need one peep through the window
In order Nature's course to contemplate.

The farther one goes
The less one knows.

Therefore, the holy man traveled not,
And yet to him knowledge came.
He saw not the things with his eyes
And yet each he knew by name."

Incidentally it may be pointed out that such a conception of knowledge well illustrates the tendency of the age to exalt the individual mind. The question how such *a priori* knowledge is possible seems to find a vague answer in the following passage:

"The nature of *tao*
Is vague and eluding.
Vague and eluding,
There is in it the form. ("*hsiang*," idea or image)
Eluding and vague

There is in it the thing itself.
Deep and obscure,
There is in it the essence.
The essence is ever true:
In it is reality.

From of yore until to-day,
Its name ever remains,
Wherewith (for us) to judge all beginnings.
How do I know the form? (狀, or, according to another reading, the nature 然)
Through It. (i. e., the name) (21).

"Vague and eluding" though this passage may appear, it undoubtedly contains a recognition of the significance of the name in knowing. This recognition is also seen in another passage: "The *tao* is ever nameless. . . . When institutions began, names arose. Names having arisen, the people would know where to stop. Knowing where to stop enables them to avoid perils" (32). Here Lao-Tze seems to have perceived the wonderful possibility of names, not only as a means through which to know "all beginnings," but also as instruments for the ordering of social life.

Unfortunately this conception of names, like that of change, was made untruthful by Lao-Tze's emphasis on the superiority of the natural state of "namelessness." All names, all distinctions are unnatural and therefore degrading. "How little difference is there between the 'yea' and the 'yes'? How little does 'good' differ from 'bad'?" (20). "When the world knows beauty to be beauty, there is ugliness. When it knows goodness to be goodness, there is evil" (2). Hence his iconoclasm.

But the fact that names were discussed at all is the best proof that thought had passed beyond the undisciplined stage and was entering upon the stage wherein it is to subject itself to examination and reflection. The age of Sophistry was fading into the age of Logic. The emancipation of the human mind during the Enlightenment had paved the way for an era of more constructive thinking, and the seething torrent of destructive criticism as exemplified in the teachings of Teng-Shih and Lao-Tze, had necessitated and hastened the rise of Logic.

PART II

The Confucian Logic

Biographical Note

Confucius was born in 551 B. C. in the State of Lu. According to traditional record, he visited Lao-Tze in 518 B. C., and for a time studied under him. In 504, he was Minister of the Interior in his native State. In 502 he was made Minister of Justice. From 500 to 498, he was Acting Minister of State. His policy having been obstructed by strong opposition, he left the country in 498, and traveled from State to State for a period of thirteen years. Returning to his native country in 484, he began his great work of editing the poetical, historical, and religious literature of the empire. He also wrote several appendices to the *Book of Change*, and completed a history of his own State known as the *Chun Chiu*. He died in 479 at the age of seventy-two.

He was essentially a statesman and reformer. It was only after bitter opposition had thwarted his opportunity for constructive reforms that he resolved to consecrate his life to the education of the youth of his time. As a public teacher he exercised a tremendous influence in many States. It has been recorded that 3000 pupils enrolled in his school. There may be some exaggeration in this estimate, but the length of his teaching career and the wide extent of his traveling must have helped to extend his influence throughout the empire.

Of himself he has left us these few modest characterizations: "Living on coarse rice and water, with bent arm for pillow, mirth may yet be mine. Ill-gotten wealth and honors are to me a wandering cloud" (*Lun Yu*, VII, 15). "I murmur not against Heaven, nor grumble against men. Learning from the lowest, I cleave the heights" (XIV, 37). He was "a man so eager that he forgets to eat, whose cares are lost in triumph, unmindful of approaching age" (VII, 18). And a contemporary of his paid him this fine tribute: He was "the man who knows it is vain, yet cannot forbear to stir" (XIV, 41).

Chapter I

The Problem of Confucius

The age of Confucius, as we have seen in the preceding chapter, was an age of political disintegration, social unrest, and intellectual anarchy. Above all, it was an age of moral disorder. "The whole world is one seething torrent"—so said one of his contemporaries. "The world is out of order" (*Wu Tao*) was the most prevalent characterization of the time. Mencius who flourished in the latter half of the fourth century B. C., described the age of Confucius in these words: "The world had fallen into decay, and truth had faded away. Perverse doctrines and violent deeds had arisen. There were instances of ministers murdering their sovereigns and of sons murdering their fathers. Confucius was afraid" (Mencius, Bk. III, Pt. II, IX, 7). Indeed during a period of 234 years (B. C. 719–485), no less than thirty-six cases of regicide were recorded in the *Chun Chiu*.

It was natural that the central problem of Confucius should be the reform of society. The task of philosophy was conceived as that of social and political regeneration. He, too, was in quest of the *tao*, of the way of ordering the world! Confucius was deeply impressed by the anarchical condition of the thought of his time, and was driven to the conclusion that the moral degradation of society was the result of the intellectual disorder which had been undermining society for centuries. Ever since the Chou Emperor ceased to be the spiritual as well as the political leader of the empire, there had been lacking a central authority for the standardization of the beliefs and rites and duties of all classes within the empire. "When order prevails in the world," said Confucius, "rules of conduct, music, and punitive expeditions proceed from the Son of Heaven. When the world is out of order, rules of conduct, music, and punitive expeditions proceed from the feudal princes. When these things proceed from the feudal princes, rarely can the empire maintain itself more than ten generations. When they proceed from the grand officers of a feudal State, rarely can that State last more than five generations. When even

the subsidiary servants of the grand officers grasp the orders of the State, rarely can it last more than three generations. When order prevails in the world, government will not be in the hands of the grand officers. When order prevails in the world, there will be no discussions among the people" (*Lun Yu*, XVI. 2).

This passage clearly shows his attitude towards the spiritual and the intellectual disorder of his age, when rules of conduct, music, and punitive expeditions no longer proceeded from the Son of Heaven, when government was often in the hands of the grand officers, and when private opinions among the common people were rife. It is to this lack of some central authority for the intellectual organization of the empire that Confucius seems to have attributed the moral perversity and degradation of his age.

"That ministers murder their sovereigns and sons murder their fathers," said Confucius, "has not come about in a day or a night. The process has been a gradual one, and the present evils are due to a lack of timely detection and rectification. The *Book of Change* says: 'Walking on frost, one sees the approaching ice.' Which means that there is a natural sequence of events" (*Book of Change*, Appendix to the *Kuen Kwa*, 2). In other words, the cause of the moral and political disorder lies deeper than such unnatural acts as regicide and parricide themselves. There has been a long and gradual process of intellectual disorganization, decadence of beliefs and convictions, and relaxation of duties and relations.

I quote the following passage from the *Lun Yu* as the best statement of the problem of Confucianism:

> "Confucius was asked by a disciple what he would first undertake were he to govern a State. The Master answered: 'It must needs be the rectifying of names.' 'Indeed,' said the bewildered disciple, 'that is far-fetched, sir! Why rectify them?' 'Yú,' said Confucius, addressing the disciple by name, 'thou art uncultivated. A gentleman should show a cautious reserve in regard to what he does not know. If names be incorrect, speech will not follow its natural sequence. If speech does not follow its natural sequence, nothing can be established. If nothing can be established, no rules of conduct or music will prevail. Where rules of conduct and

> music do not prevail, law and punishments will not be just. When law and punishments are not just, the people will not know where to place their hands and feet. Therefore, a superior man requires that names must be capable of being spoken, and that what is spoken must be capable of being put into practice. A superior man is never careless of words'" (*Lun Yu*, XIII, 2).

In thus conceiving "rectification of names" as the heart of the problem of social and political reformation, Confucius may be said to have conceived the problem of philosophy as essentially one of intellectual reorganization.

This somewhat brief summary cannot be fully understood without collateral illustrations which I now propose to supply. "If," said Confucius, "names be incorrect, speech will not follow its natural sequence. And if speech follow not its natural sequence, nothing can be established." This statement will become clear if we study the following passages in which Confucius discusses the importance of the correctness of names.

Confucius said: "The *ku* (a vessel with corners used for sacrificial purposes) no longer has corners (*ku*). What a *ku!* What a *ku!*" (VI, 23). To say "a cornerless vessel is a *ku* (a vessel with corners)" is to make a proposition which does not follow the natural sequence. Or, to take another example: When asked by an influential minister of his native State about the art of government, Confucius said: "To rule (*cheng*) is to set straight (*cheng*). If you give an upright lead, sir, who will dare walk crooked?" (XII, 17).[1] Here the word 政 (government) comes from the word 正 (right, to set aright). A government is that which sets people straight. To say that the present governments which have long forgotten their duty and are no longer capable of performing it, are "governments," is another example of making a judgment which does not follow the natural sequence of terms.

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[1] Compare the following passages: "An upright ruler is obeyed before he commands: even commands go unheeded where the ruler himself is crooked" (XIII, 6). "What is government to him who can govern himself? Who cannot rule himself, how should he rule others?" (XIII, 13). "He who governs by means of his own virtue is like the north star which holds its place and the multitude of stars revolve about it" (II, 1).

Now, this state of affairs where our activities, duties, relations, and institutions no longer mean what their names indicate, is no less than a state of intellectual confusion and anarchy. For in such a state of conditions, what ground of certainty and validity have we in our daily discourse and judgment of truth and falsehood, right and wrong? If a round and cornerless vessel may be called a *ku*, what right have we in holding that a square is not a circle? If a group of immoral and corrupt courtesans, "so many pecks and hampers," as Confucius characterized them,[1] may be styled a "government" which was to set people straight, then who can repudiate those sophists "who will argue a right to be wrong and a wrong to be right"?

That, I think, is what Confucius meant by saying that "if speech follow not its natural sequence, nothing can be established." And he goes on to say, "if nothing can be established, no rules of conduct or music (which was considered an integral part of moral and religious life) can prevail." That is to say, where there is no intellectual certainty and order, there can be no morality and harmonious living. Consider the following passage:

> "When Duke Ching, of Chi, asked Confucius about the art of government, the latter said: 'Let the prince be prince; let the minister be minister; let the father be father; and let the son be son.' 'Good!' said the Duke. 'If, indeed, the prince be not prince, the minister not minister, the father not father, and the son not son, then, though I have my revenue, can I enjoy it?'" (*Lun Yu*, XII, 11).

This conversation well illustrates what Confucius considered the inseparable connection between intellectual disorder and moral perversity, between the failure to "rectify the names" and the impossibility to establish moral laws and harmony of life. For the inevitable result of a state of intellectual disorganization is the breakdown of all rights and duties, the obliteration of all relationships and obligations proper to the various strata or classes of

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[1] After discussing the various classes of people, Confucius was asked by a disciple, "Of what sort are those who now engage in government?" The Master said, "Pooh! There are so many pecks and hampers,—not worth being taken into account" (*Lun Yu*, XIII, 20).

society and the State. That there are so many instances of such unnatural crimes as regicide and parricide is precisely because the princes neither are themselves princely nor are they regarded as princes; because the ministers not only fail to perform their ministerial duties faithfully, but also forget the allegiance and loyalty which they owe to their rulers; because fathers are no longer the moral and spiritual heads of their families; and because sons have forgotten the filial piety and obedience proper to their *status* in the family. When these duties and relationships have fallen into oblivion, then the *li* or rules which prescribe the conduct proper to every stratum of the social hierarchy will lose their force and authority as effective guides of individual and social conduct.

How, then, can the world be rescued from its present state of moral perversity and political disorder, and be "restored to righteousness?" Confucius answered: By rectifying names. From what has been said above, one can readily see that the "rectification of names" is no more task for the grammarian or the lexicographer. It is, as I have said, a task of intellectual reorganization. Its object is, first, to make the names stand for what they ought to stand for, and then to so reorganize the social and political relations and institutions as to make them what their names indicate they ought to be. The rectification of names thus consists in making the real relationships and duties and institutions conform as far as possible to their *ideal* meanings which, however obscured and neglected they may now have become, can still be re-discovered and re-established by proper study and, literally "judicious" use of the names.[1] When this intellectual reorganization is at last effected, the ideal social order will come as night follows day,—a social order where, just as a circle is a circle and a square a square, so every prince is princely, every official is faithful, every father is fatherly, and every child is filially pious; where law is law, where prohibition actually prohibits, and where rewards and punishments are meted out in just proportion to actual deserts. In short, the logical outcome of such a rectification, as Confucius conceived it, would be an ideal society in which every member of

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[1] See below, chapter V.

the community would faithfully discharge the duty proper to his or her "calling" or status. Or, to use Confucius's own words:

"When the father is father, the son is son, the elder brother is elder brother, the husband is husband, and the wife is wife,—then the family is in proper order. When all families are in proper order, all will be right with the world." (App. to the *Kwa* judgment of the *kwa* of Family.)

Such, then, is the problem of Confucianism. The problem is one of rectification of names without which "nothing can be established" and "the people will not know where to put hand and foot." This is the problem which we must constantly bear in mind in studying the logic of Confucius.[1]

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[1] For this formulation of the problem of Confucius, I take pleasure in acknowledging my indebtedness to Professor L. Levy-Bruhl's clear and suggestive account of the philosophy of Auguste Comte with whose positivism Confucius had much in common. I here quote a few sentences from Professor Levy-Bruhl's *The Philosophy of Auguste Comte:* "Institutions, Comte says, depend on morals, and morals, in their turn, depend on beliefs. Every scheme of new institutions will therefore be useless so long as morals have not been 'reorganized,' and so long as to reach this end, a general system of opinions has not been founded, which are accepted by all minds as true, as was, for instance, the system of Catholic dogma in Europe in the Middle Ages" (p. 4). "The confused disturbing movements which fill it (contemporary society) with trouble and agitation and which, unless rational harmony be at last established, threaten its destruction, are not due merely to political causes. They proceed from moral disorder. And this in turn proceeds from intellectual disorder, that is to say, from a lack of principles common to all minds, and from the absence of universally admitted conceptions and beliefs" (pp. 25, 26). "Either modern society must perish, or minds must regain their stable equilibrium by submission to common principles" (p. 27). "The problem thus presents itself to Comte: To establish by rational means system of universally accepted truths, concerning man, society, and the world" (p. 25).

Chapter II

The Book of Change

"As he stood by a stream, Confucius said: 'Ah! that which is passing is just like this—never ceasing day or night'" (*Lun Yu*, IX, 16).

I

It has been said that the Platonic logic originated as a reaction against the Heraclitean doctrine of change; that, impressed by the all-pervasiveness of change, Plato sought and found stability in the changeless "ideas." It is significant that the book which, in my opinion, contains most of the basic doctrines of the Confucian logic is known as the *Yi*, or *Book of Change*.

The *Book of Change*, one of the "Five Classics" of Confucianism, in its present form, is a work made up of separate parts written by different authors at different times. At the time of Confucius, it was used as a divination book. Tradition tells us that Confucius spent so much time in studying this book that the leathern strips which bound together the boards of his bamboo volume were thrice worn out before he at last declared himself to have understood its contents.

The nucleus of this book consists of a set of sixty-four figures known as *kwas*. A *kwa* is a lineal figure made of three or six whole or divided lines. A three-line *kwa* has been translated as a trigram; a six-line *kwa*, a hexagram. There are only eight trigrams. By doubling and variously combining them, sixty-four hexagrams are obtained. (See Charts I and II.)

I. The 8 Primary Kwas.



1. Heaven
2. Earth
3. Thunder
4. Mountain
5. Fire
6. Water
7. Water in motion
8. Wind; wood

II. The 64 Kwas in the order in which they now appear in the Book of Change.



It is highly probable, as some scholars have maintained, that these figures were originally the word-signs of a now extinct language which was used in Ancient China before the invention of the ideographic language. The eight trigrams were probably letters of the alphabet representing eight primary elements or

forms, and the sixty-four hexagrams were the derivative words formed by compounding the trigrams. One of the most plausible proofs employed in support of this theory is that the sixth *kwa* ☵ (water) has practically the same form as its ideographic equivalent 水.

However that may be, these sixty-four *kwas* were later used as signs for the purpose of divination. And it was as a sacred book of divination that Confucius found the *Book of Change*. According to traditional scholarship, the book as Confucius found it was divided into sixty-four chapters under the sixty-four hexagrams. Each chapter contains (1) a proposition or "judgment" on the *kwa*, and (2) six separate propositions or "judgments" on each of the six lines (*hsiao*) of the *kwa*. The *kwa*-judgment is always an observation on the character or quality of the *kwa* which is determined by the quality of its component trigrams. The *hsiao*-judgment states the quality of the line which is determined by its wholeness or dividedness and by its positional relation to the other lines of the *kwa*.

The *Book of Change* in its present form, however, contains in addition what have been called the "Ten Wings" or "Ten Appendices" which traditional scholarship attributes to Confucius. These Appendices are:

1. Sixty-four explanatory notes on the sixty-four *kwa*-judgments: Part I.
2. Same: Part II.
3. Sixty-four explanations of the *hsiangs* or "ideas" of the *kwas*.
4. Three hundred eighty-four explanatory notes on the three hundred eighty-four *hsiao*-judgments.
5. "Appended Remarks" on the book as a whole. (Quoted in this essay as "App. I," being the first App. traditionally separated from the main body of the work.) Part I.
6. Same: Part II.
7. Remarks on the first two *kwas*.
8. Remarks on some of the *kwas*.
9. On the order of the sixty-four *kwas*.
10. Miscellaneous remarks.

It is impossible for a modern student to attribute all the ten appendices to Confucius. It seems safe to hold that 1, 2, 3, and 4 were written by Confucius himself. 5 and 6, though not free from frequent interpolations, form on the whole an invaluable collection of many undoubtedly genuine views of the Master, some of which were probably of his own writing, while others were recorded, in all probability, by his disciples. Appendix 7 probably contains a few genuine sayings of Confucius, together with very stupid interpolations.[1] 9 is a later addition, but apparently by a masterly hand. 8 and 10 are undoubtedly works of inferior interpolators.[2]

The present study of the Confucian Logic is based on these appendices (especially on Appendices 3, 5, and 6), with collaborations and illustrations from the collection of Confucian sayings known as the *Lun Yu*, or "Analects," and from other works such as the *Chung Yung*, or "Doctrine of the Mean," and the *Chun Chiu*. The *Book of Change*, though ranked high among the Confucian Classics and long received with awe and reverence, has unfortunately been little understood by the traditional school of commentators, partly because of the difficulty of the original text itself, but largely because of the occultism and the moralisticism which for centuries have prepossessed the minds of the critics and obscured the meaning of the book. In the present essay an effort is made, for the first time in the history of the interpretation of the *Book of Change*, to break away almost completely from the traditional, occult, and moralistic views, and to interpret the Confucian Appendices either as logical theories or as discussions having a bearing on the problem of logic. For the correctness or incorrectness of this interpretation, the present writer holds himself entirely responsible.

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[1] E.g., its first paragraph was apparently taken from the *Tso Chuan*, in which it was mentioned by Mo-Chiang fifteen years before Confucius was born.

[2] I have accepted here the critical views of Ou-Yang Shiu, of the Sung Dynasty, whose work, *Yi Tung Tze Wen*, was perhaps the best and most courageous work of "Higher Criticism" on the *Book of Change* that traditional scholarship has ever produced.

II

In the *Book of Change*, Confucius found a symbolic representation of the complexities of change in the universe. We have seen that his one-time teacher, Lao Tze, had already hit upon the idea that change is a continuous process from the simple and small to the complex and great, and is therefore within our comprehension and control. Said Lao Tze: "Contemplate a difficulty when it is easy; manage a great thing when it is small." "Comprehend the ways of the past wherewith to master the things of the present." This is precisely the lesson which Confucius drew from his study of the *Book of Change*.

"In the *Book of Change*," said Confucius, "there is the Grand Terminus (—), which generates the Primeval Pair (— and --). The Primeval Pair produces the Four Forms (⚌, ⚍, ⚎, ⚏), from which are derived the Eight *Kwas*. The Eight *Kwas* (may be used to) determine all good and evil, and therefrom arises the great complexity of life" (App. I, Pt. I, 11). That the great complexity of change can be symbolically represented by a set of figures which in turn can further be reduced to the elemental line (—), is a fact which seems to have deeply impressed Confucius in the same way as numbers impressed the Pythagoreans and Platonists. Herein is found a perfect system by means of which all change in the universe can be brought under our examination and understanding.

All change, Confucius held, arises from motion, which is produced by the pushing of that which is active against that which is passive (App. I, Pt. I, 1,2,6; Pt. II, 1). The principle of activity is represented by the whole line (—) and is called the *chien;* the principle of passivity is represented by the divided line (--), and is called the *kuen*. The former is also called "the easy" and the latter "the simple." "Surely the *chien* (—) shows us ease and the *kuen* (--) shows us simplicity" (App. I, Pt. II, 1). "In ease and simplicity is obtained the principle of the universe!" (Pt. I, 1). "Are not the *chien* and the *kuen* the gateway to all change?" (Pt. II, 6). It is from the "simple" and the "easy" that all the complexity and multiplicity of life and change have arisen. Consequently the complexity and the multi-

plicity can be understood through that which is easy and simple. "In all conduct and affairs, the most perilous is always known from that which is easy. . . . In all conduct and affairs, that which is confronted with the greatest obstacles is always known from the simplest" (Pt. II, 12).

Lao-Tze, as we have seen, carried this idea too far by insisting on the non-existent as still superior to the simple and easy, and on the possibility and desirability of returning to the truly original state of non-action. Confucius was a positivist and contented himself with the simple and easy as the starting-point. In his political thinking, he was not free from the influence of his Master's doctrine of non-assertion as the ideal government. This influence is seen in many of his eulogies of "government by non-assertion." (*Lun Yu*, II, 1; VIII, 18 and 19; XV, 4; cf. XVII, 19.) But Confucius seems to have held that that ideal can be realized not by means of iconoclasm and non-interference, but only by a vigorous process of intellectual reorganization. He did not entertain any imaginary theories of the State of Nature, nor did he advocate a return to it. He conceived of human history as a continuous process of gradual development from crude ways of living to complex forms of civilization; from cave-dwelling and hunting and fishing to the advanced stages of agriculture and commerce, of political and military arts; from knotted cords to written records. (App. I, Pt. II, 2.) And because this development is a continuous one, originating in the simple and easy forms and ending in complexity, it is therefore necessary, in order to understand the complicated and confused institutions and activities of the present, to begin with a study of the earlier and simpler forms of the past. Hence the Confucian emphasis on the importance of historical studies, of "making manifest what has gone before and thereby understanding what is to come" (App. I, Pt. II, 6). "He who familiarizes himself with the old and thereby understands the new, is fit to be a teacher" (*Lun Yu*, II, 11; cf. *Chung Yung*, XXII).[1]

[1] This philosophy of history has greatly influenced the development of the historical sciences in China, so much so that many histories are entitled "Mirrors," implying that, recording the past, they enable us to understand the present.

Here, then, we have the first step toward the intellectual reorganization of society. It consists in going back to the simple and easy for the understanding of the complex and difficult. It may be characterized as the quest for the *ki* or "embryonal." The *ki* or "embryonal" is "the minutest beginning of an activity or that which first appears in a good or evil.". . . "He who knows the *ki* is indeed god-like!" (App. I, Pt. II, 5).[1] And to be thus god-like is the ambition of the statesman and reformer.

This conception of change as capable of being understood and controlled if reduced to its simple and easy forms, is an idea which underlies the whole philosophy of Confucius. We have seen in Chapter I that he conceived of the "rectification of names" as the necessary basis for the moral and political reformation of society. Names are conceived as so important, because in them alone are to be found the *ki* or embryonal of all our things, activities, and institutions. All our activities, utensils, and institutions, according to the Confucian logic, have originated in the *hsiang* or "ideas"; and these "ideas" cannot be discovered and understood except through the names by which our activities, utensils, and institutions are now known. We shall now study the Confucian doctrine of "ideas" as the embryonal beginnings of our utensils and institutions.

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[1] I have translated the word *ki* (幾) by "the embryonal" because the word comes from 幺 (minutest), which is the plural of 𢆶. The last word represents an embryo. The orthodox texts all omit the words "or evil" (凶), but I have followed the text extant at the time of Kung Yin Ta, of the Tang Dynasty

Chapter III

The Hsiang or "Ideas"

The most important logical doctrine in the *Book of Change* is the doctrine of the *hsiang*. The word *hsiang* 象 or 象 has a very interesting history. It originally means an elephant. Han Fei (d. 233 B. C.) gives this account of the derivative meaning of the word: "Few people have seen a living elephant (because it is produced only in the 'southern barbarian' countries) though they possess the bones (ivory) of dead ones. They only imagine its living shape from pictorial representations of it. Therefore all that men conceive in imagination is called *hsiang*" (Han Fei Tze, XX). A *hsiang* is, then, an image or "idea" which one forms of a thing. In the *Book of Change*, the word *hsiang* is used in two slightly different senses. In the first sense, a *hsiang* is simply a phenomenon noted or perceived in nature. Thus we read of the "*hsiang* of the heavens." (App. I, Pt. I, 11, and Pt. II, 9.) In the second sense, a *hsiang* is an idea or notion capable of being represented by some symbol or being realized in some activity or "utensil."

It is in the second sense that the word *hsiang* is most generally employed in the *Book of Change*. The sixty-four *kwas* represent as many or more *hsiangs*. ䷿ is a *kwa*, but it represents the idea (*hsiang*) of "triumph" or "success" suggested by the overcoming of fire (☲) by water (☵). Reverse the order, and we have ䷾ representing the idea of "defeat" or "failure." Similarly, all the other *kwas* symbolize such ideas as "humility" (䷎ showing a mountain lower than the earth's surface); "preparedness" (䷏ showing thunder coming forth from underneath the earth, suggesting the idea of sudden emergency); "rest" (䷳ showing thunder under a river); "infancy" (䷃ showing water at the foot of a mountain, suggesting the idea of a waterhead); and so on. Most of the *hsiangs* have their derivative or "borrowed" ideas: e. g., ☰ represents Heaven; its hexagrammatic form ䷀ symbolizes activity, and it has also such derivative meanings as king, father, etc.

Whence have arisen these "ideas"? They have originated in the minds of the wise men of antiquity to whom "the heavens revealed the meaning of the natural phenomena (*hsiang* in the first sense) of which they formed the ideas (*hsiang*)." (App. I, Pt. I, 11.) "When Pao Hsi ruled over the Empire, he observed the phenomena of the heavens above and the forms on earth below; he noted the manner of birds and beasts and the products of the soil; and, receiving suggestions both inwardly from his own self and externally from distant objects, he first invented the eight *kwas*, in order to penetrate into the mysteries of nature and to describe the reality of all things" (App. I, Pt. II, 2). "The sages have thereby made manifest the complexity of the universe, and represent its various forms and symbolize the characteristics thereof. Therefore they have called them the *hsiangs*" (App. I, Pt. I, 8 and 12). "The sages have created the *hsiangs* in order to represent what they conceived (or meant)" (Pt. I, 12).

Thus it was from the phenomena of nature that the Confucian "ideas" took their origin. The wise men of antiquity, at the suggestion of these phenomena, conceived in their minds the "ideas" and legislated them, as it were, into such symbolized forms as the *kwas* or the names for the representation of the multitudinous complexity of the universe.[1]

It is, however, not merely as "meanings" of such symbols as *kwas* or words, that the "ideas" are considered of supreme importance in the logic of Confucius. The "ideas" are the ideal forms which the ancient sages conceived and which they sought to

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[1] This interpretation is not only warranted by the passages quoted above from the *Book of Change*, but is also corroborated by the statements of Tung Chung-Shu, of the Han Dynasty, who represented the "Chun Chiu School" which was the only school that continued the logical tradition of early Confucianism. I quote a few sentences from his works: "The wise men of antiquity cried out ($hsiao^3$) in imitation ($hsiao_3$) of Heaven and Earth, thus giving rise to the generic names (hao, formerly pronounced $hsiao_3$). They shouted ($ming_1$) in issuing forth commands ($ming_3$), thus giving rise to specific names ($ming_1$). A name is a shouting command; a generic name is a cry in imitation of nature. . . . A name is that by means of which the sages express the ideas (meaning) of Heaven" (*Chun Chiu Fan Lü*, XXXV). (The indices indicate the "upper" tones, and the subscripts, the "lower" tones of the Chinese words.)

embody in activities, utensils, and institutions. In this manner the ideas may be said to have given rise to all human works, inventions, and institutions. They were, to use an Aristotelian term, their "formal causes." Thus we read: "When conceived, they are called 'ideas.' When materially embodied, they are called 'utensils.' When instituted for general use, they are called laws. When wrought into the everyday life of all the people, they are called the works of the gods" (Pt. I, 11). This view is also implied in another passage: "What manifest themselves above are called the ways (of nature). What are embodied on earth below are called 'utensils.' . . . When brought to the people and practiced on them, they are called 'works'" (Pt. I, 12).

Thus it is the ideas which have been responsible for the creation or invention of our utensils and institutions. The history of civilization, according to Confucius, has been a long series of successive attempts to realize the "ideas" or perfect heavenly ideals into human instruments, customs, and institutions. Some of Confucius' explanations of the beginning of human institutions are extremely interesting, if not entirely true from the anthropological point of view. The invention of the plowshare, for example, which marked the beginning of agriculture, is held to have been suggested by the idea of increase or growth represented by ☴ (wood) over ☳ (thunder; hence motion). The institution of a midday market for the exchange of wares and goods among the people, is said to have originated in the idea of friction represented by ☲ (fire; hence lightning) and ☳ (thunder). Transportation by domesticated beasts of burden, it is held, was suggested by the idea of rest represented by ☳ (thunder) underneath ☵ (river). The invention of canoes and oars is said to have originated in the idea of floating symbolized by ☴ (wind or wood) over ☵ (water). The custom of burying the dead in coffins and tombs was probably taken from the idea of submergence or deluge represented by ☴ (wood) under ☵ (river). Still more ingenious, if a little too complicated and far-fetched, are the explanations of the invention of the pestle and mortar and of written records. The mortar-and-pestle invention is said to have originated in a notion (*hsiao kuo*) which is represented by ☳ (thunder) over

☶☶ (mountain), that is, motion set a-going on something which is itself immovable. The invention of written records to take the place of "knotted cords" was probably taken from the idea of rainfall represented by ☵☵ (river) over ☰☰ (heaven), which suggests the notion of reaching a vast area and number from above. (App. I, Pt. II, 2.)[1]

The same view pervades the whole of the Confucian Appendices. All the "*hsiang*-remarks" (Appendix III) separately appended to the sixty-four *kwas*, are illustrations of the doctrine that our mechanical inventions, religious rites, moral codes, traditional customs, etc., have had their "formal causes" in the ideas. Thus we read: "Heaven moves on actively: that is Ch'ien ䷀. The superior man therefore sought to perfect himself without cessation." "A spring flows out from the mountains: that is *Mung* (Infancy) ䷃. A superior man thereupon sought to mature his action and improve his virtue." "There is water beneath the earth's surface: that is *Sze* (Multitude) ䷆. A superior man thereupon sought to gather people around him and nourish them." "There is water on the earth's surface; that is *Pi* (Attachment or Adherence) ䷇. The ancient kings thereupon created the thousands of vassal states and cultivated the friendship of the (feudal) lords." "Earth above mountain: that is *Chien* (Humbleness and Humility) ䷎. A superior man thereupon sought to protect those who had and to increase (the property of) those who had not; to weigh things justly as if in a balance and to administer justice accordingly." "There is water on the mountain top: that is *Kien* (Obstacles, Difficulty) ䷦. The superior man thereupon reflected within himself and endeavored to improve his own character." "There is water overflowing the river: that suggests *Kieh* (Temperance or Control) ䷻. The superior man thereupon instituted weights and measurements and judged (the people's) character and behavior."

Many more of such passages can be cited. But I hope the above quotations will suffice to make clear what is meant by the

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[1] See Legge's translation of the whole chapter in "Sacred Books of the East," Vol. XVI, pp. 382–385.

doctrine that all human activities, all our institutions and inventions, have originated in the *hsiang* or "ideas." Behind all the fantastic imaginings, behind all its almost occult appearances, we must not fail to recognize the practical and humanistic ideal which animates the whole Confucian philosophy. That ideal is the same as the Baconian ideal of understanding the secrets of nature for the advancement and perfection of the human race. As the Baconian philosophy culminates in the doctrine of "forms," so Confucianism, I believe, centers around the doctrine of *hsiang* or "ideas." The quest for the *hsiang* or "ideas" is a quest for what Bacon called the "nature-engendering-nature (natura naturans)," if not of things in general, at least of those things of man's own creation—that is, of human activities, utensils, and institutions. But the parallel ends here, for the Confucian conception of what the "ideas" really are resembles more the Aristotelian than the Baconian conception of "forms." The "ideas" are the "formal causes" of things and institutions. Man saw wood floating on water and invented ships; he saw rain flowing down from the heavens, and conceived the idea of reaching multitude and posterity, and thereupon invented written records to take the place of knotted cords. "He looks at a wilderness, but even as he looks, beholds a garden."[1] And it is this "idea" of a garden which determines what the wilderness is to become. In this sense, the formal cause *is* the final as well as the efficient cause.

Confucius was perhaps nearest to Bacon, and therefore to physical science, when he treated all change as originating from motion caused by the pushing of that which is active against that which is passive. But he was too deeply interested in human institutions and relations to fully develop this scientific aspect of his system. He assumed, however, that it was from the natural phenomena (*hsiang*) of change that the "ideas" (*hsiang*) had arisen, which "ideas" in their turn became the formal causes of human inventions and institutions. In this, Confucius seems to have been in accord with the prevailing tendency of his time, the tendency to deprecate the artificial and to exalt the natural. Lao Tze had advocated the abolition of all

[1] E. J. E. Woodbridge: *The Purpose of History*, p. 89.

institutions of civilization on the ground that they are artificial and unnatural. Confucius, too, was an admirer of "the ways of nature," and of "government by non-assertion." But he was also a practical reformer and statesman. Accordingly, he sought to reconcile the "naturalism" of his contemporaries with his historical view of institutions. This he did by attributing to all human utensils and institutions a natural origin, and by imputing all the present moral and political disorder to their gradual deviation from the natural, original meaning and purpose. *The natural was the ideal*, and the task of the reformer-statesman was to rediscover the ideal as the criterion for the rectification of the now degenerated forms.

The doctrine of ideas, as stated for the first time in the preceding pages, was of great importance in that it furnishes the basis for the Confucian doctrine of names which we have already discussed in Chapter I. In the *Book of Change*, the "ideas" are symbolized in trigrammatic and hexagrammatic figures or *kwas*, which, as we have noted, were probably the word-signs of a now extinct language. The modern equivalent of the *kwa* is the name or word.[1] The names are regarded as of supreme importance and their rectification is deemed a necessary preliminary to social and political reforms, because they are the symbols *par excellence* of the ideas, because in them alone are the ideas still traceable and recoverable. And to rectify the names thus means to make the names mean what they ought to mean in the light of the source-ideas which they embody. Names are "correct" when their meaning is in accordance with their original ideas; and when names are correct, speech will then "follow its natural sequence." Until then, "nothing can be established."[2]

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1 See Shu Shen's preface to his great dictionary (the *Shuoh Wen*). It is almost needless to point out that all "words" (字), not only nouns and pronouns, but all "parts of speech" are "names" (名). Cheng Kang-chen, the greatest Confucian commentator of the Han Dynasty, said: "What the ancients called 'names,' we now call 'words.'"

2 For the relation of the doctrine of "ideas" to the names, read App. I, Pt. II, 6—which chapter I have refrained from translating because of the numerous difficulties of the text.

Chapter IV

The Tsi or Judgment

Besides the doctrine of "ideas," the *Book of Change* contains another important theory of logic, namely, the theory of judgment. In our study of the judgment, two preliminary considerations must be borne in mind. First, a Chinese proposition or judgment differs from its occidental counterpart in that the copula, which has played so important a rôle in occidental logic, is omitted in the Chinese proposition, its place being indicated only by a short pause. Thus, "Socrates is a man," becomes "Socrates, man." Structurally, a proposition or judgment is, to use words of Hsun Tze (whose system of logic we shall take up later) "a combination of different names (words) in order to discourse about an idea" (Hsun Tze, XX). "Fire burns," "Plato wrote the *Symposium*," "It will probably snow to-morrow," etc., are equally legitimate forms of judgment: they are equally "combinations of words to discourse about a fact." All the mystic halo that has grown up around the copula in occidental logic is thus eliminated.[1]

The second preliminary consideration is of still greater importance, because it touches upon the nature of judgment. The Chinese word *tsi* (辭) is a compound of 爵 (to set in order) and 辛 (crime), and originally means a "judgment" or a "sentence" pronounced by a judge. Some of the judgments in the *Book of Change* are even called "decisions" (*Tuan*, 彖).[2] Literally a

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[1] Cf. Hobbes: "But there are, or certainly may be, some nations that have no word which answers to our verb *is*, who nevertheless form propositions by the position only of one name after another, as if instead of *man is a living creature*, it should be said, *man a living creature*; for the very order of the names may sufficiently show their connection; and they are as apt and useful in philosophy as if they were copulated by the verb *is*" (Elements of Philosophy, Pt. I, Ch. III, 2). Cf. also J. S. Mill's *Logic*, Bk. I, Chap. IV, 1.

[2] 彖 is a compound of 㕣 (pig's head) + 豕 (pig), originally meaning "pig's walking." In the *Book of Change*, the 彖 is defined as 才 (*tsai*) which was originally synonymous and is now still symphonious with 㢟 (*tsai*) "to cut" and 裁 (*tsai*) "to cut off," which is precisely the derivation of the English word "decide" (from L. *decidere*). The 彖 (*tuan*), said Liu Shien (劉獻), is a decision (*tuan* 斷).

judgment is, therefore, that which judges of and decides on something. For this reason, I shall in what follows, use the term "judgment" rather than "proposition."

In the *Book of Change*, there are two kinds of judgments: (1) the *tuan* (彖) or the "*kwa*-judgment," and (2) the *hsiao-tse* (爻辭) or the "*hsiao*-judgment." The former "discourses about the idea (*hsiang*)" of the *kwa;* the latter "discourses about its moments of change" (App. I, Pt. I, 3.) (A). In the original ancient text, as I have mentioned, there are sixty-four *kwa-judgments* on as many *kwas*. For example, the judgment on the *kwa* of Humility (䷎) reads: "Humility implies success; the superior man will end well." The judgment on the *kwa* of Preparedness (䷏) is: "Preparedness befits such activities as creating (feudal) States and conducting military expeditions." The judgment of Sympathy (䷬, showing river flowing down the mountains) is: "Sympathy succeeds and favors that which is right: it is propitious for marriage."

(B). Of the *hsiao*-judgments there are 384, the number of *hsiaos* or lines or moments. The following are a few examples. The fifth line of the *kwa* of Perseverance (䷟), which is a passive line occupying the position of mastery, has this judgment: "Its virtue is constancy. Good for women, bad for men." The last line of the *kwa* of Triumph (䷡) which represents the consummation of success, reads: "The head is under water: there is peril." The fifth line of the *kwa* of Humility (䷎), which symbolizes a "humble" character in the position of a king, reads: "Not to enrich oneself at the expense of one's neighbors. Good for punitive expeditions. Always successful."

"*The Book of Change*," says Confucius, "contains the *hsiangs*[1] (ideas) in order to reveal things. And judgments are appended thereto, in order to tell things" (App. I, Pt. I, 11). A *kwa* is a symbol for an idea which "reveals" itself to the competent observer, but in order to "tell" something about it, to discourse about it, judgments are necessary. "The sages created the *hsiangs* in order to represent what they conceived (or meant). . .

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[1] The modern text reads "four *hsiangs*," which I believe to be an error. "Four *hsiangs*" would be meaningless in the context.

And they appended judgments thereto, in order to express what they wished to say" (App. I, Pt. I, 12). What, then, does a judgment tell? "That which distinguishes the order of superiority and inferiority[1] is to be found in the *kwa*. That which tells what is good and what is evil is to be found in the Tsi or judgment. . . . Therefore, in the *kwa* are found (the distinctions of) superiority and inferiority; and in the judgment are found (statements of) difficulty and facility. Every judgment points out whither it (the *kwa* or the *hsiao*) is tending" (App. I, Pt. I, 3).

In these words we find a definition (a functional one) of the judgment. "A judgment points out whither something is tending": it "tells what is good and what is evil." Take our first example of *kwa*-judgment: "Humility implies success: a superior man will end well." Here the judgment "Humility implies success" (or literally, "Humility succeeds") tells something about "humility": it indicates to what it will lead: it shows its relation to something else. It tells whither humility is tending. Or, let us take a *hsiao*-judgment for further illustration. The first *hsiao* of the *kwa* Humility (䷎) has this judgment: "Primary six (i. e., the bottom broken line) indicates an ever humble superior man and is good for crossing great streams." This line is a bottom line of passive quality (--), thus representing humility at its humblest. But neither the line itself nor its name ("primary six") tells us anything about its relations and tendencies. A judgment is needed to tell us what it exhibits and what it is good for.

Thus, while a *kwa* expresses an "idea" statically, and a *hsiao* expresses a stage of it also statically, the judgment may be said to tell the movement (動) or activity of the *hsiangs* and the *hsiaos* by showing their tendencies and relations. It is in this sense that judgments are regarded by Confucius as capable of telling what is good and what is evil. (App. I, Pt. I, 3, 8, and 12.) Says Confucius: "All good and all evil, and all that calls forth remorse and regret,—are produced by movement or activity" (Pt. II, 1); and "good and evil are terms describing the right and wrong of movements or activities" (Pt. I, 3). Just because all good and evil

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[1] That is, universality and particularity.

depend upon the right and wrong performance of activity, judgments that indicate the relations and tendencies of human activities are therefore useful tools to insure their right and successful performance. They enable us to make inferences and guide our course of action. Thus Confucius said: "That which contains all the complexities of the universe is to be found in the *kwas. That which inspires* (literally, "drums on") *the activities of the world is to be found in the judgments*" (App. I, Pt. II, 12; cf. 8).

Thus the value of judgments is essentially practical. They tell whither things are tending, point to what is good and what is evil, and thereby "inspire the activities of the world." At any rate, such is the value of the type of judgment contained in the *Book of Change*. Confucius said: "Therefore, when a gentleman is about to do something or to go somewhere, he seeks advice therefrom (i. e., from the judgments in the *Book of Change*). He receives responses as promptly as an echo follows a sound. Whatever be the problem, remote or immediate, intricate or profound, he will thereby be enabled to know what will probably happen" (App. I, Pt. I, 10).

Such, then, is the type of judgment contained in the *Book of Change*. They are to be the rules of conduct. They very much resemble what have been called "judgments of practice":[1] judgments of what is to be done. We may be reminded that the type of judgment which Confucius was considering is that which properly belongs to a book of divination: it is the object of a book of divination to tell people what to do. But we must also remember that to an ancient but by no means superstitious people, a divination book of the nature of the *Book of Change* served exactly the same purpose as a book of scientific laws in our own age. A modern work on, say, medicine, contains exactly the type of judgment which the *Book of Change* contains. It tells the reader how to observe the symptoms of various diseases, how to

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[1] There are, for example, propositions of the form: M. N. should do thus and so; it is better, wiser, more prudent, right, advisable, opportune, expedient, etc., to act thus and so. And this is the type of judgment I denote practical." Dewey, *Experimental Logic*, p. 335.

prevent or cure them, etc. So the *Book of Change, according to its own light,* tells him about the tendencies and probable results of his activities in order that he may pursue the right, and avoid the wrong, course. The difference between the age of Confucius and the age of Wilhelm Ostwald and Karl Pearson is not that the latter is able to get along without the assistance of rules of what to do, but that its rules of conduct are principles founded on exact knowledge and verified by scientific experiment, whereas those of the ancients were merely formulations of folk-wisdom and *a priori* thought. Thus Confucius gives this account of the origin of the judgments in the *Book of Change:* "The wise men, therefore, purified their minds, retired to privacy, and experienced (mentally) with the people all good and evil. God-like, they foresaw the future; sagacious, they took in the past . . . therefore they understood the ways of nature and comprehended the affairs of mankind. And they created that wonderful thing (the *Book of Change*) in anticipation of its use by the people" (Pt. I, 11). It is, therefore, this rationalistic and *a priori* conception of the origin of the judgments, rather than the type of the judgments themselves, which differentiates the *Book of Change* from a modern book of scientific laws.[1]

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[1] That the Confucian conception of judgment was not confined to the type of judgment appropriate only in a book of divination, will be seen when we take up the problem of the ratification of judgments in Chapter VI.

Chapter V

The Rectification of Names and Judgments

Our study of the logic of Confucius started out with the doctrine of the rectification of names as the central problem of Confucianism. In the *Book of Change* we also read: "So to manage wealth and rectify speech (*tsi*, judgments) as to prohibit the people from doing evil, is righteousness" (App. I, Pt. II, 1). We have also pointed out that the final aim of the rectification of names is to reëstablish on earth the ideal relations of society, to make every prince a prince, every minister a minister, every father a father, and every son a son. We shall now study the way in which Confucius proposed to execute the task of rectifying the names and judgments.

I

A modern reader will have probably remarked that the dictum "So to manage wealth and rectify judgments as to prohibit the people from doing evil" contains the essence of a philosophy of law, and the ends which that doctrine proposes to achieve are in reality the ends of what we now call "legislation." While this interpretation is not incorrect in that the Confucian logic later actually furnished a distant basis for the logic of the Jurist or Legalist School,[1] it is necessary to point out here that certain peculiar features in the social organization of the time of Confucius precluded him from propounding a legal philosophy, and turned him to seek the application of his doctrine in a different direction.

The age of Confucius was still under the influence of certain principles characteristic of feudalism. Society was divided, generally speaking, into two classes: the "gentlemen" or "superior men" and the "little men": a "privileged" class and an unprivileged class. "Privileged" is here used in its etymological sense. Only the plain people, the retainers, the tenants, the serfs,

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[1] See Part IV, Chapter V.

etc., were governed by laws: they constituted the unprivileged class. The lords, the officers, and the knights[1] composed the privileged class, that is, the class exempt from the laws. This latter class was governed not by law codes but by what was called the *li*, or "rites." The *li* is a body of positive rules of propriety—a "code of honor,"—by which the "gentlemen" regulated their own conduct, while the legal codes which provided for the five kinds of penalties with their "three thousand" degrees were applicable only to the masses.[2] This dualistic morality, this division of society into the "superior men" to be governed by a code of honor alone, and the "little men" or the masses to be governed by the fear of punishments, had made the idea of "government by law" highly undesirable because highly unrespectable. Confucius never thought of the law as an effective instrument of reforms. "If the people be led by laws and their conduct regulated by punishments," says he, "they may try to avoid the penalties but have no sense of shame. Lead them by virtue and standardize them by the rules of propriety, and they will have a sense of shame and, moreover, will become good" (*Lun Yu*, II, 3). But Confucius was aware of the impossibility of a "crownless sage" like himself establishing a universal code of rules of propriety in an age when the empire was divided into hundreds of States with the Central Empire sunk into hopeless impotency. And he frankly admitted that such rules of propriety as should govern the empire ought to proceed from the "Son of Heaven," that is, from the Emperor. (*Lun Yu*, XVI, 2.)

By what means, then, did Confucius seek to "rectify the names,"—a task which he considered so necessary to moral and political reformation? The answer is: *By using the written words and judgments so judiciously and so judicially as to imply moral*

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[1] By the time of Confucius, the "knights" were no longer exclusively a military class. There had arisen a class of *civil* knights, not unsimilar, though much superior in numbers, to that existing in Great Britain which includes Sir Rabindranath Tagore as well as Sir John French.

[2] In the *Li Ki* (Book I) we read: "The *li* are not applicable to the masses, while the legal penalties are not to be imposed on the gentlemen." Cf. also *Hsun Tze*, Chapter X, where it is stated that the classes from the knights upward are to be regulated by the *li* and the arts, while the masses should be governed by the laws.

judgment, to approve and condemn as the laws of a State ought to approve and condemn. This notion must appear to an Occidental reader to be rather fanciful and untenable. But it is an idea which has had tremendous influence upon Chinese thought, and especially upon the development of historical sciences in China. It is an idea which Confucius sought to embody in a work known as the *Chun Chiu.*

II

The *Chun Chiu* ("Spring and Autumn") is a chronicle of the State of Lu, covering a period of 242 years (B. C. 722–480). At the first glance, it appears to be the driest chronicle that has ever been written. We read, for example:

> "Duke the Reverent, Year 10, Spring, First Month of the Imperial Calendar, the Duke defeated the army of Chi in Chong So.
>
> Second Month, the Duke invaded the State of Sung."

But we know from early and reliable sources that the *Chun Chiu* has a deeper significance than its apparent dryness would indicate. Thus Mencius said:

> "The world had fallen into decay, and right principles had dwindled away. Perverse doctrines and violent deeds had arisen. There were ministers murdering their rulers, and sons murdering their fathers. Confucius was afraid, and wrote the *Chun Chiu*" (Mencius, III, Pt. II, IX, 8).

Again:

> "Confucius completed the *Chun Chiu*, and rebellious ministers and villainous sons were struck with terror" (Ibid. IX, 11).

And says the Epilogue to Kung Yang's *Commentary:*

> "Wherefore did the sage make the *Chun Chiu?* To reform the corrupt age and restore it to rightness, there is no instrument that approaches in effectiveness the *Chun Chiu.*"[1]

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[1] See also Sze-Ma Chien's *Epilogue* to his *Historical Records,* and also Tung Chung Shu's *Chun Chiu Fan Lu.*

Let us now examine a few of the characteristics which are supposed to have made the *Chun Chiu* a work that "struck rebellious ministers and villainous sons with terror" and that purports to "reform a corrupt age and restore it to rightness." I. That the *Chun Chiu* is more than a mere chronology of dates and events and that it has a logical import, will be seen in a most famous entry together with the interpretations made by the three greatest commentators of the early Confucian School. The original entry reads:

> "Year 16 (of Duke Hsi) in Spring, First Month of the Imperial Calendar, the first day of the moon, there fell stones (i. e., meteors) in Sung,—five of them. In the same month, six fishhawks flew backwards past the capital of Sung."

The *Tso Commentary* remarks that the "stones" were "stars" (meteors) and that the backward flying of the six hawks was caused by an unusually strong wind. Here is Kung Yang's comment: "How is it that the text first says 'there fell' and then 'stones'? 'There fell stones' is a record of what was *heard*. There was first heard something falling. On examining what had fallen, it was found to be stones. Further inquiry showed that there were five of them. . . . Why does the text say 'six' first and then 'fishhawks'? 'Six fishhawks flew backwards' is a record of what was *seen*. There were first seen six somethings. On examination they were found to be fishhawks. On more careful and leisurely examination they were seen to be flying backwards." The *Kuh Liang Commentary* is equally interesting: "Why does the text first say 'there fell' and then 'stones'? There was (seen) the falling and then the stones. 'In Sung' means within the boundaries of that State. The number *following after* indicates that the stones were scattered about and could not be seen together from any one place. The wording refers to the realm of the ear. In 'six fishhawks flying backwards past the capital of Sung,' the number is put first, indicating that (the birds) were seen *together*. The wording refers to the realm of the eye. . . . The superior man is never careless in regard to anything. The recording even of stones and fishhawks being so exact, how much more so will it be in regard to men! Therefore, if words be not so used as they are here used in describing the five stones and six fishhawks, the royal way will never be exhibited."

It is this fine, exact, judicious use of the written word which constitutes the first characteristic of the *Chun Chiu*. Its linguistic importance is obvious: it affects the language both favorably and unfavorably, for while it emphasizes careful and exact usage, it tends to a mechanical and pedantic view of literature. Its logical significance is twofold: first, to make the language exact means an improvement of an instrument of logic; and second, as the last sentences in the quotation from Kuh Liang clearly indicate, this linguistic exactness is an integral part of the logical philosophy of Confucius.

II. The events in the *Chun Chiu* are not merely recorded with linguistic exactitude, but at the same time ethical judgments are pronounced upon them. The judgments are implied in the wording itself. There are, for example, thirty-six cases of rulers being murdered by their heirs, ministers, or subjects. Note the different ways of recording some of these regicides:

(*a*) "Year 4 (of Duke Yin of Lu), the third month, Chou-Shu, of the State of Wei, murdered (*shi*) his Prince, Wuen."

(*b*) "In the ninth month, the people of Wei killed (*sa*) Chou-Shu (who had through the above-recorded regicide become the ruler of Wei) in Poh (a town in the neighboring State of Chen)."

(*c*) "Year one (of Duke Wen) in the winter in the tenth month, on Ting-Wei Day, Shang-Chen, Heir Apparent of Tsu, murdered (*shi*) his ruler, Chuen."

(*d*) "Year 18 (of Duke Wen) in the winter, (the State of) Chu murdered (*shi*) its ruler, Shu-Chi."

(*e*) "Year 18 (of Duke Chen) in the first month of the Imperial Calendar, on Kan-Shen Day, (the State of) Tsin murdered (*shi*) its ruler, Chou-Pu."

(*f*) "Year 2 (of Duke Hsuen) in the ninth month, on Yih-Chin Day, Chao-Tuen, of Tsin, murdered (*shi*) his ruler, Yi-Kao."

Of these six cases, (*b*) uses the verb *sa*, "to kill," because the murdered ruler was himself a murderer and usurper. The other

five entries use the verb *shi*, "to kill a person higher in rank." In (*a*), (*c*), and (*f*), the murderers are mentioned by name in order to specify the responsibility for the crime. In (*c*) the title "heir apparent" is mentioned in order to emphasize the extraordinary unnaturalness of a crime which is a parricide as well as a regicide. In (*f*), the real murderer, we are told by detailed records, was not Chao Tuen, but his nephew, Chao Chuan; and the crime was here imputed to the former as a sign of disapproval because as Prime Minister of the State he failed to bring his nephew to justice. In (*b*), "the people of Wei" are the agents, because the slain prince deserved the death; Chou Shu was not mentioned as "their ruler" because he was not a legitimate prince; and the place of death—"in Poh"—was mentioned because the people of Wei were so impotent in punishing the murderous usurper as to require the help of a neighboring State. In (*d*) and (*e*), the murder, though committed by specifiable ministers, is imputed to the States of Chu and Tsin respectively in order to show that the penalty of death was really what these peoples desired to impose on the two obnoxious rulers.

This attempt to imply ethical judgment in what appear to be merely "notices" of historical events, is probably the most characteristic feature of the *Chun Chiu* in its original form. Unfortunately, the work as we possess it to-day is probably not entirely the original text. In its present form, it contains numerous inconsistencies with regard to its ethical judgments. Such inconsistencies are probably due to later modifications (whose we know not) made necessary by the antagonism of those powerful "houses" in the State of Lu. One of the strongest arguments in support of this theory is the fact that most of the inconsistencies are concerned with events that happened within Confucius' native State.

III. Consistent with the two foregoing principles, the *Chun Chiu* seeks to embody the author's political ideal of a perfect feudal hierarchy once more under the supremacy of the Emperor of Chou. Thus every year in the *Chun Chiu* opens with the phrase "In the Spring, in the first month of the Imperial Calendar," the calendar being one of the reminders of the once universally acknowl-

edged authority over the entire realm. Moreover, although many of the States had acquired territories far vaster than the Imperial Domain, and although some of them, like those of Tsu and Wu, had long assumed the title of "kingdom," they were mentioned in the *Chun Chiu* always by the original titles given them by the emperor in the early days of feudalism. Thus the King of Tsu is always "Earl of Tsu," and the King of Wu always "Earl of Wu," while the ruler of a weak and small State like Sung is always known as the "Duke of Sung." And as Confucius believed that "when right prevails in the world, rules of propriety and music and punitive expeditions proceed from the emperor" (*Lun Yu*, XVI, 2), so he registered his disapproval and condemnation of the wars then being carried on by one State against another, by recording them in the *Chun Chiu* as "invasions" and "aggressions." Only those wars led by princes whose leadership had received at least the nominal sanction of the Emperor, were recorded as "punitive expeditions."

Thus by its peculiar methods,—(1) its exact use of language, (2) its implicit ethical judgments, and (3) its distinction of social status,—the *Chun Chiu* is said to have been intended by Confucius to embody his doctrine of "rectifying names and judgments" and "to reform a corrupt age and restore it to rightness." That he was unsuccessful in realizing this original purpose, history has shown us. But this is a story which does not properly belong to our present dissertation. My object in bringing in the *Chun Chiu* is to illustrate the motive which underlies the logical doctrines contained in the *Book of Change*. That motive was a practical one: "to reform a corrupt age and restore it to rightness." The key to the solution of this problem Confucius believed to be in an intellectual reorganization of society by means of "names" and "judgments." Words are to express the "ideas" or "ideals" (what things ought to be) from which the real things and institutions have deplorably deviated, and which they should always seek to approximate. Propositions are to be truly "judgments" which should be so judicious and judicial as to "inspire the activities of the world" and "prohibit the people from doing evil."

PART III

The Logic of Moh Tih and His School

BOOK I

INTRODUCTORY

I

Of the philosophical literature of the period extending from the death of Confucius (478 B. C.) to the last quarter of the fourth century B. C., very little reliable source-material has been preserved to us. There is, to be sure, a large amount of literature traditionally attributed to the several leading disciples of Confucius and to their followers. But probably no student trained in textual and "higher" criticism will dare to accept such material as genuinely belonging to the period to which it has been generally ascribed. That is a question which does not much concern us here, for however trustworthy or dubious such material may be, it contains little or nothing which throws any light on the development of the method of philosophy of the age. The exceptions to this statement are the Commentaries on the *Chun Chiu*, by Kung Yang and Kuoh Liang, both disciples of Tze Hsia, and the *Ta Hsuoh* and the *Chung Yung*, generally attributed to the disciple of Tsan Tze, a disciple of Confucius. But even these works contribute little to a history of ancient Chinese logic. The Kung Yang and Kuoh Liang commentaries can only serve as illustrations of the Confucian doctrine of rectification of names which has already been discussed in Part II of this essay. The *Ta Hsuoh* and the *Chung Yung* are important, not because of their own merits, but because of the part they played many centuries later in furnishing a method or methods for the new "Confucian" philosophies of Sung and Ming.

Of the non-Confucian schools of this period, too, little source-material has come down to us. The works entitled *An Tze Chun Chiu* and *Lieh Tze* can certainly not be assigned to this period.

The Seventh Book of the *Lieh Tze* probably contains a fairly trustworthy account of the "Epicurean" ethics of the School of Yang Chu. But none of these works is of any value for our present purpose.

The only work of real importance—though it, too, is not free from later interpolations—is a collection of fifty-three books under the title of *Moh Tze*, that is, the teachings of Moh Tih. None of these fifty-three books, it seems to me, was actually written by Moh Tih himself. The major portion of this work, Books 8–26 and 28–30, consists of records, probably written by the early Mohists, of the essential doctrines of Moh Tih. Books 38, 39, and 40 contain his occasional sayings and conversations and anecdotes, most if not all of which can be accepted as records by the early Mohist school. Books 43–53, dealing with the arts of fortification and city defense, can probably also be so regarded. Books 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 27, 31, 41, and 42 are later compilations based on certain fragmentary sayings and anecdotes. Books 32–37, which will be studied in detail in subsequent chapters of this essay, are here accepted as the works of the later or new Mohist School. Books 1 and 2 contain nothing but moralist platitudes decidedly more Confucian than Mohistic.

We cannot here take up the details of textual and higher criticism of this remarkable collection. Nor can we consider here the problem of the synoptic books, namely, Books 8–10, 11–13, 14–16, 17–19, 23–25, 28–30, which were written in the form of trilogies with verbal variations and much overlapping and repetition—a problem resembling in many respects that of the synoptic Gospels in the New Testament. Suffice it to say that this collection was long ignored by the hostile Confucian scholars, and consequently suffered many textual corruptions. During the last 140 years, however, the general movement to revive ancient learning has brought this work to the attention of scholars, and, since the publication of Pih Yuan's edition with commentaries in 1784, it has had the benefit of many great textual critics like Chang Hui-yen, Wang Lien-sun, Wang Yin-tze, Yü Yueh, and Sun Yi-yong. Mr. Sun Yi-yong's 1907 edition of the work, embodying all the previous notes and commentaries together with his own, is still the best edition available.

II

Moh Tih, perhaps one of the greatest souls China has ever produced, has never had a biographer until the twentieth century. Sze-Ma Chien, the great historian, gave him a vague notice of only twenty-four words in his "Records of a Historian."[1] In his 1907 edition of the *Moh Tze*, Sun Yi-yong wrote a short biography of Moh Tih[2] based entirely on contemporary testimony, documentary records, and the internal evidences found in the *Moh Tze*. According to Mr. Sun, Moh Tih was probably born during the reign of King Ting (or King Chin Ting, B. C. 468–441), and died in the last years of King An (B. C. 401–376). Mr. Sun held that Moh Tih probably died after 381 B. C., because the death of the famous general Wu Chi which occurred in that year was mentioned in Book I of the *Moh Tze*.

These dates seem to be disputable. In the first place, the three books on which Mr. Sun based his theory, namely, Books 1, 27, and 41, in all probability are either later compilations or contain obvious interpolations. Moreover, the death of General Wu Chi was also mentioned in the *Lü Sze Chun Chiu* (Book XIX, ch. 3) in connection with an incident which directly contradicts Mr. Sun's theory. There we are told that in the year of Wu Chi's death, Mang Shen, head or "Elder Master" (*chu tze*)[3] of the Mohists, together with 185 of his disciples, perished in a city which he had been intrusted to defend. Before his death, Mang Shen sent two envoys to another Mohist named Tien Shiang Tze, and conferred on him the office of "Elder Mastership" of the Mohists. From this we infer that by 381 B. C. "Mohism" had already become an organized and recognized institution and the system of "apostolic succession" had been in vogue. All this could not have been accomplished during the lifetime of its founder. The logical conclusion would be that Moh Tih had been dead long before 381 B. C.

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[1] Generally translated "Historical Records."

[2] Vol. VIII, pp. 1–20.

[3] See below, 3 of this chapter.

Furthermore, we learn from the *Tan Kung*[1] that Kung-Shu Pan, the famous mechanician, whose meeting with Moh Tih is sufficiently attested, was present at the funeral of the mother of Ki Kang Tze. We know that Ki Kang Tze died in 468 B. C., and his father died in 492 B. C.[2] The death of the mother probably occurred somewhere between these two dates, say, 480 B. C. This would mean that Kung-Shu Pan who was old enough to offer his new mechanical device for her burial, was probably born at least twenty years before, that is, about 500 B. C. His contemporary, Moh Tih, was probably born about the same time.

Thus we may conclude that Moh Tih lived approximately between 500 and 420 B. C. He was a native of the State of Lu, that is, he was a compatriot of Confucius. Consequently, he was brought into contact with the Confucian School which, after the death of Confucius, was then spreading over the several States. According to some sources, he actually studied in the Confucian schools.

He became dissatisfied with the ritualism and formalism of the Confucians who were busily engaged in the task of codifying the traditional customs, rites, and moral laws into an elaborate system of rules regulating every human relationship and every phase of human conduct. He was of a highly religious temperament and was disgusted with the early Confucians who accepted the ancient institution of ancestral worship, and devised extravagant rituals for funeral and burial, but who were mostly atheists, and at best agnostics.[3] Nor could he accept the Confucian doctrine of determinism, which held that "life and death are pre-determined, and wealth and honors are in the hands of Providence."[4] Above all he rebelled against their attitudinarianism which refused to consider the practical consequences of beliefs, theories, and institutions.[5]

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[1] That is, Book II of the *Li Ki*.

[2] *Tso's Commentary* on the *Chun Chiu*, years 3 and 27 of Duke Ai.

[3] Confucius himself was an agnostic. See *Lun Yü*, XI, 11.

[4] *Lun Yü*, XII, 5.

[5] For Moh Tih's criticism of the Confucians, see *Moh Tze*, ch. 40, 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 14, 15. The chapter (31) entitled "Criticism on the Yü" (i. e., the Confucians), is spurious.

So he founded a new school, the only school in Ancient China which enjoyed the distinction of being called by the name of its founder, namely, "Mohism." For in the Chinese language even Confucianism has never been called "Confucianism" but "Yu" (儒). As a system of thought, Mohism has much in common with Utilitarianism and Pragmatism. (This we shall presently discuss in the chapters following.)

But Moh Tih was more than a philosopher. He was the founder of a religion. Indeed he was the only Chinese who can truly be said to have founded a religion. For Taoism was never founded by Lao Tze, nor was Confucianism as a religion founded by Confucius. But Mohism was once a religion of great vitality and wide following. As a religion, Mohism repudiates determinism and holds that the salvation of the individual depends on his own efforts to do good. It believes in the existence of spirits and ghosts who possess intelligence and power to reward and punish men according to their deserts. It has as its basic tenet the doctrine of the Will of Heaven which is: "Love all." This doctrine of universal altruism is a repudiation of the Confucian principle of a gradation of love decreasing with the remoteness of relationship.

One of the most remarkable features of Mohism is its asceticism. Its followers lived a simple life, wearing coarse clothing, encouraging hard labor, practicing self-denial, prohibiting singing and music, and abolishing all rituals for burial and mourning.

As a religion based on the doctrine of "Love all," Mohism condemned the institution of war. The following story told in numerous sources best portrays the spirit of Mohism and the character of its founder. Kung-Shu Pan, the State Engineer of Chu, had just completed his new invention of a "cloud ladder" for besieging walled cities, and the King of Chu was planning an invasion into the State of Sung. When Moh Tih learned of this, he started out from his native State and traveled ten days and ten nights all on foot, arriving at the capital city with sun-burnt face and battered feet. There he secured an interview with the State Engineer whom he succeeded in convincing that his cause was wrong and condemnable. He was then presented to the King who was finally persuaded that it was neither right nor profitable to carry

on an offensive campaign for the purpose of testing a newly invented siege machine. "Before I met you," said the State Engineer, "I had wanted to conquer the State of Sung. But since I have seen you, I would not have it even if it were given me without resistance but with no just cause." To this Moh Tih replied: "If so, then it is as if I had already given you the State of Sung. Do persist in your righteous course, and I will give you the whole world."[1]

Perhaps no tribute to Moh Tih can be more reliable than those paid to him by his severe critics. Mencius, who once condemned the teaching of Moh Tih as leading men to the ways of birds and beasts, said: "Moh Tih loved all men, and would gladly wear out his whole being from head to heel for the benefit of mankind."[2] Another critic, Chuang Tze, said: "The life of the Mohists is toilsome and their death ritual is too simple. Their way is too primitive. It makes men sad and sorrowful. It is difficult to practice. . . . It is against human nature and man cannot stand it. Though Moh Tze himself could bear it, how about the world? . . . But Moh Tze was certainly a glory (literally, "a beauty") to the world! What he could not attain he would never cease to seek, even though he be in privation and destitution. Ah, what a genius he was!"[3]

III

Mohism seems to have had a very wide following for almost two centuries (430–230 B. C.). Han Fei (?–233 B. C.) tells us that the great schools of learning of the time were the Yü (i. e., the Confucians) and the Mohists.[4] The *Lü Sze Chun Chiu*, written under the patronage of Lü Poh-wei (?–235 B. C.), says that the followers of Confucius and Moh Tih were found in every part of the empire.[5] In an appendix to his edition of the *Moh Tze*, Sung Yi-yong gives a list of Mohists whose names were found in the various books of that period. In this list there are fifteen disciples

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[1] Ch. 41: 23.

[2] *Mencius*, Bk. VII, Pt. I, 26.

[3] *Chuang Tze*, Epilogue.

[4] *Han Fei Tze*, ch. 50.

[5] Book II, ch 4.

of Moh Tih, three Mohists of the third generation, one of the fourth generation, and thirteen other Mohists whose lineage is no longer traceable.[1]

According to Han Fei, the School of Moh Tih after his death was divided into three separate branches: The School of Shiang Li, the School of Shiang Fu, and the School of Teng Lin.[2] The development of Mohism seems to have taken two different directions. On the one hand, it developed a kind of religious organization with a recognized head known as the "Elder Master" (*chu tze*, 鉅子 or 巨子).[3] The selection of the Elder Master seems to have been made by means of a sort of "apostolic succession," the successor being chosen by his predecessor before his death. In this religious phase of Mohism were included the essential doctrines of Mohist ethics such as universal altruism, antideterminism, belief in spirits and ghosts, asceticism, antagonism to the fine arts, anti-militarism, and so on.

On the other hand, there sprang up a distinct school of scientific and logical Mohism, which came to be known as Neo-Mohism (別墨).[4] "They (the Neo-Mohists) argued with one another about solidity and whiteness and about agreement and difference. They discussed among themselves whether odd and even numbers did not contradict each other." This quotation from the *Chuang Tze* has never been properly understood. My researches on Books 32–37 of the *Moh Tze* have enabled me to see that it refers to the psychological and logical doctrines of the Neo-Mohists. They analyzed our processes of knowledge and found that our perception of whiteness is a different process from our perception of solidity or hardness, and that our knowledge of a "hard white stone" is not the same as either of the two processes. They were interested in the study of numbers and figures. Above all, they were founders of a highly advanced and scientific method based on the principles of agreement and difference. They

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[1] Vol. VIII, App. III, and App. VI, the latter being a collection of the fragmentary remains of their teachings.

[2] *Han Fei Tze*, ch. 50; cf. *Chuang Tze*, Epilogue.

[3] *Chuang Tze*, Epilogue, and *Lü Sze Chun Chiu*, Bk. XIX, ch. 3.

[4] *Chuang Tze*, Epilogue.

discovered the "joint method of agreement and difference" and had a quite modern conception of deduction and induction.

As we shall soon see, the Neo-Mohists were great scientists, logicians, and metaphysicians. The development of this new school could not have taken place before the middle of the fourth century B. C. My study of the Mohist works has led me to the conclusion that Books 32–37 belonged to this new school. I base this theory on more grounds than one. In the first place, the style of these six books is absolutely different from the main body of the *Moh Tze*. Secondly, while no mention of Moh Tih was made in these books, the term "Mohist" twice occurred in Book 37. Thirdly, they are absolutely free from the supernatural and even superstitious naïvetes which are frequently found in the ethico-religious teachings of the founder. They are undoubtedly the product of an age of science. This discrepancy in content and in treatment cannot be explained except on the assumption that a long interval—probably as long as one hundred years (400–300 B. C.)—had elapsed between the death of Moh Tih and the composition of these books.

Fourthly, both the problems discussed in these books and the way in which the problems are formulated and propounded, were in perfect accord with the trend of the philosophical speculations of the last quarter of the fourth century B. C. Indeed the Zenoianparadoxes of Hui Sze and his fellow dialecticians mentioned in the Epilogue of the *Chuang Tze*, and the theories of Kung-Sun Lung as preserved in the fragmentary work entitled *Kung-Sun Lung Tze*, cannot be properly understood except in the light of the six books in question. It is not improbable that either Kung-Sun Lung or his immediate predecessor was the author of these books, for the theories now contained in Books 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6 of *Kung-Sun Lung Tze* are all found in those books, sometimes in substance only and very often in exactly the same phraseology.[1] At any rate the six books can safely be assigned to the period of Hui Sze (who was still alive at the time of the death of King Hui of Liang (319 B. C.)) and Kung-Sun Lung who flourished in the first half of the third century B. C.[2]

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[1] See below, Chapter VI.

[2] This view was maintained by Wang Chung in a preface to his own notes on the *Moh Tze* dated 1790. His notes, however, were not published.

Probably Neo-Mohism as a school of scientific investigation and logical inquiry flourished about 325–250 B. C. This is the only school of Chinese thought which has developed a scientific logic with both inductive and deductive methods. It has also advanced a theory of knowledge based on psychological analysis. It continued the pragmatic tradition of Moh Tih and developed an experimental method. For we find in the six books above referred to, evidences of experiments with concave and convex mirrors, and many formulas of mechanics and the science of light.

The growth of the school, however, appears to have been arrested toward the last half of the third century B. C. At the end of that century, Mohism with all the schools disappeared entirely. Its disappearance was so complete that Sze-Ma Chien, who wrote his great history toward the end of the second century B. C., was unable to ascertain whether Moh Tih was contemporaneous with Confucius or after him.[1]

This total disappearance of Mohism was probably due to several causes. First, its doctrines of universal love and anti-militarism were incompatible with the needs of the age. The third century B. C. was a century of gigantic wars which resulted in the conquest of all the "Contending States" by the State of Chin. Thus in the *Kwan Tze*,[2] we find a statement like this: "If the principle of disarmament triumphs, then our strategic passes will be defenseless. And if the doctrine of universal love triumphs, then none of our soldiers will be willing to fight." Han Fei, who was as honest and outspoken as Nietzsche, said the same thing: "What are incompatible with each other should not coexist. To reward those who kill their enemies and at the same time praise acts of mercy and benevolence; to honor those who capture cities and at the same time believe in the doctrine of universal love, . . . how can an efficient and strong State result from such self-contradictory acts?"[3]

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[1] *Records of a Historian*, Bk. 74.

[2] A work which bears the name of Kwan Tze, a great statesman of the seventh century B. C., but which was in all probability a work of the third century with even later interpolations.

[3] *Han Fei Tze*, ch. 49.

Nor was this age of warfare propitious to scientific research and philosophical speculation. The nations demanded practical politicians and military geniuses. Let us again quote Han Fei: "Those whom the government benefits are not those whom it uses. Those whom it uses are not those whom it benefits. Therefore those who ought to serve the State have gone to the schools. That is why the States are in such disorder. . . . What is now called wisdom consists of subtle and speculative theories which even the wisest men do not quite understand. . . . When you have not even coarse rice to eat, think not of wine and meat. When you have not even rags to wear, think not of silk and embroidered garments. . . . Now nothing is more detrimental to good government than to encourage what even the wisest do not quite understand when the actual need is common sense. Therefore, subtle and speculative theories are no business of the people."[1]

Thus the utilitarian basis on which Mohism was founded came back to itself as a boomerang and caused its own downfall. Mohism was persecuted under the Chin Empire together with Confucianism. Its books were burned together with the Confucian works. After the founding of the Han Empire (B. C. 206 to A. D. 7), Confucianism soon reëstablished itself. But Mohism, which had been attacked by the Confucians and the Jurists alike, was never revived.

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[1] *Han Fei Tze*, ch. 49.

BOOK II

THE LOGIC OF MOH TIH

Chapter I

The Pragmatic Method

The Duke of Shih once asked Confucius about government. The latter answered that a good government is that which draws people from afar and reforms what has become obsolete.[1] Commenting on this conversation, Moh Tih said: "The Duke of Shih did not know how to ask a question, nor did Confucius give a correct answer. Could it be that the Duke did not even know that the ideal of government was to draw people from afar and rejuvenate that which has become obsolete? What he really wanted to know was *how* to accomplish this. Wherefore, then, did Confucius tell him what he had already learned instead of what he did not know?"[2]

This apparently casual remark well illustrates the essential difference in method between Confucianism and Mohism. It is, generally speaking, a difference between the *what* and the *how*, between an emphasis on ultimate ideals and first principles, and an emphasis on intermediate steps and consequences. Let this be the introduction to our study of the logic of Moh Tih and his school.

Confucius, as we have seen, had taught that the rectification of names—that is, the use of names according to their natural and ideal meaning—was essential to the moral reformation of society and the State. The problem of Confucianism, therefore, was one of establishing an ideal world, a world of universals, of ideal relations, for the real world to imitate and approximate. Accordingly, early Confucianism busied itself with two tasks: first, to teach the judicious use of the written word, as exemplified in the *Chun Chiu*; and, secondly, to edit and codify and elaborate the customs. moral

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[1] Compare *Lun Yü*, XIII, 16, where the answer reads: "Gladden those around you, and draw people from afar."

[2] *Moh Tze*, ch. 38: 10.

precepts, rituals, ceremonies, etc., into a system of *li* (禮) which can best be translated by the German word *Sittlichkeit* in the Hegelian sense. The object of the *li* was to furnish men with a code of ideal relations for the regulation of individual conduct and social intercourse. But the *li* in its exaggerated form became an intolerably elaborate code of rules, prescribing with rigidity and minute detail every phase of human conduct including eating, drinking, clothing, sitting, standing, walking, cooking, talking, sleeping, shooting, marriage, death, mourning, funeral, burial, bowing, kotowing, sacrificing, etc., etc.[1]

"Moh Tze," said the *Hui Nan Tze*, "studied the works of the Confucians and learned the methods of Confucius. But he considered their system of *li* as too cumbrous, vexatious, and inconvenient. He thought that their burial rituals were too extravagant and tended to impoverish the people, and that their unnecessarily long period of mourning (three years) was injurious both to the vitality of men and to the normal conduct of business."[2] Indeed Moh Tih was rebellious against the whole method of Confucianism, against the method of setting up a world of universals, of first principles, with little or no regard for their practical consequences.

Dissatisfied with the method of Confucianism, Moh Tih sought a criterion by which to test the truth and falsehood, and the right and wrong, of beliefs, theories, institutions, and policies. This criterion he found in the practical consequences which the beliefs, theories, etc., tend to produce. The Confucian doctrine of ideas (*hsiang*)[3] had held that things and institutions originated in ideas which were afterwards embodied into utensils and institutions and principles. According to this logic, in order to grasp the meaning of the real things of the present, it is necessary to go back to the original ideas, to the ideal meanings, of the names by which these things are now known. Against this view Moh Tih

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[1] The best way to understand the truth of this description is to read Legge's translation of the *Li Ki*, and Steele's translation of the *I Li*, the latter being preferable because more elaborate.

[2] *Hui Nan Tze*, a work compiled under the patronage of Liu An, Prince of Hui Nan, of the Han Dynasty, chap. XXI.

[3] See part II, ch. III.

maintained that our institutions and utensils and conceptions originated, not in transcendental ideas, but in practical needs. Human institutions (which constitute the problem that most interested both Confucius and Moh Tih) owe their origin to certain practical purposes or ends, for the realization of which these institutions are created. In order to understand the meaning of these things, it is necessary, therefore, to ask what practical results they tend to produce. Their practical consequences constitute their value, and at the same time constitute their meaning.

To take a concrete example. Moh Tih said: "I asked the Confucians, wherefore they should have music, and they answered, 'Music (*yoh*) is an amusement (*yoh*, now pronounced *loh*).'[1] I said to them: 'You have not answered my question. If I asked you why you should build a house and you said it was built for protection against cold in winter and heat in summer and for separate dwelling of persons of different sexes, you would then be telling me *why* you built the house. Now I asked why you should have music and you said music is an amusement. That is equivalent to saying that a house is to be a house.'"[2]

Briefly stated, Moh Tih's main position is this: that the meaning of every institution lies in what it is good for, and that the meaning of every conception or belief or policy lies in what kind of conduct or character it is fitted to produce. The following quotation may serve as a concise statement of his pragmatic method: "Any principle which can elevate conduct should be perpetuated. That which cannot elevate conduct should not be perpetuated. To perpetuate anything that cannot elevate conduct is nothing but waste of speech."[3]

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[1] Which is the definition given in Book XVII of the *Li Ki*. The Confucians were very fond of making etymological definitions. See Confucius' definition of government in the *Lun Yü*, XII, 17.

[2] Ch. 40: 14.

[3] *Moh Tze*, ch. 39: 5. 言足以遷行者, 常之. 不足以遷行者, 勿常. 不足以遷行而常之, 是蕩口也.

The same statement appears also in chapter 38: 12, with the substitution of the word 舉 (to lift up) for 遷 which now means "change," but which formerly meant "change for the better" as, for example, in 君子以見善則遷, in the *Book of Change*.

It must be added here that while insisting on practical consequences as the sole criterion of value and worth of principles and institutions, Moh Tih was always cognizant of the importance of the motives of action, motives being here taken to mean not mere wishes, but foreseen ends which call forth endeavor. The following conversation will illustrate this point: "Wu-Ma Tze said to Moh Tze: 'Your doctrine of loving all men has not yet benefited the world, nor has my contrary doctrine done it any harm. Since neither has produced any (visible) consequences, why do you always approve your own theory and condemn mine?' Moh Tih said: 'Here is a (house on) fire. One man is seeking water to extinguish it. Another man is seeking a torch to spread the conflagration. Neither has as yet succeeded in accomplishing anything, but which of them do you approve?' 'I approve the motive of the one seeking water, and condemn the motive of the other holding the torch.' 'Therefore,' said Moh Tih, 'I approve my own motive and condemn yours.'"[1]

Having discovered the pragmatic method, Moh Tih employed it throughout his teachings, basing his own theories on it and subjecting many of the current doctrines to the same test. Speaking of his own theory of universal altruism, he said: "If it were not fitted for practice, even I myself would reject it. But how can there be anything which is true (or good) which cannot be practiced?"[2]

The following remarkable passage illustrates with clarity and force the nature of the method of Moh Tih:

"Now a blind man may say, 'That which shines with brilliancy is white, and that which is like soot is black.' Even those who can see cannot reject these definitions. But if you place both white and black things before the blind man and ask him to choose the one from the other, then he fails. Therefore I say, 'A blind man knows not white from black,' not because he cannot name them, but because he cannot choose them.

"Now when the gentlemen of the world undertake to define virtue and benevolence, even the wisest men of antiquity cannot

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[1] Ch. 38: 4. Cf. ch. 39, 2.

[2] Ch. 16.

surpass them. But if one takes a benevolent act and a malevolent act and asks them to choose the one from other, then they fail. Therefore, I say, 'The gentlemen of the world know not benevolence,' not because of their definitions but because of their choice."[1]

In thus contrasting choice and conduct with naming and defining, Moh Tih probably had in mind the logic of Confucianism which begins with the attempt to discover through the study of names what things ought to be, and seeks to reform the real social and political order by furnishing it with an elaborate and rigid system of ideal relations. It is true that Confucius conceived of judgments as statements of what to do and what not to do. But in attributing to them an absolute and *a priori* origin, he and his followers have in effect made the universals what things *ought* to be regardless of consequences. As a later Confucian put it: "Set up what is righteous, and consider not its beneficial results. Make known the right Way, and take no account of its practical operations."[2] As a result, the universals came to be regarded as ends in themselves. There was no way nor any desire to test their validity. Nor was there any criterion to guide their application to concrete situations. For, detached from their practical consequences, universals are nothing but empty words and abstractions, to be conjured up or to be dispensed with according to the blind guidance of caprice and bias. They became, indeed, as meaningless and as irresponsible as the blind man's definitions of black and white.

The issue may be stated in a different way. The great contribution of the Confucian logic lies in the discovery of the significance of the names, the "predicables." But the Confucians failed to see that the predicables detached from their practical bearing upon the "predicated," are empty and meaningless. It was left to Moh Tih to introduce into Chinese logic the term "subject" or "the predicated" (實, *shih*).[3] The Mohists defined these two terms as follows: "That by which something is said (about something) is the predicate (名, *ming*); that about which something

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[1] Ch. 39: 9.

[2] Tung Chung-shu.

[3] *Shih* means "substance," "reality," "real thing," etc.

is said, is the subject or the predicated."[1] Thus, after describing how the princes of his day all praised righteousness and at the same time carried on cruel and devastating wars, Moh Tih said: "This means that they praise the *name* of righteousness and do not recognize the *substance* (*shih*) of righteousness. They may be likened unto the blind man who can say the *names* 'black' and 'white' as well as any seeing man, but who cannot recognize the black and white *things*."[2]

We can hardly exaggerate the importance of this belated discovery of the subject or the predicated. The problem of the logic of Confucianism was the problem of *rectifying names by means of names;* that is, of correcting the now corrupt and degenerate meaning of names by reëstablishing their original and ideal meaning. Any modern student of philology can readily see the futility of the attempt. For even dismissing the difficulty of an infinite regress, it is evident that the original meaning, when finally discovered, can have very little more than mere etymological interest. What logical and moral good is there achieved when we have finally traced the word "idea" (象) to its original meaning of an "elephant"? And if we abandon the strictly etymological approach, we are compelled to resort to arbitrary meanings, to those meanings which the philosophers themselves consider to be ideal. This arbitrary and subjective method of determining the ideal meaning had actually been adopted by the Confucian School, especially in the *Chun Chiu*, where even historical facts were distorted in order to convey the arbitrary judgments of the historian.

It was to check this irresponsibility of contentless predicables that Moh Tih's discovery of the "subject" was epoch-making in the history of Chinese logic. A predicate must be taken with reference to the predicated; a judgment must be taken with reference to its practical consequences. Knowledge consists, not in learning predicables and universals, but in the ability to use these things in real life,—"to elevate conduct." A man is said to "know" things "not because of his ability to name them, but because of his ability to choose them."

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[1] Ch. 34: 81.

[2] Ch. 19. Cf. the quotation from ch. 39: 9, given above.

Moh Tih was never tired of condemning the traditional attitude of dissociating general principles from their practical bearing upon life and conduct. Throughout his works, we find a persistent warning that this traditional attitude will result in the individual's losing the capacity for applying these principles to real situations. It will result in forming what Moh Tih termed the habit of "being wise in petty things and ignorant in great things." That is to say, by constantly confining one's mind to defining and re-defining general principles without testing their validity by examining the kind of conduct and character they are fitted to produce, one gradually loses one's sense of proportion and valuation and tends to "strain at a gnat and swallow a camel."

This habit of "being wise in little things and ignorant in great things" forms one of the most familiar themes in the works of Moh Tih. It is mentioned by him on at least six different occasions,[1] each time with a wealth of convincing illustration. Nowhere, however, does he bring out this point more eloquently and forcibly than in the first of his trilogy on the then as now prevalent attitude toward war. I quote this chapter in its entirety as a fitting conclusion to the discussion of his pragmatic method:

> "Here is a man who enters his neighbor's orchard and steals some peaches and plums therefrom. When this is known, he is condemned by the public, and, when caught, will be fined by the government. Wherefore? Because he has injured his neighbor to profit himself.
>
> "And if he steals from his neighbor a dog, a pig, or a chicken, he commits a wrong greater than the stealing of peaches and plums. Why? Because he has done a greater injury to another man; and the greater the injury he does, the greater is the wrong, and the severer shall be his punishment.
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> "And if he steals his neighbor's horse or cow, he commits a wrong still greater than stealing a dog, a pig, or a chicken. Why? Because he does a greater injury to another; and the more he injuries another, the greater is the wrong, and the severer shall be his punishment.

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[1] Chapters 9, 10, 17, 23, 25, and 41: 6.

"And if he goes as far as to waylay an innocent man, take away his fur coat and cloak, and stab him with his sword, then his crime is still greater than that of stealing a horse, or a cow. Why? Because he has done thereby a still greater injury. And the greater the injury a man does to another, the greater is his crime, and the severer shall be his punishment.

"In all these cases, the gentlemen of the world agree to condemn this man and declare, 'He is wrong!'

"Now here is the greatest of all crimes—the invasion of one nation by another. But the gentlemen of the world not only refuse to condemn it, but even praise it, and declare, 'It is right!'

"Shall we say that these gentlemen know the distinction between right and wrong?

"Killing one man constitutes a crime and is punishable by death. Applying the same principle, the killing of ten men makes the crime ten times greater and ten times as punishable; similarly the killing of a hundred men increases the crime a hundredfold, and makes it that many times as punishable.

"All this the gentlemen of the world unanimously condemn and pronounce to be wrong.

"But when they come to judge the greatest of all wrongs—the invasion of one state by another—(which is a hundred thousand times more criminal than the killing of one innocent man),[1] they cannot see that they should condemn it. On the contrary, they praise it and call it 'right.' *Indeed, they do not know it is wrong.* Therefore they have recorded their judgment on it to be transmitted to posterity. If they know it was wrong, how could we explain their recording such false judgments for posterity?

"Here is a man who sees a few black things and calls them black, but who, after seeing many black things, calls them white. We must all say that this man does not know the distinction between black and white.

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[1] The sentence in brackets is not found in this chapter; I have taken it from chapter 25 where the same passage, with variations, is repeated.

"Here is another man, who tastes a few bitter things and calls them bitter, but who, having tasted many bitter things, calls them sweet. We must all say that this man knows not the distinction between bitter and sweet.

"Here is a world which condemns a petty wrong and praises the greatest of all wrongs—the attack of one nation upon another—and calls it right. Can we say that the world knows the distinction between right and wrong?"[1]

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[1] Ch. 17.

BOOK II

THE LOGIC OF MOH TIH

Chapter II

The Three Laws of Reasoning

Having stated the essential characteristics of Moh Tih's method, we shall now take up his theory of dialectics, that is, his conception of the method of reasoning and argumentation. This may be called the "Method of Three Laws." Said Moh Tih: "In reasoning about things, there is needed a standard form. Reasoning without a standard form is like calculating the time of day and night on a constantly shifting dial, and cannot lead to clear knowledge of the distinctions between right and wrong, good and evil. Therefore, in reasoning and argumentation there must be three laws. What are the three laws? . . . (1) There must be a basis or foundation; (2) There must be a general survey; (3) There must be practical application.

"Where to find the foundation (say, of a theory)? Find it in a study of the experiences of the wisest men of the past.

"How to take a general survey of it? Survey it by examining (its compatibility with) the facts of the actual experience of the people.

"How to apply it? Put it into law and governmental policy, and see whether or not it is conducive to the welfare of the State and of the people.

"These are what I call the Three Laws of Reasoning."[1]

While the order of the first and second laws is sometimes reversed, the third, namely the law of practical application, is always the final test. The statement of the whole method as quoted above needs little amplification on my part. So I shall confine myself to the task of illustrating Moh Tih's application of

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[1] Ch. 28. The same laws appear in chapters 29 and 30. The statement of these laws in chapter 29 has slightly suffered later corruption. The other two chapters agree exactly. Cf. ch. 4 and also ch. 10.

the method by quoting *in extenso* the arguments he employed first, in disproving fatalism, and, second, in proving the existence of spirits of the dead.

I

In his arguments against fatalism or determinism, Moh Tih said: "There are some men who hold that there is fate. Why do they not try to look into the facts of the wise rulers of the past? When King Cheh (1818–1784 B. C.) had ruined the kingdom, King Tang (1783–1753 B. C.) took over the kingdom and again restored it to order and prosperity. When King Chou (1154–1123 B. C.) had again brought the kingdom to ruin, King Wu took it over and restored it once more to order and peace. The same kingdom and the same people found peace and prosperity under a Tang or a Wu, and disorder and ruin under a Cheh or a Chou. How can one say that things are predetermined?

"Why not again look into the written records of past rulers? . . . Is there any statement in their laws, . . . penal codes, . . . and ordinances, . . . to the effect that blessings cannot be asked for and catastrophes cannot be averted, that reverence and piety avail not, and cruelty is harmless? . . ."[1]

The second law, that of examining the compatibility of any theory with the facts of experience, is not quite applicable to an abstract subject like determinism. Moh Tih made reference to it only when Fate was spoken of as a personified deity. He said: "My views of the existence or the nonexistence of anything are based on what the actual experiences of the eyes and ears of the people hold to be existent or nonexistent. What has been seen or heard, I call existent. What has never been seen or heard, I call nonexistent."[2] On this ground he rejects the theory of the existence of Fate. We shall have occasion to recur to this view of "the facts of experience" as a determining factor in knowledge.

But the most important of all the three laws of reasoning is, after all, the law of practical consequences. Thus we are told that

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[1] Ch. 28.
[2] Ch. 29.

fatalism must be condemned because it teaches that "men receive honors from the government not because they deserve them, but because it is predestined that they should receive them; and that punishments, too, are predetermined by fate and have nothing to do with the evils men do." Such teachings would naturally result in a state of affairs in which "government officials will steal and rob, soldiers will desert their posts, and rulers will have no one to rely on in time of peril."[1] Furthermore, determinism discourages industry, encourages negligence, and is responsible for much of the poverty and misery of the world. The people whom laziness and indulgence have placed in poverty and destitution, will refuse to attribute their misery to their own faults but to fate. Similarly, those rulers whose negligence and licentious living have brought about the ruin of their principalities, will also lay the whole blame not on themselves but on fate.[2] Finally, determinism is incompatible with all efforts of education. "Teaching people to learn and preaching the doctrine of fatalism, is like telling a man to cover his head and at the same time to uncover it."[3]

II

So much for a typical case of negative argumentation. His arguments in support of his theory of spirits of the dead are still more instructive in that they show more clearly the strength and weakness of the three laws of reasoning. Here Moh Tih begins with the second law, that is, with "the facts of experience." He argues that, in order to find out the existence or nonexistence of anything, we must first find out whether "actual experiences of the ears and eyes of the people" lend support to the belief of its existence or of its nonexistence. "If some people have seen or heard it, it is to be held as existent. If none has seen or heard it, it is to be held as nonexistent." With this general statement, he asks his opponent to inquire of the multitude of men who have seen spirits, and to read the records of historic personages who have seen the same.

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[1] Ch. 28.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ch. 40: 6.

After long citations from various historical records, he turns to the first law and says: "If you think the facts of the ears and eyes of the masses are no sufficient evidences, why not then look into the facts of the wisest men of the past?" Thereupon he produces numerous passages from the decrees, ordinances, laws, institutes, hymns, etc., of the ancient dynasties, to show that they all assumed either explicitly or implicitly the existence of spirits.

Finally, recourse is made to the third law and appeal is made to what one is tempted to term "the will to believe." "If," says Moh Tih, "if there are ghosts and spirits, then our sacrifices are offered to feed and feast our own (dead) fathers, mothers, brothers, and sisters. Is that not a very fine thing? And even if there be *no* ghosts and spirits, we are at most spending a little money on our offerings. Even so, we do not waste it in the sense of throwing it into the ditch. We can still gather our relatives and neighbors and participate in the enjoyment of the sacrificial victuals and drinks. Therefore, even if there be no ghosts nor spirits, this (the belief?) may still enable us to enjoy conviviality and give pleasure to our relations and neighbors."[1]

After an interval of over two thousand years, these words must sound exceedingly trivial to many. My object in reproducing them here is to show how the religious temperament of a thinker could influence him to employ his pragmatic method for the justification of such a theory as that of ghosts. And that after he had employed the very same method to destroy the theory of determinism! Might it not be possible that such attempts to justify a conception the validity of which has not been seriously subjected to the pragmatic test, have been one of the causes which conspired to discredit Mohism in the later days of materialism and atheism?[2]

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[1] Ch. 26. Cf. ch. 40: 7, where Moh Tih said: "The wise rulers of the past have always believed in the doctrine that ghosts and spirits have intelligence and are capable of blessing and cursing men. They held the doctrine of 'blessedness and unblessedness,' and therefore order and peace prevailed under their reign."

[2] Cf. Professor Dewey's criticism of James: "Does Mr. James employ the pragmatic method to discover the value in terms of consequences in life of some formula which has its logical content already fixed; or does he employ it to criticize and revise, and, ultimately, to constitute the meaning of that formula? If it is the first, there is danger that the pragmatic method will be employed to vivify, if not validate, doctrines which in themselves are pieces of rationalistic metaphysics, not inherently pragmatic." (*Essays in Experimental Logic*, p. 313.)

To return to our main subject. Moh Tih's Three Laws of Reasoning may be summed up as requiring as tests of truth of any given conception, (1), compatibility with the best of the established conceptions; (2), consistency with the facts of the experience of the people; and (3), its conduciveness to desirable ends when put into practical operation. We shall devote the remainder of this chapter to a critical examination of the three laws in the light of their operation as shown in the two cases of argumentation given above.

We shall begin with the third law, namely, that of practical consequences. We have already pointed out the danger of employing the pragmatic method to justify conceptions the logical validity of which is of a doubtful character. Aside from that, there is danger of construing the "practical" in a too narrow sense, in the sense of the immediately useful. Moh Tih was not unaware of the quantitative difference of consequences. The test should be based on what is practically useful for "the greatest number." Thus, speaking of the evil consequences of war, Moh Tih said: "Though four or five nations have profitted by war, that does not make war a practical (行) policy. Let us take an illustration from the profession of medicine. Here is a medicine which cures four or five out of ten thousand patients to whom it has been applied. We cannot, therefore, call it a practical (行) medicine. No dutiful son will apply it to his parent, nor will a faithful servant apply it to his master."[1]

Moh Tih, however, seems to have on certain occasions ignored the qualitative distinction between consequences, by which is here meant the difference between that which is immediately practical and that the practical worth of which cannot be immediately seen. There is a tradition that Moh Tih spent three years in making a wooden bird which, when completed, flew up into the air and remained there the whole day, and then, falling to the ground, was dashed to pieces. Upon being congratulated on his new invention, Moh Tih said: "I would rather make the axle of a vehicle which can be made out of a small piece of wood in a short time and

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[1] Ch. 18.

which, when finished, can bear the weight of thirty tons (石)."[1] If the story be true, Moh Tih should certainly be held responsible for having retarded mankind's conquest of the air for over two thousand years! Another and more instructive example of this too narrow conception of the practical is found in his advocacy of the abolition of music. He argued that music was an unnecessary expenditure of money; could not relieve the poverty and misery of the people, nor could it help to defend a nation; and that it made people idle and extravagant.[2] He was asked by Chen Fan, a Confucian: "Your theory of the abolition of music may be likened to saying that a horse must run without rest and that a bow must always remain drawn to its full strength without release. Is not that too much for beings of blood and breath?" To this question, a pragmatic one, Moh Tih could not give a satisfactory reply.[3] But his attacks on music and the ascetic influence of his school in general have probably done considerable damage to the æsthetic phase of ancient Chinese culture. In spite of all the vehement emphasis which Confucianism has placed on the moralizing and socializing power of music, the artistic development of ancient China was arrested for many centuries to come, until it received a fresh impetus from the religious art of India. There may have been many reasons, economic, religious, and otherwise, for this unnatural arrest of growth. It is not improbable that Mohism was one of the causes.[4]

So much for my criticism of the perils attached to an uncritical use of the pragmatic method. As to the indisputable merits of the method itself, I think sufficient justice has been done to them in the preceding chapter.

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[1] This story is told in many books. The one here reproduced is taken from *Han Fei Tze*, ch. 32, II, 1, 3. Cf. *Lieh Tze*, ch. 5, and *Hui Nan Tze*, ch. 11. In *Moh Tze*, chs. 41, 22, however, the invention is attributed to Kung Shu, the great engineer of the time.

[2] Ch. 27. It must be remembered that Moh Tih was also the founder of a religion which taught and practiced self-denial and asceticism. His aversion to music was probably due to his religious temperament rather than any pragmatic consideration.

[3] Ch. 7.

[4] For a splendid criticism of Moh Tih's theory in this regard, see *Hsun Tze*, chapters 10 and 20.

We may now take up the second law which purports to test a conception by the "facts of the ears and eyes of the people." From the two examples given above, namely, the case of ghosts and of fate, it is apparent that Moh Tih's conception of the observation of the senses is not quite sound. For he accepted the existence of ghosts and rejected that of fate all on the assumption that what has been seen or heard is real, and what has never been seen or heard is unreal.[1] Such a view of observation ignores the possibility of error and hallucination and the other limitations of sense observation. Some may say that Moh Tih probably meant that errors and hallucinations were real to those who experienced them. But that seems to be an anachronism which finds no textual evidences to substantiate it.

But this must not blind us to the historical importance of Moh Tih's recognition of the value of personal observation. We have seen that Confucianism had conceived of the universals as having originated in the minds of the competent observers, the sages, who, to use the words of the *Book of Change*, "purifying their thoughts, retiring to privacy, and (mentally) experiencing with the people all good and evil . . . thereby understood the ways of Nature and the affairs of the people and created that wonderful thing (i. e., the *Book of Change*) in anticipation of its use by the people." The method was purely rationalistic. We have also seen that the Confucian theory of knowledge begins not with experience but with learning, that is, with acquiring ready-made knowledge. It was as a protest against such rationalism and "classicism" that Moh Tih's reliance on direct observation was historically of no small significance. It broke away from the old procedure best characterized in Lao Tze's words:

> "The world may be known
> Without ever crossing one's gate.
> Nor need one peep through the window
> In order Nature's course to contemplate.
> The farther one goes,
> The less one knows."

[1] Compare J. S. Mill's *Utilitarianism*, ch. 4: "The only proof capable of being given that an object is visible is that people actually see it. The only proof that a sound is audible is that people hear it: and so of the other sources of our experience."

In short, Moh Tih's theory of direct observation, crude though it was, marked the beginning of Chinese empiricism, the development of which forms the substance of the subsequent chapters.

Turning to the first law of reasoning, we may ask, why should a radical thinker like Moh Tih place so much reliance on "the experiences of the wisest men of the past"? Did he not contradict his own pragmatic method by upholding the principles of the wise ancients as a test of truth? To answer these questions, it is necessary first to understand Moh Tih's conception of the use of general truths as means of prediction, that is, as guiding principles for future action.

Upon being told that while the past might be known it was impossible to know the future, Moh Tih said: "Suppose, sir, your parents were in peril a hundred li (about thirty miles) from here; and suppose you were expected to reach there in a day or they would perish. Suppose at this critical moment, you found a strong carriage with excellent horses and another carriage with angular wheels and sickly horses. Which would you choose—the strong carriage with the good horses, or the one with angular wheels and sickly horses?" The answer was: "I would surely take the strong carriage with good horses so that I might arrive there without delay." "Therefore," said Moh Tih, "did you say then that the future could not be known?"[1] This conception of prediction is essentially sound. Prediction is possible wherever the modes of behavior of all the factors entering into a future action are known and can be calculated. That good horses travel faster than sickly ones; that arsenic is poisonous; that fire burns, etc.,—all these are aids to prediction and guides for action. Herein lies the usefulness of all general truths, scientific laws, etc.

Now the experiences of the wisest men of the past as embodied in historical records belong to the same category. History has shown that certain ways of action, certain policies of state, certain beliefs, have brought about beneficial consequences, while others have resulted in ruin and degeneration. Why, then, should we not profit by the lessons of history and learn to practice the beneficial and avoid the ruinous acts? This, I believe, was the true

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[1] Ch. 41 : 18.

meaning of Moh Tih's first law of reasoning—which is elsewhere stated as follows: "Any saying or action which agrees with (the words or action of) the wisest kings of the great dynasties, namely, Yao, Shun, Yü, Tang, Wen, and Wu, should be practiced. And any saying or action which agrees with (that of) the wicked kings of those dynasties, namely, Cheh, Chou, You, and Yi, should be avoided."[1] To Moh Tih, as to any Chinese to-day, these names stand for very definite things: the first group for certain very definite virtues and policies which have produced certain definite results; the second group for certain very definite vices and practices which have ruined kingdoms and brought their agents to eternal condemnation. In this sense, Moh Tih's insistence on the experiences of the past, on consistency with the opinions of wise ancients, as a test of truth, was in no way contradictory to his pragmatic method. To test a conception by its compatibility with the experiences of the wisest men of the past is the same as testing it by comparing it with other conceptions, the practical consequences of which history has already proved.

Herein, it may be noted, lies the positive use of Moh Tih's philosophical method. While always stressing practical consequences and always criticizing the Confucians for their fondness for abstract names and principles regardless of their results in life, Moh Tih himself, too, was seeking to build up a system of universals, a system of pragmatically tested and authoritatively established truths for the guidance of individual conduct and the regulation of society and the state. To repeat his own statement quoted in the preceding chapter, "Any principles which can elevate conduct should be perpetuated." To perpetuate (常) a general principle is to work it into our habits, to generalize it as widely as possible, to establish it as a universal law. "Anyone who acts must have some rule of action. No one can accomplish anything without some rule of action. . . . Even the artisans have their standards of action. They make squares by a try-square; circles by compasses. . . . All artisans, skillful or stupid, conform to these standards. While the skillful ones may hit upon them (without actually using them), the unskillful ones may thus be enabled to

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[1] Ch. 39 : 4.

work according to these standards, and to accomplish much more than if they worked without them."[1]

Thus the method of Moh Tih, while it emphasizes practical consequences, aims at something quite different from the particular consequences. It aims at the formation of a system of universal laws of action. This idea had great influence on Moh Tih's political and religious views. In politics, he desired to see a unitary sovereignty and a universal system of laws; in religion, he taught the Will of Heaven as the most universal standard of right and wrong. An examination of his politico-religious doctrine known as the doctrine of "Agreeing Upward" (尙同, or 上同), that is, agreeing with the most universal, will better show the practical implications of Moh Tih's attitude toward universals.

This doctrine begins with a state of nature, a pre-political state, in which "each man has his own notion of right. Therefore one man has one notion of right, two men have two notions of right, and ten men have ten notions of right. The more men there are, the more conceptions of right will there be. Consequently, each man approves his own notion of right and denounces every other man's. So they denounce one another." The result is what Hobbes called "a war of all against all." "The world becomes an anarchy of birds and beasts." Then the people begin to "realize that all the evils of disorder are the results of the lack of a common judge of what is right (無正長), who shall unify the people's diversified notions of right." They therefore proceed to select the wisest and ablest man among them and elect him to be the "Son of Heaven," and they also elect other wise and able men to act as his assistants in the capacity of ministers, vassal lords, local magistrates, etc. This is the origin of government:[2] government originates in the need for a common judge of right.

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[1] Ch. 4.

[2] This repudiates the divine rights theory of the Confucians which is expressed in the *Shu King*, "Heaven planted men on earth and gave them rulers and teachers." Note also that Moh Tih conceived of the first government as elected by the people. The later Mohists developed a contract theory of the origin of the state, holding that "a ruler rules by right of an agreement between the subjects." (Chs. 33, 34.)

The common judge of right having been established, the Son of Heaven then issues his proclamation to the people, saying: "When you do not agree with a notion of right, you must all tell it to your superiors. What your superiors approve, you must all approve. What your superiors disapprove, you must all disapprove." The fundamental law is "to agree upward and not downward or sidewise." (上同而不下比.) So a district is well governed when the district magistrate "can unify all the notions of right of that district." So a state is well governed when the prince "can unify all the notions of right in his state." So the empire is well governed when the Son of Heaven "can unify all the notions of right in the empire."

But Moh Tih would not stop here. "If all the people were unified in the Son of Heaven, and not in Heaven itself, then there might yet be calamities."[1]

This leads to his theory of the Will of Heaven which is the highest standard of right. The Will of Heaven is conceived to consist in a desire to love and benefit all men, which is proved by the fact that Heaven itself blesses all men who love one another, and punishes all men who injure one another. "The Will of Heaven is to me," says the founder of Mohism, "what the compasses and the try-square are to the artisan. The artisan judges all circles and squares by his compasses and try-square, saying, 'That which agrees with my standard is right, and that which does not is wrong.' Now there are teachers in our age who write numberless books and make numberless speeches, persuading all classes of men from the princes to the student. But they are all far from true love and righteousness. I know it is so, because I have found the best standard whereby to judge them."[2]

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[1] Ch. 11; cf. chs. 12 and 13.

[2] Ch. 23. Cf. chs. 4, 23, and 25.

BOOK III

THE LOGIC OF NEO-MOHISM

Chapter I

The Six Books of Neo-Mohism

In stating Moh Tih's doctrine of the three laws of reasoning, I have not hesitated to present it together with all its crudities and naïvetés, such as the belief in spirits and ghosts and the uncritical confidence in the testimony of the senses. For I have wished to show by contrast that whiie Moh Tih has certainly produced a very important logical method, he could not have been at the same time the author of the logical system which forms the substance of this and the subsequent chapters. He could not have written the six books which now form Books 32–37 of the *Moh Tze*.

A word as to the nature and style of these six remarkable books. The first of these, Book 32, consists of ninety-two definitions. A few examples may be given here. Definition 1 says: ' A cause is that with the obtaining of which something becomes." Definition 5: "Knowledge (or, direct knowledge) is perception." Definition 6: "Knowledge (or, literally, mental knowledge) is understanding." Definition 8: "The right is the useful." Definition 22: "Life is the body plus knowledge." Definitions 40 and 41: "Duration extends over different times; space extends over different places." Definition 58: "A circle is that which has equidistant radii from its center."

The second book, Book 33, contains eighty-one general formulas of various kinds, each with a "reason." For example, Section 8 says: "Why a thing becomes so; how to find it out; and how to let others know it—these are not necessarily one and the same thing: the reason is given under 'disease.'" Section 16: "A shadow does not change its position: the reason is given under 'renewal.'" Section 17: "Standing before a mirror, an object gives an inverted image, smaller in size than the original: the reason is given under 'concavity.'" Section 45: "We may know a thing without the five senses: the reason is given under

'duration' (i. e., memory)." Section 47: "We may find out what a man does not know: the reason is given under 'choosing by name.'"

The third book, Book 34, consists of ninety-two paragraphs,[1] each being an explanatory note on one of the ninety-two definitions contained in Book 32. Section 1 thus explains Definition 1, quoted above, in these words: "Cause. A minor cause is one with which something may not necessarily be so, but without which it will never be so. It is partial and may be likened unto a point in a line. A major cause is one with which something will of necessity be so, and without which it will never be so. When this is seen, one may be said to have insight." Section 5 explains Definition 5: "Direct knowledge is intelligence meeting the thing and getting the form and shape thereof as in seeing." Section 6 explains Definition 6: "Mental knowledge is intelligence reasoning about the thing and knowing it clearly—as in understanding." Some of the explanations are very brief, while others are exceedingly long.

The fourth book, Book 35, contains eighty-one paragraphs, each explaining one of the eighty-one formulas of Book 33. Each is the "reason" above referred to. Thus Section 8 of Book 33 quoted above is explained in these words: "Something is injured by something else: that is the cause (of a disease). To find out the cause is knowledge. To tell others what is found is to make others know." The explanation of the inverted image is too long to be quoted here. Section 45, which refers to memory, is explained thus: "Intelligence sees (a fire) through the eyes, and the eyes see because of the fire. And the fire is not known except through the senses. But after some duration of time, it can be seen without the eyes as well as if there were a real fire." The explanation of Section 47, referring to testing one's knowledge by choice, is as follows: "What to one is as distinct as if it were actually seen, is knowledge. Mix what he knows with what he does not know, and ask him to say which things he knows and which things he knows not. If he can do that, he may be said to know both."

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[1] A few now missing.

These four books form one group. In them are found theories of logic, psychology, ethics, economics, and politics, and laws of grammar, mathematics, mechanics, and the science of light. With the exception of a few remaining treatises on geometry (e. g., the *Book of Chou Pi*) and medicine (e. g., the *Huang Ti Nai King*), these books are the only existing testimony of the scientific achievements of ancient China.

The fifth book, Book 36, is perhaps textually the most difficult of the six. It is apparently a fragmentary work with much of its content missing. It is free from interpolation, but has suffered much irreparable textual corruption. Some readable portions of it, however, are of great value to our knowledge of Mohism. Take for example this statement of utilitarianism :

> "To estimate the weightiness and lightness of bodies is called balancing. Balancing is not to find out the right or the wrong of things. . . . To estimate the weightiness and lightness of actions is called calculating. Calculation is to determine their right and wrong. . . . (The law is:) Of two goods, take the greater; of two evils, take the lesser. . . . To take the greater of two goods is not done under compulsion. To take the lesser of two evils is done under compulsion. The former means choosing one of two things not yet realized. The latter means avoiding one of the two situations in which you have already been placed. . . . To choose the lesser of two evils is not to choose an evil: it is choosing a good. . . . When you are held up by a robber and lose a finger in order to escape with your life, it is a good."

Or, take this logical discussion :

> ". . . If a stone is said to be white, then it is similar to all white things. But if it is said to be big, its bigness does not entitle it to be classed among big things. There is a difference : what is predicated after its size or extension, can be known only when it is perceived; but what is not predicated after its size or extension, may be known even when it is not directly perceived. If a thing is named according to its location, then anything that is within that location may be so named. The name becomes inapplicable only when the

thing so named is out of that locality. Examples of this kind are: 'in this village,' 'in the State of Chi or Tzu.' ''

The sixth book, Book 37, is the best and perhaps the most interesting text of the whole group. It is a complete treatise on logic, consisting of nine sections. Section 1 sets forth the general nature and function of logic. Section 2 defines the five methods of inference which are: deduction, comparison, parallel, analogy, and induction. Section 3 discusses the dangers and fallacies of the last four methods. Section 4 names the five[1] difficulties of formal logic, most of which difficulties are due to the peculiar character of the Chinese language which has neither signs for plural number nor distinctions of generic and partitive usages of names. The remaining five sections take up these five difficulties separately and in greater detail.

These six books will form the material of our study of the Neo-Mohist logic. In addition, we shall take up the Zenoic paradoxes of Hui Sze and his fellow dialecticians as preserved in the epilogue of the *Chuang Tze*, and the six fragmentary chapters collected under the title of *Kung-Sun Lung Tze*.

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[1] The text gives only four, the fifth having been omitted probably by the copyist.

BOOK III

THE LOGIC OF NEO-MOHISM

Chapter II

Knowledge

The Neo-Mohists were the first school to distinguish the many uses of the word "知," "to know." They began by saying that knowledge presupposes a knowing "ability" or intelligence. Thus the first definition of 知 is that it is an "ability" (Book 32 : 3)[1] which is further explained as "that by means of which one knows but which of itself does not necessarily know, as, e. g., the faculty of seeing" (Bk. 34 : 3). This is no *tabula rasa* theory which conceives the mind as a passive receptacle of impressions. On the contrary, the 知 is an active intelligence ready to know: it is potential knowledge. Only it cannot of itself know things; that is to say, knowledge presupposes objects to be known.

The second meaning of 知 is that it is direct knowledge, which is perception. (Bk. 32 : 5.) It is to know of a thing. "Direct knowledge is intelligence meeting its object and getting the form and shape thereof, as in seeing" (Bk. 34 : 5). Intelligence here refers to the ability to know. There can be no knowledge until the knowing ability meets its objects. The eye has the ability to see, but there is no seeing until it comes into contact with the objects to be seen.

But there is another kind of knowledge which the word "知" cannot cover. So a new word, 恕, was invented, which is composed of 知 (direct knowledge) plus 心 (mind). This word is not now found in any of the Chinese dictionaries, old as well as new,—an evidence of the long neglect suffered by the Mohist works. It may now be rendered as "mental knowledge." "Mental knowledge is understanding" (Def. 6). "It is intelligence reasoning

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[1] All the numbering of sections or paragraphs is according to my own edition of these six books soon to be published under the title of "Moh King Sing Ku."

about its object and knowing it clearly, as in understanding a thing (after seeing it)" (Bk. 34:6). It is knowledge *about* things. "Hearing is the faculty of the ear. But to follow what is heard and get the meaning thereof, is the work of the mind. Speech is a faculty of the mouth. But to grasp the meaning of what is spoken is the distinguishing power of the mind" (Bk. 32 : 90, 91).

Thus knowledge presupposes the coöperation of three factors: intelligence, perception, and understanding. This coöperation requires the elements of time and space. "A white and solid object cannot be seen to be white and solid without duration (which is the term employed by the Neo-Mohists in distinction to 'time' or 'times') and space. Its being seen as an object possessing both whiteness and solidity is because of these two factors" (Bk. 33:13, 14). That certain qualities are conceived as "inhering" together is due to space and duration. Otherwise, one may see whiteness through the eye, one may perceive solidity through the sense of touch, but one cannot see "a white, solid thing." (Bk. 33 : 4, 35; Bk. 35:35.)

Moreover, in order that an object may be truly known, sufficient length of time should pass to allow a clear and distinct perception of the object. If something flashes across our eyes as swiftly as an arrow fleeting across the window, no impression of it is left on the mind and consequently we do not know what it is. "There is neither a horse nor a cow." Nor can an object be known if it passes by slowly but at too great a distance from the eyes, as in the case of some object seen crossing a bridge. In such cases, even when the objects are seen afterwards, we cannot say that this is a horse and that is a cow. (Bk. 35: 50.)

Memory is the retention of impressions which sufficient duration of time has made clear and vivid to the mind. "We may know a thing without the five senses; that is because of duration" (Bk. 33:45). "Intelligence sees (a fire) through the eyes which see because of the fire. The fire is not known except through the senses. But after some duration of time, it can be seen without the eyes as well as if there were a real fire" (Bk. 35:45). Thus "retention (memory) is because of duration" (Bk. 32:50).

We remember things by the aid of names. A name is a sign (指, 志) which represents the attributes of the thing or the group of things so named. The name "horse" represents all that goes to make up the horse. The name "fire" represents all the qualities of fire. So "when we see a fire and say it is hot, it is not necessary for us to feel the heat of that fire" (Bk. 35:46). For fire "must be hot: it is remembered so" (Bk. 33:46).

The Confucians, as we have seen, had maintained that names originated in transcendental "ideas" which the wise sage-rulers of antiquity ordered to become names. The Neo-Mohists, on the other hand, held that names are convenient devices which men use to denote the substances. They are nothing but predicables to be predicated to subjects. (Bk. 34:31, 81; Bk. 32:81; Bk. 37:1.) Names are either general (達) or generic (類) or private (私). (Bk. 32:78.) "'Thing' is a general name: all substances can be so called. 'Horse' is a generic name: a generic name applies to all those substances that are similar to one another. 'Chang' is a private or proper name: such a name is limited to the subject so named" (Bk. 34:78). A private name is correct when the person named answers to it. (Bk. 35:71.) A generic name is correct which embodies all the attributes essential to the genus. (Bk. 34:92; Bk. 33:1; Bk. 37:9.) All names are correct which have received the mutual consent of the people using them. (Bk. 34:92.)

The Neo-Mohists classified all knowledge into three classes, according to the way in which it is acquired. "Knowledge comprises learning, inference, and personal experience" (Bk. 32:80). "Learning is that which is received through transmission. Inference is that which cannot be hindered by distance. Direct experience is that which is personally observed" (Bk. 34:80). This classification is not absolute, for the different classes overlap each other. Learning, for instance, is conceived as comprising both "that which is told by another" and "that which is personally observed." (Bk. 34:82.)

The definition of inferential knowledge as "that which cannot be hindered by distance" may be illustrated by the following passages. "When we learn that what we do not know is like what we have already known, then we know both" (Bk. 33:69). The explanatory section gives this illustration: Suppose, while standing

outside a room, we are told that the color of the inside is the same as the color of the outside. Now if the outside is white, then we know that the inside is also white. "The color outside is knowledge of personal observation ; the color inside is knowledge by inference" (Bk. 35:69). Inference, therefore, is knowing the unknown by means of the known: it is extending the knowledge of direct experience beyond the field of personal observation. Although separated by distance, an object may thus be known "as distinctly as if it were actually seen" (Bk. 35:47).

True to the pragmatic and empirical tradition of Moh Tih, the Neo-Mohists also conceived choice and conduct as the test of knowledge. "We may find out what a man does not know by asking him to choose by means of names" (Bk. 33:47). The explanation of this section is as follows: "What is to one as distinct as if it were actually seen, is knowledge. Mix what he knows with what he does not know and ask him to say which things he knows and which he knows not. If he can do that, he may be said to know both" (Bk. 35:47).

Theories, too, are to be tested by the practical consequences they tend to produce. "Initiating (a theory) deserves just as much blame as supporting (one): both are to be judged by the practical achievements" (Bk. 33:68). "The initiator (of a belief or theory) deserves no blame when what he advocates has as little practical use as the tares in the wheat field. . . . Telling a man to take by force another's coat may be highly criminal or may be only slightly criminal (that is, according to whether or not the order is carried out). Causing some wine to be sent to a man may or may not be praiseworthy (that is, it depends upon what use is made of the wine)" (Bk. 35:68).

While holding that knowledge ought to influence conduct, the Neo-Mohists, however, recognized that human actions are by no means always guided by knowledge. "*Conduct,*" we read, "*is the completion of knowledge, and is dependent upon desires*" (Bk. 32:75). This remarkable definition of conduct is explained in these words: "Suppose a man desires to cut off his finger. If he does not foresee the evil consequences of this action, then his intelligence is to blame. But if his knowledge has cautioned him not to do it, and he still desires to cut it, he will suffer the consequences." In

this case, the desire is so strong that it refuses to be checked by undisputed knowledge. "Again suppose a man does not know the danger or safety beyond that wall. He could find it out if he went there. But he would not go. In this case, he checks his desire by his doubts." Here the desire is not very strong, so it is readily checked even when there is no certain knowledge of the possible dangers of a contemplated action. (Bk. 34:75.)

The problem of education is, therefore, that of attaining right desires and aversions. The Mohists defined the right as the good, or, more literally translated, the useful (利).[1] (Bk. 32:8.) "The good is that which when obtained is liked. The evil is that which when obtained is disliked" (Bk. 32:26, 27). "Desire, if correct, determines (literally, 'weighs') the good. Aversion, if correct, determines the evil" (Bk. 32:85). But what is correct or right desire and aversion? To this problem the Mohists gave no solution *überhaupt*. The individual will have to decide for himself what is correct desire or aversion in a particular situation. When he is held up by a burglar and his life is imperiled, he will be choosing the good if he saves his life by losing his purse or even losing his finger. When he is not thus acting under compulsion but is given free choice, the right action consists in doing what his best knowledge considers to be the good. While no rigid rule can hold true for all cases, some general principle may be laid down for the guidance of the individual. This principle is: "Of two evils, choose the lesser; of two goods, choose the greater." And the criterion of what is a lesser evil or a greater good again depends upon the knowledge and training of the individual himself. One thing, however, is certain. The Mohists never conceived that criterion in terms of self-interest. A thing is a "lesser evil" or a "greater good" in proportion to its social value; that is, either directly to society or to the individual conceived with reference to his worth to society. "If the loss of a finger and the loss of an arm make no practical difference to the world, then there is no difference between the two" (Bk. 36).

Morality, in short, is an art. It is "weighing the heaviness and the lightness of actions" in order "to determine their right

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[1] The Confucians had defined the right as "what ought to be" (宜).

and wrong." It is choosing the good whenever it is recognized. It is evaluation. Moral education, therefore, aims at developing the individual's ability to see or foresee the consequences of his action so vividly as to arouse his desire or aversion for it. The end of moral education is right evaluation; that is, right desires and right aversions. Since "conduct is the end of knowledge and is dependent upon desires," right desiring will produce right conduct. And since right desiring is in its turn dependent upon the ability to foresee vividly the consequences of one's action, the problem of conduct is, after all, a problem of right knowing. Therefore, "not to know that knowing a thing or not has practical consequences, is absurd" (Bk. 33: 32). For "it is knowledge that reasons about things, and without knowledge we have nothing wherewith (to reason about things)" (Bk. 35:32).

BOOK III

THE LOGIC OF NEO-MOHISM

Chapter III

Cause, Form, and Deduction

Having discussed the Neo-Mohists' theory of knowledge, we shall in this and the following chapters study their theories of inferential knowledge. We shall begin with a definition and description of the nature and general method of reasoning. "In order to distinguish between right and wrong, to inquire into the causes of good government and misrule, to know the points of agreement and difference between things, to examine the relations between names (predicables) and substances (subjects), to be able to determine the good and the evil, and to be able to meet difficult and doubtful situations,—in order to accomplish all this, the reasoner notes and observes the happenings (literally, the becoming-so) of all things and seeks the order or relation between the various judgments; he defines the subject with the predicate, expresses his meaning in a proposition, and gives the reason (or the 'because') in a premise; he selects instances on the principle of similarity and affirms on the principle of similarity" (Bk. 37:1).

This remarkable sentence states clearly the Neo-Mohists' conception of logic. The use of logic is sixfold: (1) to distinguish the right from the wrong (which is the Chinese way of saying "to tell truth from falsehood"); (2) to inquire into the causes of the success and failure of human institutions; (3) to learn the points of agreement and difference between things; (4) to find out the relations between substances and predicables; (5) to determine the good and the evil, and (6) to be able to meet difficult and doubtful situations. The whole procedure of logical reasoning is summed up as consisting in observation of facts and search for the order or relation between the various judgments. The formal aspects of reasoning are also enumerated here: the terms, the proposition, and the "because" in premises. Finally,

logical reasoning is conceived as entirely based on the principle of similarity, the principle that similars are similarly determined.

The term employed by the Neo-Mohists for inference is that which literally means an "explanation." The word is also used to mean the "premise" or the proposition which contains the explanation or reason or ground of a conclusion. "A premise is that by which something is made clear" (Bk. 32 : 72). We may thus define inference as the process of knowing by means of a premise or premises. According to the passage quoted above, a premise is that which states the "because" of the conclusion. The relation of the "because" to the conclusion is causal: the because is to the conclusion as a cause is to its effect. In the Neo-Mohist logic, the same word (故) is used for both "cause" and "because." We shall therefore begin our study of the Neo-Mohist logic with their conception of causality.

"A cause is that with the obtaining of which something becomes" (Bk. 32 : 1). In the explanation of this definition, we are told that a cause may be either complete or incomplete. "A minor cause is one with which something may not necessarily be so, but without which it will never be so. It is only partial, and may be likened unto a point in a line. A major cause is one with which something will of necessity be so, and without which it will never be so. When this is seen, one may be said to have insight" (Bk. 34: 1). A major cause is a complete cause, the "sum-total of conditions." A minor cause is a partial or incomplete cause. This conception of causality, it may incidentally be pointed out, is in accord with the spirit of a scientific age and could not be the formulation of a religious teacher like Moh Tih who attributed causal power to the spirits and the gods.

Insight is thus conceived as consisting in seeing the causal relation of things. Elsewhere we read: "Why a thing becomes so, and how to see it, and how to make others see it,—these are different things" (Bk. 33 : 8). In explaining this statement, disease is taken as an illustration: "A thing is injured by something; that is the cause (of the disease). To know this is wisdom. To tell it to others is to make others wise" (Bk. 35 : 8). That is to say, true knowledge consists in seeing things in their causal relations, and the purpose of education is to impart this knowledge

to the people in order that they may be better equipped to deal with the problems of life.

Equally important and closely connected with the doctrine of causality is the doctrine of "form" (法). "A form is that according to which something becomes" (Bk. 32:70). It may be pointed out here that the "form" (*fah*) of the Neo-Mohists originally meant a mold and is thus related to the "idea" (*hsiang*) of Confucius, which meant "to imitate or model after."[1] Thus in the explanation of the above definition, we read that "either the concept of a circle, or the compasses, or a finished circle may be used as the form (for making a circle)" (Bk. 34:70). The form is here conceived as the archetype after which a thing or a class of things is formed. It may be found either in the idea or concept of the thing, or in the instrumentality with which it is made, or in a typical member of the class to which the thing belongs.

As we have seen, a cause is "that with the obtaining of which something becomes." From this definition and from the definition of form quoted above, it follows that cause and form are one and the same thing, only viewed from a different standpoint. The form of a thing is its cause already known and formulated for purposes of inference. Drawing with a pair of compasses in a certain way is the cause of producing a circle. When this cause of circle-making is formulated, it becomes the form or "formula" by following which circles may be produced. And if circles are not produced by following this form, then it cannot be the cause of circle-production.

To seek "that with the obtaining of which something becomes" is the task of induction. To draw inferences from forms or known and formulated causes, is the task of deduction. With this we proceed to the study of the Neo-Mohist theory of deduction.

The term used by the Neo-Mohists for deduction is *hsiao* (效) which means "to imitate," and hence "a mold." Deductive reasoning is to infer from a *hsiao* or mold. The following defini-

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[1] Centuries later, the word "form" (*fah*) was used to translate the *dharma* of the Buddhists.

tion is taken from Book 37: "The *hsiao* or reasoning from a mold consists of setting up the form. That which is modeled after is that which is to be set up as the form. When the cause or the because (故) conforms to the *hsiao* or mold, it is right (true). When it does not conform to the *hsiao*, it is wrong (false). That is called *hsiao* or deduction" (Bk. 37:2).

This passage may be illustrated by two others already quoted: "A form is that according to which something becomes." "Either a concept of a circle, or the compasses, or a finished circle may be used as the form (after which a circle may be made)." Let us use this illustration: "This is a circle." To this conclusion the because may be given in either one of three ways:

"Because it has equidistant radii from the center;"

or,

"Because it is described with the compasses in a certain manner;"

or,

"Because it is an exact copy of a circle."

In each case, the because gives the form or model after which the conclusion is formed. Each, therefore, is a case of deduction.

Or, we may take the familiar example:

"Socrates is mortal,
Because he is a man."

Here the because also gives the model after which the conclusion is formed. The "form" here consists in the class or genus to which the subject properly belongs. For, as we have seen, the form is the archetype after which a thing or a class of things is formed. And that is precisely what the name of the genus stands for.

The principle of similarity which underlies all inference is merely another way of expressing the doctrine of form. "All things that are of one form are to one another as all cubes are to one another" (Bk. 33: 64). "All cubes are similar to one another because they are of one form with variations only in material Whether they be of wood or stone makes no difference in the similarity of their cubicity. This is true of all things" (Bk. 35: 64). Therefore, to have found the genus to which the subject properly belongs and to the members of which it is similar, is to have found the form.

Mr. Chang Ping-ling, in his *Kuoh Ku Lun Han*, published in 1910, maintained that the Mohists had a doctrine of syllogism. He based his argument on what seems to me an erroneous interpretation of the passage on causality already quoted. Taking the "minor cause" and the "major cause" to mean the minor and major premises of the syllogism, Mr. Chang declared that the Mohist syllogism takes this form:

M – P. (Minor premise).
S – M. (Major premise).

S – P. (Conclusion). (pp. 178,179.)

This theory I have rejected on the ground that the passage on which it is based is beyond any doubt a discussion on causality, and not on deduction. Moreover, the theory of deduction which I have quoted above, is found immediately preceding the theories of analogy and induction, and is therefore to be taken as a correct statement of the Neo-Mohist theory of deduction. This theory of deduction, as the preceding paragraphs have shown, does not require the syllogistic form: it only requires that the because must conform to the form. Thirdly, that the Neo-Mohist deduction was not syllogistic in form is seen in the following reasonings which are found in the texts:

"A puppy (狗) is a dog (犬)
"But killing a puppy is not killing a dog" (Bk. 33:53).

Again:

"A thief is a man.
"But loving a thief is not loving a man. . . .
"Killing a thief is not killing a man" (Bk. 37:6).

Had the Neo-Mohists insisted on the syllogistic form of deduction, they could not have drawn a negative conclusion from a universal affirmative major premise.

My conclusion is, therefore, that the Neo-Mohist theory of deduction is not a theory of syllogism. It is essentially a theory of correct predication. For the "form" or "mold" is simply the name of the class to which the subject belongs. "Socrates is mortal, because he is a man." Or, "Socrates is mortal, because all men are mortal." Both forms are correct deduction, because both found the class "man" to which Socrates belongs. It is not

necessary to have both the major and the minor premises, because in inference we always assume the principle of similarity which serves as the major premise when the minor alone is mentioned, and as the minor when the major alone is mentioned.

To find the "form," that is, to find the genus of the subject, is an act of classification or naming. Deduction is simply inference by means of propositions which follow the proper order of naming. "Propositions follow the order of classification. To make propositions without knowing the classificatory sequence will of necessity lead to difficulties" (Book 36). That is the rule of procedure in deductive reasoning. The problem of deduction is to explain one thing in terms of another which is "better known in its own nature." To find the genus of the subject is to make known its nature through the nature of the better known. "Predication (or naming) explains the unknown by means of the known, . . . as when we measure an unknown length by a foot-rule" (Bk. 35:69).

Correct deduction, therefore, must depend on correct classification. Deduction itself, however, does not enable us to know "the order of classification." Says Cuvier: "In order to name well, you must know well."[1] That belongs to the realm of induction.

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[1] Quoted by Ritter, W. E., in "The Place of Description, Definition, and Classification in Philosophical Biology." (*Scientific Monthly*, Vol. III, pp. 455 ff.)

Chapter IV

Induction

Book 37 enumerates five methods of reasoning, the first of which, the *hsiao* (效), we have treated as deduction. The other four are:

> "The method of comparison (the *pi*, 辟) consists in illustrating one thing by means of another. The method of parallel (the *mou*, 侔) consists in comparing two propositions consistently throughout. The method of analogy (the *yuen*, 援) says: 'You are so, why should I not be so?' The method of induction (the *tuei*, 推) consists in making a general affirmation on the ground that the unexamined instances are similar to those already examined. When it is said, 'All the others are the same,' how can one say, 'The others are not the same'?" (Bk. 37: 2.)

First, the method of comparison or illustration does not purport to discover new truths, but merely to explain one thing by means of something else which bears some resemblance to it. All metaphors, similes, and comparisons belong to this class. They are illustrative, descriptive, but not heuristic. The following story told of a Mohist will best show the nature of this method:

> The King of Liang said to Hui Sze (the Mohist): "Sir, when you wish to say anything to me, please say it direct and use no illustrations." To this Hui Sze answered: "Suppose here is a man who does not know what a *dan*[1] is and who asks, 'What does a *dan* look like?' Shall I tell him, 'A *dan* looks like a *dan*?'"
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> "No, that does not make him understand."
>
> "But if I tell him, 'A *dan* is like a bow, except that it has a piece of bamboo, instead of string, for the belly,' will he then understand?"
>
> "Certainly."

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[1] A *dan* (彈) is a sort of sling used for propelling stones or metal bullets.

"Therefore," said Hui Sze, "the process of reasoning consists in explaining the unknown by means of the known. If, my lord, illustrations are not to be used, reasoning will be impossible." [1]

Secondly, the method of *mou* or parallel, though its definition is not quite enlightening, seems to be also a kind of comparison. It differs from the first method in the fact that, while the *pi* consists in comparing one thing with another, the *mou* makes comparison between propositions. A parable such as the story of the prodigal son or that of the house built on sand, would be a case of parallel.[2] To compare the life career of Alexander the Great with that of Napoleon I, or to compare Bismarck with Cavour throughout their lives, would also be a case of parallel. Its use is also illustrative and not necessarily heuristic.

The third method, the *yuen*. is analogical inference. It says: "If you are so, why should I not be so?" This differs from the two preceding methods in one essential point. In the two former cases, the reasoner (or the speaker) already knows both the things compared and is only explaining the one in terms of the other which, to the listener, is the better known of the two. In the case of analogical inference, the reasoner knows what has happened to one thing and infers that it will also happen to another on the assumption that the former resembles the latter in certain aspects.

The fourth method is induction. "The *tuei* consists in making a general affirmation on the ground that the unexamined cases are similar to those already examined." This definition is so modern in its wording that we may well quote a modern definition of induction for its amplification. "Induction," says Mill, "consists in inferring from some individual instances in which a phenomenon is observed to occur, that it occurs in all instances of a certain class; namely, in all which resemble the former, in what are regarded as the material circumstances." [3]

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[1] Liu Shiang's *Shuoh Yuen*.

[2] Many most strikingly beautiful parables were produced in the fourth, third, and second centuries B. C.

[3] *System of Logic*, Bk. III, ch. 3, 1.

The difference between analogy and induction lies in that the former infers a particular fact from another particular fact, whereas the result of induction is a general law applicable to a whole class. The applicability of the resultant law holds as long as no negative instance is found to disprove it. That, I think, is the meaning of the last part of the definition which reads: "When it is said, 'All the others are the same,' how can one say, 'The others are not the same'?"

The difference between induction and analogy mentioned above is, however, only a difference in degree. Induction is only analogy based on more extensive observation of instances. The result of analogical reasoning, though particular in appearance, is in reality a generalization, assuming that the two particular instances in question are members of a general class. Otherwise, there is no ground for inference. In some cases, the resultant conclusion of an analogical inference may have just as much validity as a generalization based on an extensive examination of instances. Such is the case of those analogical inferences in which the particular instances chosen are so typical of the class they represent that there is no need of examining more instances.

Such an inference, reasoning from one particular to another with the resultant particularization equivalent in validity to a generalization, is called the method of *chuoh* (援, "to draw out"), which may be translated "analogical induction." "The *chuoh* is an inference where there is no doubt" (Bk. 33:49). "In a case of *chuoh*, there is no reason for doubt. Chang dies; hence we may conclude that Chun will also die" (Bk. 35:49). In the example given in this passage, the Neo-Mohists seem to have regarded the general belief that "all men are mortal" as a result of an analogical rather than an inductive inference.

It has already been stated that to infer from known or formulated causes is deduction, and to find the causes is the task of induction. It has also been stated that the Neo-Mohists conceived of the form both as a formulated cause of formation and as the class to which the subject properly belongs. This conception of forms is necessary to a clear understanding of the Neo-Mohist theory of induction. This theory of induction, if I have understood it correctly, treats induction, including analogy and

analogical induction, both as a method of computation of causes and as a method of classification. For this theory seems to assume that a causal relation is implied in the genus-species relation, and that to classify well, therefore, is one way of expressing the causal relation between things.[1] This assumption seems to be the meaning of the following passages: "Causation (使, as distinguished from 故, a cause) includes predication (謂) and causal connection (故)" (Bk. 32:77). The explanatory section reads: "Causation: To have something named is predication. It is not necessary that the thing (so named) is become so. To moisten, (for example) is (a case of) causal connection. It is necessary that some causal relation shall have taken place" (Bk. 35:77). I take this to mean that while the causal connection may be expressed in the genus-species relation, it does not follow that every predication is an expression of causation. That is to say, only classifications based on essential similarity or resemblance can be said to imply a causal connection. Suppose we say "A is a thief." If A is empirically proved to have committed theft, then to put him in the class of thieves is equivalent to saying that A is causally related to those things which have made him what he is. But if he has not committed theft, then the mere act of naming does not make him a thief. (Cf. Bk. 34:10.)

To seek examples in modern science, we may say that physics, in general, expresses causation in the form of "A is caused by B," and the biological sciences express causation in the form of "A is a species of B." The former states a causal connection (故), the latter makes a classificatory predication (謂). The former is ordinarily called explanation, the latter, description and classification. Both depend on induction, and the ordinary distinction that explaining is largely guided by hypotheses, while describing and classifying are very little so guided,—is only a superficial distinction.

Viewing induction as a method of classification as well as a method of computation of causes, the Neo-Mohists' theory of inductive methods comprises the method of Agreement, the method

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[1] "And the universal is valuable because it reveals the cause." Aristotle, *An. Post.*, 87, b. 28.

of Difference, and the joint method of Agreement and Difference. Of these, the joint method is the true method of scientific induction. (1) *The method of Agreement.* "Agreement" (同) is defined as "that with respect to which separate things are at one." (Bk. 32 : 39.) Things are said to agree in four ways : (*a*) Identity, (*b*) Generic Relation, (*c*) Co-existence, and (*d*) Partial Resemblance. (Bk 32 : 87.) "(*a*) Identity means one subject having two names. (*b*) Generic Relation means inclusion in one class. (*c*) Co-existence means occupying the same space. (*d*) Partial Resemblance means things having some points of similarity" (Bk. 34 : 87). Thus what the Chinese call *bo lo mih* is identical with what is called "pine-apple" in English. Man and the orange are generically related. Whiteness and solidity co-exist in the stone, and hydrogen and oxygen co-exist in water. Snow resembles white feathers.

(2) *The method of Difference.* Things are said to differ in four ways: (*a*) Duality, (*b*) Unrelatedness, (*c*) Separateness, and (*d*) Dissimilarity. (Bk. 32 : 88.) "(*a*) Duality means that two things necessarily have variations.[1] (*b*) Unrelatedness means that the things do not belong to any one class. (*c*) Separateness means that they do not occupy the same space. (*d*) Dissimilarity means that they have nothing in common" (Bk. 34 : 88). What is here called duality comes very near to the modern conception of individuality. Any two things, however similar they may be to each other, "necessarily" have some individual variations. These variations constitute their "two-ness" (二). The other three kinds of difference need no further illustration.

(3) *The joint method of Agreement and Difference.* This method is defined as follows: "When the methods of Agreement and of Difference are jointly used, we may know what is present and what is absent" (Bk. 32 : 89). In Bk. 34 : 89, there is an explanatory section of ninety-one words, which, to our deep disappointment, have been so corrupted that they are utterly

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[1] The original text reads: 二必異, 二也. The second character 必 (necessarily) was taken by Mr. Sun Yi-yong to mean its symphonic 畢 (entirely, throughout). According to him, the sentence would read: "Two things different in every respect," which would be a repetition of (*d*). I have therefore retained the original meaning of 必 (necessarily) and taken the passage to mean what might be called "individual variations."

unintelligible. From the scattered legible words, however, we gather that the passage discusses such variety of things as quantity, hardness and softness, animateness and inanimateness, youth and senility, color, position, right and wrong, maturity and immaturity, etc. In Book 36, there is also a long passage devoted to the discussion of the methods of Agreement and Difference, which unfortunately is also scarcely intelligible. From other places I have gathered the following passages which may serve to illustrate the use of the joint method.

"If the method is one of agreement, see to it that it is not applied with a cunning turn. If it selects certain things and rejects others, then seek the reasons therefor and see whether the selections and rejections are not satisfactorily made. To classify (止) all men as 'black' because there are black men and not-black men, or to classify all men as 'beings loved by men' because some men are beloved and some are not beloved,—how can such classifications be made! If one mentions those instances that are so and concludes (universally) that they are so, then show him those cases that are not so" (Bk. 34:92).

In discussing the method of Agreement in classification (Bk. 33:1), it is pointed out in the explanatory section that "if a man thinks that this (此) is so and says that all these (是) are so, I may show that that is not so, and thereby disprove the generalization that all these are so" (Bk. 35:1). Another passage bearing on the use of the joint method may be cited: "Unmethodical selection or enumeration does not enable us to know differences" (Bk. 33:65). "A cow differs from a horse. But to prove their difference by saying 'Because a cow has teeth and a horse has a tail,' is not permissible. These things are possessed by both. Neither the one attribute nor the other is present in the one instance and absent in the other. Say rather: 'A horse differs from a cow because the latter has horns whereas the former has none.' That is the differentia of the two species" (Bk. 35:65).

From what has been said above, it is evident that, to the Neo-Mohists, the joint method is the true method of induction. The methods of Agreement and of Difference can be used independently of each other only when the points of agreement or of difference are so obvious that no negative instance seems probable. That

this is the case may be seen in the following passage which discusses the fallacies of all the four methods of inferring from particular cases, namely, the methods of comparison, parallel, analogy, and induction.

> "Things which have certain aspects of similarity among them, may not resemble one another in other respects. The parallel between judgments may break down after reaching a certain limit. It is true that every event must have a cause. But while the events themselves may resemble one another, they may not be due to the same cause. And in selecting instances, we are always guided by some principle of selection. While the instances chosen may resemble one another, the principle of selection may not have been consistently applied throughout. Therefore, the methods of comparison, parallel, analogy, and induction . . . must not be used without great caution" (Bk. 37:3).

These fallacies may be summed up under four heads: (1) It is possible that the observed resemblances may be superficial and irrelevant while the overlooked differences may be more fundamental and significant. (2) Even when evidences of parallel development are traceable throughout many stages, the resemblance may yet be a matter of coincidence, but no proof of similarity in causation. (3) There is the difficulty known as "the plurality of causes," namely, that "while the events may resemble one another, they may not be due to the same cause." Heat may be produced by combustion, friction, electricity, etc.; death may be caused by beheading, drowning, consumption, cancer, etc. (4) Finally, there is the danger of allowing one's prejudices or prepossessions of the mind to influence one's selection and rejection of instances. "While the instances chosen may resemble one another, the principle of selection may not have been consistently applied throughout." The most common result is the ignoring of negative instances. An advocate of celibacy, for instance, may cite Newton, Descartes, Spinoza, Hobbes, Locke, Kant, Bentham, Herbert Spencer, etc., to prove that all great thinkers were celibates, thus ignoring those philosophers who married. All these four fallacies, to sum up, can only be checked by the use of the joint method which aims at the discovery of the condition or attribute present in the affirmative instances and absent in the negative instances.

Two points remain to be discussed in connection with our study of the Neo-Mohists' theory of induction. The first point is the conception of inference based on historical analogy, as influenced by a newer conception of history. We have seen that the founder of Mohism had placed great trust in the recorded experiences of the sages of antiquity, and had made compatibility with such experiences one of the three tests of truth and right.[1] The Neo-Mohists, however, do not seem to entertain such faith in this method of testing a present conception by its consistency with the recorded sayings and acts of the past. The notion of progress as adaptation to changing conditions, as we shall see in a later chapter,[2] had already dawned on the minds of the age. Thus in discussing the method of inferring from what has been to what is or will be, Bk. 35 : 15 says: "Yao (a Chinese sage-ruler of the twenty-third century B. C.) was a wise ruler because we judge him retrogressively (literally, "from the present to the past"). But if it were possible to place the ancients in the modern age, Yao would probably be unable to rule a modern state." For this reason, the Neo-Mohists discouraged the use of historical analogies. "(To say) 'this is as just as a Yao,' is to project the present into the past with a great difference in time. . . . What was just in the one differs from what is just in the other" (Bk. 33 : 52). The explanatory section to this is still more interesting: "In showing something to a man, we either use its name or point to the substance itself. To say, 'My friend is a rich merchant,' is describing him by a name. To point to this friend, saying, 'This is Ho,' is pointing to the substance (or subject). But for a modern man to say, 'This is the justice of a Yao,' means that the substance (or subject) of the name 'just' existed in the remote past. That is like predicating Chang by 'a gate of the city'" (Bk. 35 : 52). That is to say, knowledge must be verifiable and an historical analogy which is too remote for verification gives no reliable ground for belief. "Naming explains the unknown by means of the known. It should not render the known doubtful by predicating it with an unknown" (Bk. 35:69).

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[1] Pt. III, Bk. II, ch. 2.

[2] Pt. IV, ch. I.

The other point to be considered is the question of probability, of the value of knowledge acquired through inference from particular instances. In our early discussions of the relation between causes and forms, it was stated that forms are nothing but known and formulated causes. The cause sought in induction becomes the "because" in deduction. We have seen that "the because must conform to the form" which is defined as "that according to which something becomes." No cause is a true cause which is not capable of being made the "because" of induction.[1] "That with the obtaining of which something becomes" must also be "that according to which something becomes." That is to say, the validity of an inductive generalization lies in its fitness to become the premise of deduction, in its practical value to enable men to interpret the particular and manifold facts.

The question whether truth is absolute and eternal did not interest the Neo-Mohists. To them truth is rightness (正), that which men are forced to believe in, or, to use an expression of the idealists, "obliged to think." "Rightness is what cannot be objected to" (正無非) (Bk. 32:92). "Rightness is what men have all mutually agreed upon. In knowledge each man has his own say. But having all agreed upon something, as, for example, '(The circumference of) a circle contains no straight line,' no more can be said. Because all have agreed upon it, it becomes as if it were naturally so" (Bk. 34:92).[2]

This view of truth does not in the least diminish the value of knowledge. For "what will probably be so (且然), though not absolutely sure, does not deter us from our efforts" (Bk. 33:59). I

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[1] The Hindu *Anumana* (inference) often takes this form.

1. Yonder mountain is "fiery."
2. Because it smokes.
3. Whatever smokes is "fiery," as an oven.
4. Yonder mountain does smoke.
5. Therefore yonder mountain is "fiery." (Brajendranath Seal, *The Positive Sciences of the Hindus*, p. 251.)

[2] I give the original text together with my own reading:

Original text: 正五諸皆人於知有說過五諸若員無直無說用五諸若自然矣.

My reading: 正, 互諸. 人皆於知有說. 過互諸, 若"員無直," 無說. 用互諸, 若自然矣.

quote the explanation of this section as the most fitting conclusion to this study of the Neo-Mohist logic. "What will probably be is just as good as what is. What will probably be so, must be so. What will probably end, must end. What will probably require our efforts for its completion, must require our efforts for its completion" (Bk. 35:59).

Chapter V

Hui Sze and Kung-Sun Lung

I

Biographical Notes

Hui Sze was Minister of State to King Hui of Liang who reigned from 370 to 319 B. C.[1] We are told by the *Lü Sze Chun Chiu* (XXI : 1) and the *Records of the Contending States* (XX : 3) that he was still alive when King Hui died in 319 B.C.[1] We also learn from the *Lü Sze Chun Chiu* (XXI : 5) that he was sponsor for the policy which resulted in the rulers of Liang (Wei) and Chi holding a congress in 334 B. C. for the purpose of proclaiming each other "Kings." From these facts, we may infer that Hui Sze probably lived between 380 and 300 B. C.

In the epilogue of the *Chuang Tze*, Hui Sze is characterized as "a man of catholic interest and having written books sufficient to fill five cartloads." He was a great dialectician and had a very large following. He took great delight in expressing his thoughts in most striking paradoxes of which only a few are preserved to us. It is said in the *Chuang Tze* that when once asked why the heavens do not fall and the earth does not sink, and also about the causes of wind, rain, thunder, and lightning, "Hui Sze answered without hesitation or thinking, and delivered a discourse of endless length on all things in the universe." Unfortunately, the "five cartloads" of his works including the tantalizing "discourse of endless length" have not come down to us.

From the *Chuang Tze* (Book 24) we quote this most exquisite passage:

> "Chuang Tze went to attend a funeral and passed by the grave of Hui Sze. Turning to the man next to him, Chuang Tze said: 'There was a man in the city of Ying who found on his nose a drop of paint about the size of the wing of

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[1] This date of the King's death is according to the *Bamboo Chronicles*. The *Records of the Historian* (by Sze-Ma Chien) erroneously placed it at 335 B. C.

a fly. He sent for the famous master carpenter Shih and told him to take off the paint with his ax. Master Shih swung his ax as swiftly as the wind and chopped the paint off the nose without touching the skin. The man of the city of Ying stood there without even changing his countenance. Sometime afterwards, the Prince of Sung, hearing of this remarkable feat, sent for Master Shih and said to him. 'Now try it again for my sake.' 'Sire,' said Master Shih, 'truly I was once able to do it. But alas! my material died long ago.''

"'Since the death of the Master (i. e., Hui Sze), I too have lost my 'material,' and have had no one to talk to.'"

Kung-Sun Lung was a great dialectician, and, true to the Mohist tradition, attacked war and advocated peace and disarmament. According to the *Lü Sze Chun Chiu*, he presented his pacifism to King Tsao (311–279 B. C.) of Yen before the latter's victorious campaign against the State of Chi (284–279 B. C.) (Bk. XVIII, 7), and to King Hui (298–266 B. C.) of Chao (Bk. XVIII, 1). From the *Records of the Contending States* (Book XX), we learn that he was with the Prince of Ping-Yuen after the battle of Kan Tan which was fought in 257 B. C. If this last-mentioned record is trustworthy, it would seem that he flourished during the first half of the third century B. C., and was born probably about 325–315 B. C. This would disprove the ordinary interpretation of the epilogue of the *Chuang Tze* that Hui Sze and Kung-Sun Lun had dialectical conversations with each other. Personally, I am inclined to think that my assignment of dates is probably correct. For the epilogue of the *Chuang Tze* only says:

"Hui Sze regarded these (his paradoxes) as great discoveries, and taught them to the dialecticians. The dialecticians in the world were delighted in them. (Here follow the twenty-two paradoxes of the dialecticians):—With these paradoxes the dialecticians responded to Hui Sze, the discussions never ending throughout their lives. Huan Tuan and Kung-Sun Lung and the rest of the dialecticians confounded one's mind and altered one's ideas. They may have been able to triumph over one's tongue, but they cannot win over one's

mind. With his knowledge, Hui Sze argued every day with men. In effect he was merely creating curiosities with the dialecticians of the world. That is all."

In this passage there is no specific mention of the fact that Kung-Sun Lung was one of those dialecticians who conversed with Hui Sze. It was possible for *later* dialecticians to "respond" to Hui Sze's paradoxes with even more subtle ones. Furthermore, that Kung-Sun Lung was one of the protégés of the Prince of Ping-Yuen (d. 251 B. C.) seems to be too abundantly attested to admit any doubt. The fact mentioned in the *Records of the Contending States* that he was with him as late as 257 B. C., would thus seem acceptable as historically true.

Among his adversaries, Kung-Sun Lung was chiefly known as the advocate of the doctrine that a white horse is not a horse. The Imperial Catalogue of the Han Dynasty mentions his works as consisting of fourteen books. But the existing works collected under his name contain only six books of which the first is an editorial preface by some unknown hand, and the third and fourth books are so much corrupted and probably interpolated that they are scarcely readable.

II

The Paradoxes of Hui Sze

In the epilogue of the *Chuang Tze*, ten paradoxes are attributed to Hui Sze, and twenty-two to Kung-Sun Lung and other dialecticians. The ten paradoxes of Hui Sze are as follows:

1. The greatest has no exterior: it is called the Great Unit. The smallest has no interior: it is called the Little Unit.

2. That which has no thickness cannot have magnitude, and yet it may be as large as to cover a thousand miles (*li*).

3. The heavens are as low as the earth;[1] the mountains are on the same level as the streams.

4. The sun shines obliquely as it is noon. A thing dies as it is born.

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[1] Perhaps Mr. Sun Yi-yang's reading "The heavens touch the earth" is more correct. Mr. Chang Ping-ling in his *Notes on the Chuang Tze* accepted this reading.

5. A great similarity differs from a little similarity: this is called Little-Difference-and-Similarity. All things in the universe are similar to one another and are different from one another: this is called Great-Difference-and-Similarity.

6. The South has no limit and has a limit.

7. I go to Yueh (a State in the South) to-day and arrived there yesterday.

8. A series of jade rings connected into one another may be dissociated one from another.

9. I know the center of the world: it is north of Yen (the farthest northern country) and south of Yueh (the farthest southern country).

10. Love all things equally: the universe is one.

The most systematic exposition of these paradoxes that has ever been attempted by previous writers was made by Mr. Chang Ping-ling who is perhaps the foremost living scholar of Ancient Chinese Philosophy. Mr. Chang grouped the paradoxes under three heads. (A) Six paradoxes (1), (2), (3), (6), (8), and (9), are arguments aiming at the establishment of the theory that all quantitative measurements and all spatial distinctions are illusory and unreal. He maintains that (1) and (2) endeavor to show that "since no mathematical division can arrive at the ultimate and indivisible unit, therefore quantitative measurements have nothing for their initial unit. . . . Therefore all measurement is illusory. And if all measurement is illusory, there is no real difference between 'the greatest' and 'the smallest' or between 'that which has no thickness' and that which extends over a thousand miles.'"[1] He holds that (3) is a denial of the reality of altitude and depth, the illusory character of which can be seen in the perspective of paintings. (6) denies the distinction between finiteness and infinity, (8) that between divisibility and indivisibility, and (9) that of directions.[1]

(B) Two paradoxes, (4) and (7), argue for the unreality of time. Says Mr. Chang: "The past is gone and the future has not come. Their nonexistence is easily seen. Even the present cannot be grasped. The smallest unit of time is a *Kshana*. A *Kshana*

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[1] Chang Ping-ling, *Kuoh Ku Lun Han*, pp. 192, 193.

is not further indivisible, only exact divisions never stand still, and when one thinks of one unit, it is already the next unit. . . . Therefore it may be said that 'the sun shines slantingly when it is noon, and that a thing dies when it is born.' (4) . . . Again, we may leave for Yueh at noon and arrive there in the evening. If we regard the interval as one period, then we say, 'we go to Yueh to-day.' But if we regard the interval as several units, then we may rightly say, 'we arrived there yesterday' (7). All this shows that time-distinctions are human-made, and have no reality.''[1]

(C) The remaining two, (5) and (10), deny the reality of all apparent similarity and difference between things. "There are no things which are absolutely similar to one another, nor are there things which are absolutely different from one another. . . . No absolute similarity, therefore each has its individuality. No absolute difference, therefore all partake some common nature. . . . Therefore the universe is one. Hence 'Love all things equally.'''[2]

While accepting most of Mr. Chang's interpretations as correct in the main, I am inclined to think that the paradoxes like those of Zeno the Eleatic, are directed to prove a monistic theory of the universe. The tenth paradox is, therefore, to be regarded as the "moral" of the arguments. All the nine paradoxes are intended to show that "the universe is one" and that we should "love all things equally." In other words, the paradoxes constitute an attempt to establish a metaphysical basis for the Mohist doctrine of universal altruism.

It seems to me that all the paradoxes of Hui Sze and all those of Kung-Sun Lung (which we shall study later) can be interpreted in the light of collateral passages from the six books which I have treated as the texts of Neo-Mohism. In the Neo-Mohist theory of time and space, a distinction was made between duration (久) and time (時), and between space (宇) and place (所). "Duration extends over different times. Space extends over different places" (Bk. 32:40, 41). "Duration includes past and present, day and

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[1] Ibid.

[2] P. 194

night. Space covers east, west, south, and north" (Bk. 34:40, 41). That is to say, there is only one space and one time for the sections of which we have artificially devised our units of time and space. It must be noted in passing that the word "space" (宇) does not mean merely the empty space which Lao Tze called "non-being," but literally means the whole "universe," including, as we have seen, "the east, west, south, and north." This meaning has remained to this day. (See *Hui Nan Tze*, Book XI.)

That time is constantly passing from one moment to another is a fact admitted by common sense. But the Neo-Mohist holds that the universe in space is also constantly changing. "The positions (boundaries, 或＝域) of space (the spatial universe) are always shifting" (Bk. 33:12). "There is the south and the north in the morning, and again in the evening. Space, however, has long changed its place" (Bk. 35:12). Does this not seem to indicate that the Neo-Mohists have discovered that the earth moves? That this was probably the case is shown in another passage: "Spatial positions are names for that which is already past" (Bk. 33:31). "Knowing that this is not this and that this is no longer here, we still call it 'south and north.' That is, what is already past is regarded as if it were still present. We called it 'south' *then*, therefore we continue to call it 'south' *now*" (Bk. 35:31).

This, then, seems to be the assumption underlying the paradoxes of Hui Sze: that there is only one time and one space, continuous, infinitely divisible, and constantly changing. Paradox (1), therefore, may be regarded as a characterization of space. Taken as a whole, space is a "Great Unit" which "has no exterior." Taken in its smallest possible division, it is a "Small Unit" which may be regarded as "having no interior." (2) practically means the same thing: space may be so small as to "have no thickness" or so large as to "cover a thousand miles." Because space is constantly moving, therefore the heavens may be as low as the earth and mountains on the same level as rivers (3). Similarly, the "to-day" in one country may be the yesterday of another (7), and the "center of the universe" may very well be anywhere on the map, be it "north of Yen" or "south of Yueh" (9). All these are platitudes in an age which recognizes that the

earth is round and its rotation makes day and night. The Neo-Mohists, including Hui Sze, seem to have hit upon a great truth which, being too tremendous and too revolutionary to be easily explained on the insufficient data at their command, they explained in paradoxes.

I am inclined to think that this interpretation is not altogether an anachronism. Chou Yen (鄒衍), who was a contemporary of Hui Sze, maintained that what was then known as the "Middle Kingdom" was only "one of eighty-one parts of the world." He said that China formed one of the nine divisions of similar size which together form a continent. There were nine continents of approximately similar size, which together constitute the world. Each continent is surrounded by a "subsidiary sea," and the group of nine continents is surrounded by the "great sea" or ocean.[1] Chuang Tze, who was a younger contemporary of Hui Sze, also had a parable in which occurs this passage: "Are not the four seas in the universe like a little cavity on a gravel in a great lake? Is not the Middle Kingdom within the seas like a small grain in a great granary?"[2] The existence of such fantastic speculations about the size of the known portion of the earth in comparison with the vast unknown areas, would seem to indicate that it is not altogether unwarranted to construe the Neo-Mohists' theory of space as a bold hypothesis bordering on a belief that the earth, and not the sun, is moving.

Paradox (4) is based on the Neo-Mohist theory of temporal unity with, perhaps, a touch of pessimism. Only at one very brief moment can the sun shine at noon, and, as space is continuously moving, even that very brief moment of noonday seems only illusory. And compared with the infinity of time which "includes past and present, day and night," the life span of man is no less momentary and illusory than the moment of noon sun.

Still Mohism was neither skepticism nor pessimism. Infinite as time and space are, they are finite for all our practical purposes. Paradox (6) says, "The south has no limit, and has a limit;" that is, it is both infinite and finite. This, too, finds collaboration

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[1] Sze-Ma Chien, *Records of the Historian*, Bk. 74, 1.

[2] *Chuang Tze*, Book 17.

in the Neo-Mohist texts. "Infinity does not deter us from generalizing universally" (Bk. 33:72). This proposition is proved by what may be taken as an excellent example of a dilemma. "Whatever is finite can be exhaustively enumerated. Whatever is infinite cannot be so enumerated. If it is uncertain whether (the world is) finite or infinite, then it is also uncertain whether it cannot be exhaustively examined. If it is uncertain whether it cannot be exhaustively examined, then it is also uncertain whether or not it is completely inhabited by men. To assert positively the impossibility of including all men when it is uncertain whether men cannot inhabit the whole world, or to assert positively the impossibility of loving all men when it is uncertain whether all men can be included—that is absurd" (Bk. 35:72). Again we read: "Not knowing the number (of its members) we may yet know that something is true of the whole class. The reason therefor lies in the known instances" (Bk. 33:73). That is to say, for all practical purposes inferences may be drawn from incomplete enumeration of instances, and therefore infinity is no hindrance to induction. "What will probably be is just as good as what is." And what is infinite may be regarded as finite.

Paradox (5) may also be illustrated by quotations from the Neo-Mohist texts. In the chapter on induction, we have seen that Neo-Mohism takes cognizance of individual variations which constitute the "duality" or individuality of things. For all purposes of classification, however, individuality matters very little. Moreover, as we shall see later, the age was one of development of biological study, and the theory of organic evolution was already in the air. The idea that there is some essential and elemental unity underlying all apparent diversity and variation, was probably assumed in the paradox that "all things in the universe are both different from and similar to one another." Mr. Chang's interpretation of this paradox quoted above is, therefore, essentially correct. This again leads to the conclusion that "the universe is one," which is the basis of the Mohist doctrine of universal love.

The paradox of the chained jade rings (8) is perhaps the least interesting of all. Yet its solution points a moral which is both suggestive and illuminating. It was solved by a woman, the

Queen Dowager of Chi (d. 249 B. C.), who was once asked to dissociate a series of jade rings connected into one another. She solved the problem by breaking the series with a hammer.[1] This solution may not be the one intended by Hui Tze. The underlying principle, however, seems to be the same. To the mathematician who calculates the circumferences and radii of the rings, each ring may be conceived as dissociated from the others. The fact that they are chained into one another does not bother him in the least. This is in principle the same as breaking the series with a hammer. Both are "pragmatic" solutions.

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[1] *The Records of the Contending States*, XIII.

Chapter VI

Hui Sze and Kung-Sun Lung

(Concluded)

III

The Paradoxes of Kung-Sun Lung and Others

The material for this study consists of the twenty-one paradoxes preserved in the epilogue of the *Chuang Tze*, the seven paradoxes preserved in the *Lieh Tze* (Bk. IV, 12), and the six chapters now entitled the *Kung-Sun Lung Tze*. As the first-mentioned source contains more material than the other two, it is here taken as the basis of discussion, the other materials serving only as collateral illustrations.

The epilogue of the *Chuang Tze* is not quite clear as to the authorship of the twenty-one paradoxes. It attributes them to the "dialecticians" of whom two are mentioned by name—Kung-Sun Lung and Huan Tuan (桓團); the latter is mentioned in the *Lieh Tze* (Bk. IV, 12) as Han Tan (韓檀). But as five of the paradoxes, (*k*), (*o*), (*q*), (*t*), and (*u*), have been specifically attributed to Kung-Sun Lung in the *Lieh Tze* and one, (*b*), is in effect identical with a paradox ascribed to him in the *Lü Sze Chun Chiu* and the *Kung Chung Tze*, I have, for the sake of convenience, treated tentatively the paradoxes as if they were all Kung-Sun Lung's.

The paradoxes are:

a. The egg has feathers.

b. A fowl has three legs.[1]

c. Ying (the capital city of Chu) contains the whole world.

d. A dog may be a sheep.

e. The horse has eggs.

f. The frog[2] has a tail.

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[1] Which, I believe, is the same as the paradox "Chang has three ears" (*Kung Chung Tze*, XI).

[2] The original text is *ting tze* (丁子), which has been variously interpreted. I have accepted the interpretation of Cheng Huen-ying who says: The people of Chu call the frog *ting tze*.

g. Fire is not hot.

h. The mountains have mouths.

i. The wheels of a carriage do not touch the ground.

j. Eyes do not see.

k. Marks do not reach (the thing);[1] the reaching will never end.

l. The tortoise is taller (or longer) than the snake.[2]

m. The carpenter square is not square; the compasses cannot make a circle.

n. A chisel does not fit into (the hole of) the handle.

o. The shadow of a flying bird has never moved.[3]

p. A swiftly fleeting arrow has moments both of rest and of motion.[4]

q. A puppy is not a dog.[5]

r. A yellow horse and a dark cow make three.[6]

s. A white puppy is black.

t. An orphan (motherless) colt has never had a mother.[7]

u. If a rod one foot in length is cut short every day by one half of its length, it will still have something left even after ten thousand generations.[8]

These paradoxes I now propose to treat under four main heads:

I. A theory of the infinity of time and space;

II. A theory of potentiality and actuality;

III. The principle of individuation;

and IV. A theory of knowledge.

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[1] The same as in the *Lieh Tze*.

[2] I am inclined to think that this paradox was a corruption of one which probably was similar to the Zenonian paradox of Achilles and the tortoise.

[3] The version in the *Lieh Tze* is "The shadow does not move," which is the same as in the *Moh Tze*, Bk. 33: 16.

[4] This is the same as Zeno's third argument against motion.

[5] Cf. "A white horse is not a horse," which, though not included in this collection, is the most famous of Kung-Sun Lung's paradoxes.

[6] Cf. "A hard white stone makes two," another of his most famous theories.

[7] The same in the *Lieh Tze*, except that "colt" reads "calf."

[8] This is the same as Zeno's second argument against motion. It is practically the same as the paradox in the *Moh Tze*, Bk. 33: 59.

(I)

In these paradoxes, we find even more subtle arguments for the infinite divisibility of time and space than those advanced by Hui Tze. Paradoxes (*p*) and (*u*) will be easily recognized by students of Greek philosophy as identical with Zeno's third and second arguments against motion. Paradox (*u*) reads: "If a rod one foot in length is cut shorter every day by one half of its length, it will still have something left even after ten thousand generations." This is stated in the Neo-Mohist texts as follows: "To cut short (a given length) only by half of its length, will never reach the end: the explanation lies in the point (端)" (Bk. 33:59). The explanatory section reads: "To cut off (a given length) always by half its length, means an infinite regress. On reaching a point where there is nothing to halve, there is still the point. If it is still possible to cut off before and behind, there is still the point in the middle. To cut short a thing always by half its length, no more and no less, is therefore impossible" (Bk. 35:59). In the words of an early commentator, Sze-Ma Piao: "If still divisible, there is the two; if no longer divisible, there is still the one."[1] The problem involved in this paradox is clearly stated in the *Lieh Tze* (IV, 12) as the problem of "Infinity of things" (物不盡) which Wei Mou, a disciple of Kung-Sun Lung, explained as follows: "Whoever reaches the end of a thing will find something still left."

Paradox (*p*) reads: "A swiftly fleeting arrow has moments both of rest and of motion." The flying arrow, that is to say, is both at rest and in motion. Says Sze-Ma Piao: "The body is at rest, and the tendency (勢) is in motion. When the body is seen clearly and distinctly, it is in slow motion. When the tendency is seen clearly and distinctly, it is in rapid motion." This is a very suggestive passage. The arrow is a body which takes time (or duration) to traverse a distance (Bk. 33:63 and Bk. 35:63). If its flight has taken time, it must have "stopped" at every point it traversed. For a thing is said to be at rest when its occupation of one space lasts for some time (cf. Bk. 32:50). When we say the

[1] Quoted in Loh Teh-ming's Commentaries on the *Chuang Tze*.

arrow is in motion, we are only viewing it in its "tendency." If the eye can see the invisible, we may even say that it is still in motion when it has apparently "stopped." Therefore the conclusion is that motion and rest are subjective distinctions which are not real.

Paradox (*e*) is still more illuminating. "The shadow of a flying bird has never moved." In the Neo-Mohist texts, it is stated as: "The shadow does not move" (Bk. 33:16), which is the same as in the *Lieh Tze*. In both, the explanation is said to lie in renewal (更). A fuller explanation is contained in the Neo-Mohist text: "When light comes, the shadow disappears. If it can be seen, it will be found to remain there throughout the ages" (Bk. 35:16). The shadow seen at the next moment is a new or "renewed" one; it is no longer the same shadow which, though unseen, remains in the original position. The other paradox, (*i*), is only a supplement to this. It says: "The wheels of a carriage (in motion) do not touch the ground." Viewed in its "tendency," the shadows of a flying bird are one, and the wheels may be said to have never touched the ground. Viewed logically, the wheel is every moment at rest, and the shadow never changes its position.

(II)

The second problem involved in the paradoxes, seems to be that of potentiality and actuality. As I have repeatedly indicated, the age was one of the development of biological sciences. The troublesome question whether the hen or the egg comes first, naturally attracted the attention of the scholars. During the first half of the third century B. C., as we shall see later, the theory of organic evolution[1] had come into existence. The general tenor of the theory recognizes that all organisms come from some elemental germ (*ki*, 幾) common to all species. In the light of this theory, many of the paradoxes are no longer unintelligible. If all the developed forms come from some original, simple, and "formless" something, that something must therefore potentially contain all the later forms in miniature. Therefore we may say that "the egg

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[1] See Part IV, ch. I.

has feathers," (*a*). Because the thinkers of the time had begun to recognize the organic continuity throughout the gradations of the animate world, beginning with the *ki* (germ) and culminating in man, it is therefore quite justifiable to say that "a dog may be a sheep," (*d*); that "the frog has a tail," (*f*); that "the horse has eggs," (*e*); that "a white puppy is black," (*s*); or that "a tortoise is longer than the snake" (*l*). With the insufficient data at our command, we are unable to say whether these paradoxes were the precursor or merely an echo of the theory of organic evolution above referred to. One thing is sure: they deal with the problem of potentiality and actuality which the interest of the age in biological speculations has inevitably brought to the front. And the general conclusion which may be drawn from these paradoxes is that all the complex forms of organic life are potentially contained in the original simple beginnings.

(III)

Another problem which is involved in the paradoxes and which, in my opinion, most interested Kung-Sun Lung, is the problem of individuation. The Neo-Mohists had formulated a logic which, as we have seen, is essentially a theory of scientific classification. In classification the individual is explained in the species, and the species in the genus. It is natural that the problem of individuation should soon attract the attention of the logicians as is indicated here and there in Neo-Mohist texts. It has been held that all things which are of one form are similar to one another, as all cubes, be they made of wood or stone, are similar to one another. (Bk. 33:64; Bk. 35:64.) If consistently carried out, this view will tend to submerge the individual in the universal.[1] But the individual is not so easily dismissed. "The parents of Hueh are human beings, but Hueh's service to his parents is not the same as his services to mankind. His brother may be a good-looking man. But his love for him is not a love for a good-looking man (or for all good-looking men). . . . A thief is a man. But 'there are many thieves' is not

[1] "Moh Tze," said Hsun Tze, "has seen that which is universal in men, but has ignored that which is particular" (*Hsun Tze*, Book 17).

the same as 'there are many men.' 'No thief' is not 'no man.' For to dislike the numerousness of thieves is not to dislike the populousness of men, and to desire the elimination of thieves is not to desire the extinction of the human race. . . . Therefore we may say: 'Thieves are men; but to love thieves is not to love men; and to hate thieves is not to hate men; and to kill thieves is not to kill men' " (Bk. 37:6).

But this position is not proof against the arguments of opposition.[1] So long as thieves are classified as men, it is impossible to draw the negative conclusion that to kill thieves is not to kill men. Kung-Sun Lung came to rescue with his theory that "a white horse is not a horse," which is equivalent to saying that a thief is not a man. In the Neo-Mohist texts, we find the statement that "a puppy is a dog, but to kill a puppy is not killing a dog" (Bk. 34:53). Against this, Kung-Sun Lung advanced the paradox (*q*) that "a puppy is not a dog."

In doing this, Kung-Sun Lung was breaking away from the Neo-Mohist theory of forms, for which he substituted a theory starting out with a distinction, not between form and matter, but between shape (*hsin*, 形, which, like form, has the same origin as the Confucian "idea" or *hsiang*) and color. A "white horse" is not a "horse," because "horse" denotes the shape, and "white" denotes the color, and what denotes the color is not the same as what denotes the shape. "Ask for a 'horse,' and either a yellow horse or a black horse may answer. Ask for a 'white horse,' and neither a yellow horse nor a black horse will answer. . . . A 'white horse' is horse plus whiteness, that is, horse-ness plus white-horse-ness. Therefore I say, a white horse is not a horse." Again, "A 'horse' is indeterminate in color, therefore a yellow or black one will answer. A 'white horse' is determinate in color, thus excluding the yellow and black horses by reason of their color, and is therefore only answerable by a white horse" (*Kung-Sun Lung Tze*, II).

The same principle is implied in paradox (*r*): "A yellow horse and a dark cow make three." This I believe to be the same as his theory that "a hard white stone makes two." Probably the word "cow" in paradox (*r*) should read "horse," as the adjective

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[1] See *Hsun Tze*, Book 22.

"dark" (驪) has a "horse-radical" and was originally applicable probably only to horses. If so, the paradox would mean that "horse" plus "yellow" plus "dark" makes three, just as "whiteness" plus "solidity" makes two. Color thus constitutes the principle of individuation in these several cases. But it is erroneous to conclude that to Kung-Sun Lung, color is the sole principle of individuation. Paradox (*q*) has already shown that this is not the case. It seems to me that (*m*) deals with the same principle. "A carpenter's square is not square: the compasses cannot make a circle." The Neo-Mohists had held that "either the concept of a circle, or the compasses, or a ready-made circle, may be the form of a circle." Kung-Sun Lung now holds that the compasses cannot make a circle, nor can the carpenter's square serve as the form of a square. That is to say, the carpenter's square and the compasses can only give the general "shape," but do not make the individual square and circle. Each individual square or circle has its "duality" or individuality which is contained only in the individual thing itself.

This recognition of the individual itself as the cause of individuation is of great significance in many ways. Ethically, it means a modification of the Mohist doctrine of universal love for its reconciliation to the then growing philosophy of law. "Thieves are not men." Therefore killing thieves is not killing men. Logically it means the shifting of emphasis from universals to particulars, probably resulting in giving more emphasis on induction than the earlier Neo-Mohists had done.

(IV)

Finally, there is contained in these paradoxes a theory of the nature and method of knowledge which finds corroboration both in the Neo-Mohist texts and in the *Kung-Sun Lung Tze*. In our study of the Neo-Mohists' theory of knowledge,[1] it was pointed out that they held that knowledge is possible only with the cooperation of the intelligence, sense perception, and understanding. We read that hearing, for example, is the faculty of the ear, but to follow what is heard and grasp its meaning is the work of the

[1] Book III, Chap. II.

mind. (Bk. 32:9c.) This view seems to underlie the paradoxes of the fourth group. "A fowl has three legs," (*h*),—which is elsewhere reported as "Chang has three ears,"—seems to mean that the organs of the body cannot function without some directing center, namely, the mind. "Although the fowl has only two legs," says Sze-Ma Piao, "it requires the soul (神) to move them. Therefore we may say that it has three legs." Similarly, the third ear of Chang is the soul. Similarly, "the eyes do not see," (*j*), without the mind. Nor is fire hot, (*g*), without the understanding soul. Without the creative activity of the mind, the separate sense perceptions alone will not enable us to have true knowledge of things. In the chapter on "Whiteness and solidity (hardness)" in the *Kung-Sun Lung Tze*, we read: "When we look at it (the white stone), we get its whiteness but not its solidity. When we touch it, we get its solidity but not its whiteness. . . . When we have got its whiteness and its solidity, that which is seen and that which is not seen will coinhere. When the seen and the unseen coinhere, it is one. If two, they will not hold each other.[1] Therefore they must be coinherent in each other. Coinherence means containing (literaliy, concealing) each other" (Bk. V). This act of construction is the work of the soul. Whiteness is seen through the eyes and with the help of light. Hardness is perceived by the hand feeling along the object. It is, however, the soul (神) which can see when the eyes are not seeing or where there is no light or when the hand is not actually feeling. It is in the soul that what is seen and what is felt through touch are construed to be coinherent in each other (*ibid.*).[2]

Paradox (*k*) has troubled many a critic. It says: "Marks do not reach; the reaching will never end." The first half occurs in the *Lieh Tze* and is thus explained by Wei Mou, the disciple

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[1] The original text follows: 不見離一一不相盈. Yü Yueh (俞樾) suggested this reading: 見不見離一, 一不相盈. Based on the collateral evidence of the *Moh Tze*, Bk. 35:4, I have adopted this reading: 見不見離一, 一不相盈.

[2] This is an interpretation rather than a translation of the concluding paragraphs of Book VI, the text of which is much corrupted. Professor N. Hattori of Japan also made an interpretation of this passage in his article "Confucianism and Its Opponents," published in the *Cosmopolitan Student* for April, May, 1916, p. 138. Some of his readings of the text I cannot accept.

of Kung-Sun Lung: "Where there are no marks, all will reach." This does not seem to give much aid to the critics. The trouble lies in the word "mark" or "sign" (指) which commonly means "a finger."[1] It seems to me that this paradox can only be understood when the meaning of the word "finger" is properly understood. This word is used in the third book of the *Kung-Sun Lung Tze*, which is entitled "On Marks (fingers) and Things." After years of study and philological research, I have concluded that the word "finger" here means "a mark" or "a sign," that which "signifies." Let us see the use of the word in this long misunderstood book. The main thesis of this book is contained in its opening paragraph: "There are no things which are not marks, but marks are no marks. If there be no marks in the world, nothing can be called a thing. Yet marks are no marks. For without things can there be marks?"[2] It seems that by "mark" or "sign" is here meant the attribute or quality by which a thing is known. "There are no things which are not marks" means that things are what their attributes indicate them to be; that is, what they are perceived to be. This subjectivism is immediately qualified by the realistic statement, "But marks are no marks"; that is, marks are not entities in themselves but marks of things. "For without things, can there be marks?"

Taking "fingers" to mean "marks" or "attributes of things," paradox (*k*) would then mean that our ordinary knowledge of things is only knowledge of their marks and "does not reach" the real things, and that any attempt to reach the "things-in-themselves" is a futile process of infinite regress. We know a horse by its horse-ness, a white horse by its white-horse-ness, and a white stone by its white-ness and solidity. For all practical purposes this knowledge is quite adequate and sufficient. The explanation which Kung-Sun Lung's disciple gave to the paradox that "where there are no marks, all will reach," would seem to mean, *not* that

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[1] Thus Professor A. Forke, in his *Chinese Sophists* (*Journal of the China Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*, vol. 34, pp. 1–100), translates paradox (*k*) as "The finger does not touch, the touching never comes to an end." Forke is inconsistent when he translates the same paradox in the *Lieh Tze* as "Definitions do not hit the point." Both Legge and Balfour use the word in the sense of a finger.

[2] Forke translates "fingers" as "definitions" which I cannot accept.

it is always possible to reach the things-in-themselves, but that without these marks one would probably have to reach the real things in every case of cognition. But since "the reaching will never end," one might as well be content with the knowledge of the perceived attributes of the things. As the Neo-Mohists have said, when we see a fire and say it is hot, it is not necessary for us to have actually felt the heat of that fire: "fire" must be hot. That is to say, for all practical purposes, it is not necessary even to reach the marks themselves but only the names which are the marks of the marks.

The marks, it must be added, are no mere universals which ignore individual variations. "Each mark naturally and of itself excludes the non-mark" (Book III). That is to say, each mark, being the mark of an individual thing, has its own "this-ness" which marks it off from all other things. So are the names with which the marks are indicated. Each name has its individual signification. A generic name demarcates one genus, a specific name demarcates one species, and a proper name demarcates one individual. "A name," says the *Kung-Sun Lung Tzu* (Book VI), "is the predicate of a subject (or substance). If we know that this is not this and that this is not here, we shall not predicate it (by 'this'). If we know that that is not that and that that is not there, we shall not predicate it (by 'that')." Paradox (*l*) is a good example of the individual nature of names. It says: "An orphan (motherless) colt has never had a mother." Wei Mou explains: "When it had a mother it was not an 'orphan colt.'"

Here we have a new doctrine of the "rectification of names" different from that which Confucius had originated some two centuries before. To rectify names is not to go back to their ideal meanings, nor to use names so "judiciously" as always to imply ethical judgment, as Confucius and the Confucians had taught, but to name things according to their actual individual characteristics. In order to rectify names in this sense, it is therefore necessary first to know these individual characteristics, their resemblances and differences,—a task which can only be accomplished by the methods of induction, by scientific classification. In order to name well we must know well. The law of "rectification of names" as stated both in the Neo-Mohist texts (Bk. 35:67) and in

the *Kung-Sun Lung Tze* (Book VI), is: "The that-ness of that must be confined to that; the this-ness of this must be confined to this." "When the names are rectified, then that will answer 'that' and this will answer 'this.' When that does not respond to 'that,' then the predicate 'that' is useless. When this does not answer to 'this,' then the predicate 'this' is useless" (Book VI; cf. the *Moh Tze*, Bk. 35 : 71). This is the philosophical theory of the Neo-Mohist logical method. It is essentially a method of scientific classification: a method which, on the one hand, relates the particulars into classes, and, on the other hand, divides and subdivides the classes into species and individuals according to their "duality" or individual variations.

IV

Concluding Remarks

I have devoted what might seem an unproportionally large space to the paradoxes of Hui Sze and Kung-Sun Lung. My own justification is twofold. In the first place, I believe that the six chapters of the *Moh Tze* which I have treated as the texts of Neo-Mohism were not the work of Moh Tih but the product of the period approximately identical with the period from Hui Sze (380–300) to Kung-Sun Lung (320–250). Probably they belong to the period from 325–250 B. C. The fact that practically all the paradoxes of Hui Sze and Kung-Sun Lung can find collateral illustrations in those six chapters, and that they can be understood only in the light of these collateral illustrations, is a fact which no history of Chinese logic can afford to ignore. What is more striking is the fact that several of the paradoxes of Kung-Sun Lung and many passages in the *Kung-Sun Lung Tze* are found verbatim in those texts. Three of the seven paradoxes attributed to Kung-Sun Lung in the *Lich Tze* are also found in those texts. Do not these facts justify my contention that those six books were the works of the Neo-Mohists of the period specified above, and that Hui Sze and Kung-Sun Lung were not the isolated "Sophists" who formed the "school of logicians," but the legitimate representatives of the school of Neo-Mohism which continued the ethical and logical traditions of Moh Tih, and which has given to

China the most systematically developed theory of logical method in the entire history of Chinese thought?

In the second place, the paradoxes of Hui Sze and Kung-Sun Lung, while they are consistent and continuous with the logical theories of Neo-Mohism, were to no small extent responsible for the discrediting and the consequent downfall of Neo-Mohism, and especially of its logic. The history of thought affords an abundance of examples of the fact that very often a great truth is distorted by the way in which it is stated by its originator, and vital problems are obscured by the obscurantism with which the problems are presented. The paradoxes of Zeno, the *homo mensura* of Protagoras, the "ideas" of Plato, the *cogito, ergo sum* of Descartes, the *esse* is *percipi* of Berkeley,—are excellent illustrations. Similarly, the logical theories of Neo-Mohism became obscured when expressed in the form of striking paradoxes. While, as is stated in the *Chuang Tze*, "the dialecticians were greatly delighted in them," the paradoxes became the subject of attack and ridicule by the opponents of the school. They were naturally subject to stupid distortions. The paradox that "a white horse is not a horse," for example, soon became "a horse is not a horse" (*Kung Chung Tze*, IX). "Chang has three ears" was sometimes corrupted into "Chang has three teeth" (*Lü Sze Chun Chiu*, XVIII, 5). Moreover, the paradoxes became so unnecessarily subtle that the pragmatic test of Mohism was used by its opponents to discredit the theories of its own representatives.[1] The *Kung Chung Tze*, a compilation of the Han dynasty, tells this story:

> "After Kung-Sun Lung had eloquently demonstrated that Chang had three ears, the Prince of Ping-Yuen asked Kung Chuen, a descendant of Confucius, what he thought of the arguments. The latter replied: 'Yes, he has almost succeeded in making Chang have three ears. But he has had a difficult task to perform. Now, to say Chang has three ears is very difficult and after all not true. To say that he has two ears is true as well as easy. I wonder, my lord, which you prefer: the difficult and untrue, or the easy and true?'" (XI).

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[1] Cf. the quotations from Han Fei at the end of Book I.

Accordingly, the pardoxes were discredited by the Confucians and by the practical politicians. A century later, when logic had become a lost science, the name "the school of logicians" was applied exclusively to the dialecticians or "Sophists" such as Teng Shih, Hui Sze, and Kung-Sun Lung, and the "logical" was identified with the paradoxical, the sophistical, and the unintelligible.

PART IV

Evolution and Logic

Chapter I

Theories of Natural Evolution[1]

The problem of change, as we have seen, has always interested the philosophers of ancient China. We have seen that both Teng Shih and Lao Tze maintained that nature is "not benevolent." Lao Tze held that all beings come from the great void or non-being, and that the process of change has been one of unfolding from non-being to being, from the one to the many, from the simple to the complex, and from the easy to the difficult. This conception, however, was mutilated by his exaltation of the non-existent over the existent, and resulted in his philosophical nihilism. Moreover, while holding nature to be not benevolent, he was so profoundly impressed by the all-sufficiency of the natural process that very often he again approached a teleological view of nature, as for instance in his characterization of her as the "great executioner," or in a statement like this: "The net of nature is vast, so vast. It is wide-meshed, but it loses nothing."

Confucius was probably influenced by Lao Tze's theory of nature and of change. In the Appendices to the *Book of Change*, he seems to have also held that change is a continuous process of multiplication and complication beginning with the simple and easy, or the *ki*. There we also find a frankly materialistic conception of the universe,—that all the complexities in the universe have come about through motion, through the pushing of that which is active against that which is passive.

But neither Lao Tze nor Confucius has given us any fully developed theory of natural evolution. Nor were they at all

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[1] See my article on *Theories of Evolution in Ancient China* in "Science" (Shanghai), Vol. III, No. 1, pp. 19–41.

interested in the problem of change in the biological world. During the two centuries following the death of Confucius (479 B.C.), however, the attention of thinkers seems to have been gradually directed toward biological studies. In the Neo-Mohist texts, for instance, we find that one of the six modes of "being" (爲) is "becoming" or "developing into" (化) (Bk. 32:85), which is defined as "covered (concealed) change" (32:45). Elsewhere the development of the frog into the *huen* (鶉),—a common belief found in many texts of the age,—was given as an instance of "becoming" (34:45 and 86). Unfortunately, only fragmentary evidences of the development of biological studies during that period have been preserved to us. But even the fragmentary passages found in such works as the *Lieh Tze*, the *Chuang Tze*, and other works, will perhaps be able to give us a glimpse of the biological speculations of that remarkable age.

We shall begin with the *Lieh Tze*, a work which was most probably compiled in a much later age but which seems to contain many fragments belonging to the fourth and third centuries B. C. This work contains two distinct theories of evolution. The one (Bk. 1:2)[1] is also mentioned in a work of unknown authorship entitled *Chein Tsuoh Tu* (乾鑿度), and seems to belong to the Han Dynasty. For that reason, we shall only take up the other theory contained in Bk. I:1 and 3, which is as follows:

> "There is that which reproduces and that which does not reproduce. There is that which changes and that which does not change. That which reproduces not can produce that which reproduces. That which changes not can transform that which changes. . . . That which reproduces not is permanently unitary (疑獨).[2] That which changes not goes and will ever return (往復). The ever-returning is endless. The permanently unitary is eternal" (Bk. I:1).

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[1] Translated in Suzuki's *Brief History of Early Chinese Philosophy* (1914), p. 30.

[2] This phrase has long been misunderstood. Suzuki, for example, translates it as "solitary indeterminate" (op. cit., p. 30). The character 疑 does not mean "indeterminate" or "doubtful" but "stable" or "permanent." It literally means "stand still," as, for example, in 靡所止疑, 云徂何往, in the *Book of Poetry*, or in 賓升西階上, 疑立. in the *I Li*. In the ancient script it was written 疑 as distinguished from 㤅 (doubt). But the two have long been confused into the former form.

Here we have a theory of "monads" which are permanently unitary and ever-returning, which reproduce not but which are the cause of all reproduction, and which change not but which underlie all change. Further on we read:

> "Therefore there is that which reproduces and that which produces the reproducing. There are forms and that which forms the forms. There are colors and that which colors the colors. There are sounds and that which makes the sounds. There are tastes and that which constitutes the tastes. What is reproduced may die, but what produces the reproducing never dies. The forms may become real, but what forms the forms is never manifest. The sounds may be heard, but what makes the sounds is never shown. The colors may be visible, but what colors the colors is never seen. The tastes may be tasted, but what constitutes the tastes is never manifest" (I:3).

Here follows a rimed eulogy on this basic and primeval something:

> "It can be active and passive; soft and hard; long and short; square and round. It can cause life and death; warmth and cold; floating and sinking. It can produce base and sharp sounds. It can remain dormant and become prominent. It can produce all kinds of color, taste, and smell. It has no knowledge nor faculty, yet there is nothing that it does not know or cannot do" (I:3).

It may be asked, How does this primary something become all the complexities in the universe? What is the process of evolution? The answer is: All is self-activity, self-causation. "All is self-production, self-transformation, self-extension, self-coloring, self-conscious, self-effort, self-diminution, and self-ending. It is wrong to say that it has *been* produced, or transformed, or extended, or colored, or given knowledge and effort, or diminished, or ended" (I:1).

There is in the *Lieh Tze* a little story which seems to be in line with the theory of evolution as self-activity and self-causation and which comes very near the modern theory of the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest. The story follows:

> "The House of Tien in the State of Chi held a great post-sacrificial feast at which over a thousand guests were

present. In the middle of the feast, fish and wild ducks were offered. The host looked at them and said with a sigh: 'Great is nature's kindness to man! She has produced grain and fish and birds for the use of man.' The speech was applauded by all the guests present.

"Thereupon, the son of the House of Pao, who was only twelve years old, stepped forward and said: 'It is not so, my lord. All the beings in the universe coexist with men on a basis of equality. There is no natural order of superiority and inferiority. They conquer and prey on one another only by virtue of their superior strength and intelligence. No species is purposely produced for the sake of another. Men, too, prey on those things which they are able to conquer. How can we say that nature has produced them for our benefit? Do not mosquitoes suck our blood and do not tigers and wolves eat our flesh? Shall we say that nature has produced men for the benefit of mosquitoes and tigers and wolves?'" (Bk. VIII, 20.)

So much for the theory of evolution in the *Lieh Tze*. We shall now turn to the evolutionary theory found in the *Chuang Tze*. Like the *Lieh Tze*, this work contains more interpolations and indiscriminate incorporations of unidentified fragments than genuine writings of the philosopher Chuang Tze. For that reason, I shall treat here, as I have done elsewhere, many of the passages taken from the work only as quotations from the *Chuang Tze*, but not as from Chuang Tze himself; except when I have good reason to believe in the genuineness of the chapters from which the quotations are taken.

This theory of evolution begins by dismissing the notion that the causal series must have a final cause upon which the whole chain depends. "Am I," asks the shadow, "dependent upon some thing for my being? And is that upon which I am dependent for my being, again dependent upon something else for its being?" (Bk. II:6.) In another place, Confucius is made to say: "If there be something existing before the universe, is it not also a thing? Is not that which makes it a thing again a thing? This (causal) thing, being a thing, cannot have existed before all other

things. There must still be something else. And this 'There must still be something else' can be extended indefinitely" (Bk. XXII:11).[1] Thus the argument for a final cause necessarily leads to an infinite regress, and is therefore untenable.

Having dismissed the final cause argument, this theory maintains that the process of evolution has been one of "self-transformation" (自化). It says: "The life of all animate things is like the galloping of a horse, changing at every moment and moving at every moment. What do they do? And what do they not do? They will naturally transform of themselves" (Bk. XVII:1). More specifically stated, the theory is this: "*All things are species which develop into one another through the process of variation in forms.* Their beginnings and endings are like those of a perfect ring—incapable of being definitely located. This is called the rhythm of nature" (Bk. XXVII:1).[2]

The theory that the species develop into one another by a process of variation in forms is elsewhere concretely stated as follows:

> "All species contain the *ki* (幾) or germs. The germs, when in water, become *kueh* (蠙 which is a kind of minute organism, as tiny as a cross section of silk; hence the name). In a place bordering on water and land, they become lichen

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[1] To show what the Sinologues can do with Chinese texts, I give the original text of this passage, together with two translations: 有先天地生者, 物耶. 物物者非物(耶). 物出不得先物也, 猶其有物也, 猶其有物也無已.

F. H. Balfour (*The Divine Classic of Nan-Hua*, p. 274) translates: "What Heaven and Earth first produced was Matter. Those who obstruct the course of matter—or things—are not in accord with Nature. This matter being produced, nothing appears afterwards that had been prior to it; from it other things successively take their rise, and from these again others, and so on without end." This is just the opposite of the original meaning. Herbert A. Giles, now Professor of Chinese in the University of Cambridge, translates (*Chuang Tze*, p. 291): "What there was before the universe was Tao. Tao makes things what they are but is not itself a thing. Nothing can produce Tao; yet everything has Tao within it, and continues to produce it without end." This is even worse, for the word "tao" never occurs in the original text. It is inconceivable to me that foreigners who can hardly read an ordinary text in Chinese, should have the daring to attack such a text as the *Chuang Tze*.

[2] The original text follows: 萬物皆種也, 以不同形相禪. 始卒若環, 莫得其倫, 是謂天均.

(黽蠙之衣). On the bank, they become *ling-shih* (陵舄). Reaching fertile soil, the *ling-shih* become *wu-tsuoh* (烏足), the root of which becomes *chi-tsao* (蠐螬), while the leaves become *hu-tieh* (胡蝶 which now means 'butterfly') or *hsu* (胥). The *hu-tieh* later changes into an insect, born in the chimney corner, which has the appearance of newly-grown skin. Its name is *chu-tuh* (鴝掇). After a thousand days, the *chu-tuh* becomes a bird called *kan-yu-kuh* (乾餘骨), the spittle(?) of which becomes the *sze-mi* (斯彌). The *sze-mi* becomes a wine fly (食醯), from which comes the *yi-lu* (頤輅). *Huang-kuang* (黃軦) is produced from the *kiu-yiu* (九猷). Mosquitoes come from decayed *huan* (蠸). *Yang-chi* (羊奚), paired with *puh-sen-kiu-chuh* (不筍久竹), produces the *ching-ning* (青寧), which produces the *cheng* (程), which produces the horse, which produces man. Man again goes back into the germs (機 = 幾). All things come from the germs and will return to the germs" (Bk. XVIII, 6).[1]

I do not profess to have understood this passage which all previous commentators have given up in despair. But there are certain points in it which deserve our attention. In the first place, the word *ki* (幾) in the opening sentence which the commentators have pronounced in the second or "upper" tone, thereby taking it to mean "how many," should certainly be pronounced in the first or "level" tone, and mean "the minutest atom" or "germ." This is the same word which Confucius used in the *Book of Change* to mean the embryonal beginning of things. Etymologically, it comes from 幺 which is the plural of 8, which is a pictorial representation of an embryo. In the second place, the word 機, which occurs thrice in the concluding sentences, should certainly read 幾, and mean "germs." For if it had no reference to the *ki* in the opening sentence, why should the text say "again goes back"? In the third place, while the names of the plants and animals mentioned therein are no longer capable of identification on account of the textual corruptions and of our ignorance of the

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[1] This passage also occurs in the *Lieh Tze* (Bk. I:4), where the text is more corrupted by an apparent incorporation of the notes made by some unknown commentator. For that reason, I have preferred the text in the *Chuang Tze*.

biological terminology of the period, it seems safe to say that this passage contains a theory which conceives of all species of plants and animals as forming one continuous order beginning with the *ki* or germ, passing through the various forms of lower organism, and culminating in man. That it conceives of man as coming from the other vertebrates represented by the horse, the text leaves no doubt. It is doubtful, however, how far such a bold hypothesis was based on the scientific data accessible at that time. At any rate, it seems we are warranted to take this passage as a collateral illustration of the theory that the species develop into one another through variation in forms.

What is the cause of such variation in forms? The question is not quite clearly and definitely answered. Certain passages in the *Chuang Tze* seem to show a recognition of the fact that each species is "adapted" (適得) to its particular environment. "If a man sleep in a damp place, he gets lumbago and dies. But how about an eel? Living up in a tree, man would tremble in fear. But how about the monkey? Which of the three, the man, the eel, or the monkey, has the right habitat? Again, men feed on meat, deer on grass, centipedes on snakes, owls and crows on mice. Which of the four knows the right taste?" (Book II). Again, "Chi-ki and Hua-liu (two famous types of horses) can travel a thousand *li* in a day, but they cannot catch rats as well as a wild cat can. That is because they possess different aptitudes. An owl can catch fleas at night, and see the tip of a hair; but if it come out in broad daylight, it will not be able to see a mountain. That is because different situations require different faculties" (Book XVII). These and other similar passages indicate an implicit recognition of the adaptability of individual species to the requirements of their particular environments. It is, however, not quite clear that such adaptation to environment was regarded as causally responsible for variation in forms.

One thing is clear. Chuang Tze regarded all change, all transformation and adaptation, as entirely a "natural process." "The stork does not have to wash itself daily in order to become white. The crow does not have to paint itself daily in order to become black" (Book XIV). "What do they do? What do they not do? They will naturally transform themselves" (Book XVII).

Like Lao Tze, Chuang Tze was so impressed by the all-sufficiency and all-potency of the process of nature, that, although he had discarded the Final Cause, his conception of nature tended to be deterministic and fatalistic. "The ten thousand changes ever go on, and no one knows what has caused them. How can one know where it will end and where it has begun? There is nothing left to us but to wait" (Bk. XX:7). Of the first seven books which are most probably genuine, the sixth is entitled "The Great Master" and is a most pathetic glorification of Fate. In this book, there is a story told of a Tze Yu who, on being consoled for his suffering caused by a most unnatural disease, said: "What have I to dislike? Suppose my left arm were transposed into a cock, I should therewith herald the coming of morn. Suppose my right arm were transformed into a crossbow, I should therewith seek owls for my table. And suppose my buttocks were changed into wheels and my soul into a horse, I should ride in it. . . . And long, long have all beings been unable to fight against nature! What, then, should I have to dislike?" (Bk. VI:3) Another speaker in the same book declares: "A son must go whithersoever his parents bid him. Nature is to man as parents are to their children. If she hasten my end and I demur, then I am disobedient. She can do me no wrong. This Great Unknown has given me this form, toiled me in my manhood, rested me in my old age, and is going to end all my toil with death. . . . Suppose the Master Blacksmith were smelting metal and the metal should dance and sing: 'I am going to be an Excalibur!' the Master Blacksmith would surely consider that metal as uncanny. And if a being which happens to assume the form of a man should exclaim in joy: 'I am a man! I am a man!'—surely the Creator-of-Change (造化者) would regard him as uncanny. Consider the universe as a great furnace and the Creator-of-Change as the master blacksmith, and whither am I unwilling to go?" (Bk. VI:3) Indeed nature is conceived as so all-pervasive that there seems to be no room for human effort and will. "How do we know that what I call nature is not done through man, and that which I call human effort is not in reality the work of nature?" (Bk. VI:1)

This combination of an evolutionary theory with an extreme determinism need not surprise us when we think of the deter-

ministic and automatic conception of the process of nature that underlies the evolutionism of such modern thinkers as Hegel and Herbert Spencer, and even M. Bergson. This philosophy, which is the essence of what is generally known as philosophical Taoism, has had tremendous influence on Chinese thought, especially during the second and first centuries B. C. and the third and fourth centuries A. D. It has colored the whole political and ethical thinking of the Chinese nation. But that does not quite concern us here. In the next chapter, we shall try to trace the effect of this evolutionary philosophy on the logical theories of the time.

Chapter II

The Logic of Chuang Tze

I

Biographical Note

Very little is known of the life of Chuang Tze. According to the *Records of a Historian*, he was born in the city of Mung. His name was Chuang Chou. He was once a petty officer in Mung. According to the same authority, he was a contemporary of King Hui of Liang (B. C. 370–319)[1] and King Huen of Chi (B. C. 332–315).[1] We have seen that he had been with Hui Sze and lived some time after the latter's death (*Chuang Tze*, Bk. XXIV : 6). He probably lived until the first quarter of the third century B. C.

The epilogue to the *Chuang Tze*, which could not have been written by himself as traditional critics have erroneously held, sums up his philosophy in these words:

> "Solitary and silent, there is no lasting form. Ever changing and ever becoming, there is no permanence. Is not death ever with life? Is not heaven on the same level with earth? Is not the spirit ever going on? Blindly, whither art thou going? Restlessly, whereat art thou aiming? All things considered none is the final goal.—On this have some of the ancient truths been founded. And Chuang Chou was attracted to it.
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> "In paradoxical language, in bold words, and with subtle profundity, he gave free play to his imagination and thought, without following any particular school or committing himself to any particular line. He looked on the world as so heavily laden and dirty that it was impossible to speak gravely. He realized that the world would regard roundabout language as ecumenical, accept arguments *ad verecundiam* (重言) as genuine truth, and consider parables as signs of breadth of vision.[2] Therefore he lived in a world of Heaven and Earth

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[1] These dates are according to the *Bamboo Chronicles*.

[2] This passage has often been misunderstood. It should be read in connection with Bk. XXVII : 1.

and the Spirit, and refused to be bound by the things in the universe. He made no distinction between right and wrong, so that he lived in peace with the common crowd. . . . Above, he roams in company with the Creator. Below, he consorts with those who are beyond the pale of life and death and deny the reality of beginning and ending."

This seems to be a fairly accurate account of the philosophy of Chuang Tze. In Part I of this essay, we have indicated that in ancient China there was a class of men who "fled the world" and lived in seclusion and retirement. But the note of "other-worldliness" was rarely, if ever, prominent in the great schools of thought of the fifth and fourth centuries B. C. Even Lao Tze whom the latter Taoists claimed to be their founder, was intensely interested in the problems of this world and sought their solution in political *laissez faire* and individual perfection. The *tao* which Lao Tze and Confucius sought was nothing but a "way" for the ordering of the world. But in their unreserved exaltation of the natural as the ideal over against the real as unnatural and corrupt, both Lao Tze and Confucius were unconsciously sowing the seed for a totally other-worldly philosophy of life, which found the most eloquent exponent in Chuang Tze and which, since the Han Dynasty, has greatly influenced the thinkers of China.

II

Chuang Tze's Logic

The fact that Chuang Tze was a friend and great admirer of Hui Sze is significant to the historian of Chinese philosophy. Hui Sze, as we have seen, had maintained that all things in the universe are one, and that they are at the same time similar to one another and different from one another. This he called the principle of Great-Similarity-and-Difference. But Hui Sze was a great dialectician of the Neo-Mohist school, and delighted in carrying on endless debates and discussions with the dialecticians of his time. The Neo-Mohists never were skeptical. For them, the principle of contradiction was the canon of argumentation: "In arguing, one may hold this to be a cow, and another may hold this to be no cow. It is impossible that both are right

Therefore either the one or the other must be wrong" (*Moh Tze*, Bk. 34:74). "To say that there can be no winner in a debate is wrong" (Bk. 33:33). "If there can be no winner, what is the use of argumentation? In a debate, one says *aye* and another says *nay*. The one who says it right will win" (Bk. 35:33). It was this faith in the ultimate possibility of truth to prevail that inspired the dialecticians of the age to perfect the instrument of thought and argumentation and to carry on discussions "throughout their lives without end."

But Chuang Tze could not see the consistency in thus holding the principle of Great Similarity-and-Difference and at the same time seeking to distinguish truth from falsehood by means of argumentation. And his catholic sympathy with all schools of thought led him to see the artificiality of much of the controversy between the Confucians and the Mohists. "He made no distinction between right and wrong,"—so says the epilogue of the *Chuang Tze*. This sums up the logic of Chuang Tze. In brief, this logic maintains the doctrine of relativity of truth and falsehood, right and wrong. All such logical and moral distinctions are indications of imperfect knowledge. True knowledge sees things in their totality and therefore transcends all such distinctions. "Argumentation only shows that men have not seen the whole" (Bk. II:2). This logic is contained chiefly in Book II of the *Chuang Tze*, which forms the substance of the present chapter.[1]

"Great knowledge," says Chuang Tze, "is comprehensive; little knowledge is always particular. Great speech is noncommittal; small speech makes clever distinctions." "How is *Tao* (no longer 'a way,' but 'cosmic reason') so obscured that it is spoken of as true and false? How is speech so obscured that it admits the distinction of right and wrong? Where is *Tao* not found? Wherein is speech not permissible? The *Tao* is obscured by our petty biases. Speech is obscured by its flowery appendages. Therefore there have arisen the controversies between the Yü (Confucians) and the Mohists, each denying what the other

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[1] All quotations in the present chapter, except those otherwise indicated, are from Book II of the *Chuang Tze*.

affirms and affirming what the other denies. In order to affirm what each denies and to deny what each affirms, the best way is to understand the one in the light of the other (以明). Nothing is not not-itself, nor is anything itself. Only one refuses to see what proceeds from the other man: one only sees what he himself sees. Therefore I say, *The Not-Itself comes from the Itself, and the Itself is also caused by the Not-Itself.* This is called the doctrine of the Relativity of the Itself and the Not-Itself" (彼出於是, 是亦因彼. 彼是方生之說也). . . . "The Itself is also the Not-Itself. The Not-Itself is also the Itself. Here is one controversy. There is another. Is there any real distinction between the Itself and the Not-Itself? Or is there no such thing? When the Itself and the Not-Itself are no longer opposites, then one may be said to have attained the axis of reason (*tao*). It is this axis alone which commands, as it were, the center of the circle and is in a position to deal with the infinite complexities. For it will then be seen that both sides of a controversy, the 'true' and the 'false,' are infinities. Therefore I say, the best way (to reconcile the opposites) is to understand the one in the light of the other."

Historically the passage quoted above is significant in that it shows Chuang Tze's logical theory as a reaction against the heated discussions that had been carried on by the controversialists of the time. That there is much justification for this weariness of controversies can easily be established. When Mencius, the Confucian, was first received by King Hui of Liang, he was asked: "Sir, now that you have come to us from such a great distance, may we presume that you have much to give us for the benefit of our country?" To this Mencius replied: "Why must you say 'benefit,' my sire? Why not say benevolence and righteousness?" Again, when told by a pacifist (probably of the Mohist school) that he was going to persuade the rulers of Chin and Chu to end a war between them on the ground that it was not profitable to either of them, Mencius said: "Sir, your object is a noble one, but your argument is wrong." And he suggested that he should base his argument not on profit but on benevolence and righteousness. This attitudinarianism is characteristic of the Confucian school. Yet, when one examines the work of Mencius, one is struck by his numerous economic policies designed for the "benefit" or

"profit" of the people, policies such as the national distribution of land, the reform of taxes, the encouragement of the culture of fish and the silkworm, the policy of national conservation, etc. It is natural that such controversies should come to be regarded as merely verbal and idle. It was natural that Chuang Tze should hold that such disputes only indicated the disputants' incompleteness of knowledge due to their own biases which prevented them from seeing what proceeds from their opponents.

Accordingly, he taught the doctrine of the relativity of the itself and the not-itself which seeks to reconcile opposite views by referring them all to a higher unity. "The not-itself comes from the itself, and the itself is also caused by the not-itself." What appears to be the true and the false are in reality two correlatives, only viewed from two different standpoints. If we can only look upon them, not as opposites but as correlatives which supplement each other, then we shall have attained the "axis of reason" around which all differences and opposites may be reconciled.

The principle that underlies this logic is his conception of nature, of the *tao* or cosmic reason. It consists of an automatic conception of the process of natural evolution. According to this view, everything in the universe has its reason of being, is "adapted" to its particular place and environment. "The *tao* goes on and achieves its work. Things receive names and are what they are. What shall we affirm? Affirm what is so. What shall we deny? Deny what is not so. For all things have their own peculiar constitution and their own peculiar potentialities. Nothing is not what it is. Nothing is incapable of realizing what it can be." Here we have a Chinese version of the Hegelian formula, "The rational is the real, the real the rational."

"Therefore," Chuang Tze goes on to say, "viewed from this standpoint, a beam and a pillar are one, and ugliness and beauty are the same. So are all oddities and perversities. In disintegration there is integration. In construction there is destruction. All things, be they in construction or in destruction, are pervaded by one and the same principle. Only the truly wise understand this underlying unity of all things." In thus reconciling all diversity in the all-pervading unity, Chuang Tze ridicules the vain efforts of those who "wear out their intelligence on some one point

without recognizing its fundamental identity with all others." He likens them to monkeys who became very angry when told by the keeper that they were to have three rations of acorns in the morning and four at night, but who were all pleased when told that they were to receive four in the morning and three at night. "The actual quantity of acorns remains the same, but the angry monkeys have been appeased."

True knowledge, therefore, transcends all logical distinctions. "Nothing is greater than the tip of an autumn hair, while a vast mountain may be a small thing. No one attains greater longevity than the child who dies in infancy, while Peng Tsu (a fabulous personage who is said to have lived over 700 years) may yet be considered as having died young. The universe came into being at the same time with me, and I and everything therein are one." "All distinctions arise because our knowledge is incomplete." "How do I know that what I call knowledge is not ignorance? And how do I know that what I call ignorance is not knowledge?"

Here is Chuang Tze's skepticism, which is based on his theory of evolution, on the theory that all species are naturally evolved through variation in forms and that each form or species is adapted to its particular place and environment. "Let me try to ask you," said a speaker in Book II,[1] "if a man sleep in a damp place, he gets lumbago and dies. But how about an eel? If he live up in a tree, he will tremble in fear. But how about the monkey? Which of the three, the man, the eel, or the monkey has the right habitat? Again, men feed on meat, deer on grass, centipedes on snakes, and owls and crows on mice. Which of the four knows the right taste? Monkey mates with monkey, the buck with the doe, and eels consort with fishes. Men admire a Mao Chiang or a Li Ki (famous beauties of Ancient China), the mere sight of whom would cause fishes to plunge deep down in the water, birds to soar high up in the air, and deer to run away in great speed."[2]

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[1] Most of Chuang Tze's sayings were in the form of dialogues, sometimes between historical personages such as Lao Tze and Confucius, sometimes between mythological figures. The world delights in arguments *ad verecundiam*.

[2] Giles (p. 27) adds a most stupid note: "For shame at their own inferiority."

Which of these four has the right appreciation of beauty? As far as I can see, the standard of human virtue and the distinctions of right and wrong are so hopelessly confused that it is impossible for me to discern them."

The same notion is most eloquently expounded in Book XVII, which is another of the genuine chapters of the *Chuang Tze*. "From the point of view of cosmic reason, there are no such distinctions as value and worthlessness in things. It is only from the point of view of things that each regards itself as valuable and considers all others as worthless. From the point of view of social conventions, value and worthlessness do not lie in the evaluated things themselves. From the point of view of relativity, all things are great or small merely because of one's criterion of greatness or smallness. If one only knows that the universe is but a tare seed and the tip of a hair is as large as a mountain, then one may be said to have seen the relativity of things. And from the point of view of function, all things exist because of that for which they are existent, and all things are non-existent because of that for which they are non-existent. If one only knows that although East and West are opposites, the one cannot exist without the other, then one may be able to know the function of things. And from the point of view of individual inclinations, things are approved or disapproved, called good or evil, in accordance with the criterion of individual judgment. If one only knows that a Yao (the symbol of wise kingship) and a Cheh (the symbol of tyranny) will approve their own conduct and disapprove that of each other, one will see the individual interests and biases of things. Of old, the Emperors Yao and Shun abdicated their thrones in favor of their chosen successors (instead of their own heirs), and they were both regarded as sage emperors; but when King Kuei (of Yen, B. C. 320–316) abdicated his throne in favor of his Minister Tze Tsi, he ruined his kingdom by this imitation of Yao. King Tang (B. C. 1783–1754) and King Wu (B. C. 1122–1116) founded their dynasties by revolutions, but the Duke of Peh (d. 479 B. C.) also started a revolution which cost his life. Therefore, voluntary abdications and revolutions, the virtue of a Yao and the vice of a Cheh, were valuable or disastrous according to their respective times, and none of them is to be regarded as the

standard for all times. . . . Therefore, to say 'Why not always follow the right and never the wrong, the just and never the unjust?' indicates a failure to apprehend the principle of the universe and the nature of all things."

It is a great pity that a fruitful theory like the one contained in the passages quoted above which denies the absoluteness of truth and morality, was mutilated by Chuang Tze's conception of the process of natural evolution and human history as purely an automatic unfolding of the Tao or cosmic reason, or, to use a phrase of Hegel, as a process of development and realization of the world spirit. Chuang Tze was so overwhelmed by the consciousness of the infinity and all-sufficiency of the process of nature that he looked upon all human effort and endeavor as not even of infinitesimal worth, and upon all human knowledge as hopelessly incomplete and inadequate. Therefore he counsels men to surrender this hopeless quest for knowledge and for accelerating change. "How do I know that what I call knowledge is not ignorance?" "How do I know that what I call human effort is not in reality the work of nature?" "Life is finite, and knowledge is infinite. To drive the finite in pursuit of the infinite is fatal" (Bk. iii:1). "What man knows is not to be compared with what he does not know. The span of his existence is not to be compared with the span of his non-existence. To strive to exhaust the infinitely great with the infinitely small, therefore, necessarily lands him in confusion and causes him to lose his self" (Book xvii).

This leads us back to his logical theory according to which all logical dictinctions are unreal and illusory. "Viewed in their difference, the liver and the gall are as far apart as the state of Chin (in the extreme northwest) is from the state of Yueh (in the extreme southeast). Viewed in their underlying identity, all things in the universe are one" (Bk. v : 1). All disputes about truth and falsehood, right and wrong, therefore, are needless and gratuitous. "Suppose you and I had an argument in which you won and I lost, are you necessarily right and I necessarily wrong? Or if I won and you lost, am I necessarily right and you necessarily wrong? Or are we both partly right and partly wrong? Or are we both wholly right and wholly wrong? If we ourselves cannot understand each other, so much the more will the world be

in the dark, and whom shall we set up as our arbiter? If we appeal to one who agrees with your view, then he is already in agreement with you, how can he arbitrate between us? And if we appeal to one in agreement with me, how can he, being already on my side, arbitrate between us? And if we appeal to one who differs from, or agrees with, both of us, then, being either in agreement or at variance with both of us, how can he act as our arbiter? Therefore, you and I and all the others are incapable of understanding one another. Upon whom shall we depend for a decision?'' And Chuang Tze himself suggests a solution of this difficulty: ''Reconcile all in the rhythm of nature.'' ''Take no heed of time, nor of right and wrong. Aspire to the realm of the Infinite, and take refuge therein.''

Chapter III

Hsun Tze

I

Biographical Note

The determination of the dates of Hsun Tze forms one of the most interesting problems of Chinese historical criticism. Liu Shiang (d. B. C. 8), in his editorial preface to Hsun Tze's works in the Imperial Library, said that at the age of fifty, Hsun Tze came to Chi during the reign of King Wi (d. B. C. 333) or King Huen (B. C. 332–314). Others sought to prove that he was still alive when his disciple Li Sze became Prime Minister of Chin in B. C. 213.[1] The discrepancy is so great that many critics have found it difficult to reconcile the divergent views. My own belief is that all the controversies have been due to an erroneous punctuation of the biography of Hsun Chun or Hsun Tze in Sze-Ma Chien's "Records of a Historian." (Book 74.) The original text says: "Hsun Chun was a native of the state of Chao. It was not until his fiftieth year that he first came to the state of Chi." Here follows an irrelevant passage of forty-one words which is either a wrongly transposed paragraph properly belonging to the preceeding biography, or an interpolation by a later hand (for such interpolations are common in the "Records of a Historian"). The text goes on to say: "Tien Pien and others of his group (who had, by their philosophical speculations, made the capital of Chi famous as a cultural center) had been dead during the reign of King Shiang (B. C. 283–265). And Hsun Chun was then regarded as the foremost teacher (literally, the oldest master)." The early critics have made the most unpardonable mistake by reading the phrase "during the reign of King Shiang," as part of the next sentence, thus making the text mean that Hsun Tze (or Hsun Chun) had at the age of fifty come to Chi some time before the reign of King Shiang, and that during the latter's reign he

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[1] See Appendices I and II to Wang Shien Chien's edition (1891) of the *Hsun Tze*, Vol. I.

was regarded as the foremost teacher. This mistake is unpardonable, because it is impossible to separate an adverbial phrase from its main sentence by the conjunction "and" (而).

According to my reading of Sze-Ma Chien's text, therefore, Hsun Tze was fifty years old when he first came to Chi some time after the reign of King Shiang, probably about B. C. 260–255. This theory is in accord with the remaining parts of the biography above referred to, where it is stated that after his stay in Chi, Hsun Tze went to Chu where he was appointed Magistrate of Lan Ling by the Prince of Chun Sun, and that after the latter's death (B. C. 238), he retired and made his home in Lan Ling where he died. His death probably took place about B. C. 235 at the age of about seventy.

Hsun Tze was of great historical importance, because, while always regarded as a Confucian, he was opposed to the other Confucian schools such as that of Mencius, whose theory of the original goodness of human nature was mercilessly attacked by him. Moreover, his conception of human nature as essentially wicked and of all human goodness as entirely the result of nurture, had great influence on the political and educational theories both of his time and during the Han dynasty. Furthermore, two of his disciples, Han Fei and Li Sze, became two of the chief exponents of the Legalist school, whose philosophy and policies were put into actual practice under the First Emperor of Chin and brought about the general persecution of all schools.

II

Nature and Progress

"Chuang Tze," said Hsun Tze, "was misled by his conception of nature, and failed to see man" (*Hsun Tze*, XXII).

This sentence is not only the keenest and the most concise criticism of the philosophy of Chuang Tze, but also furnishes what seems to me the key to the whole philosophy of Hsun Tze himself. Chuang Tze's philosophy of evolution, as we have seen, resulted in a fatalistic conception of progress and in a logical theory which denies all logical distinctions and thereby all reality of knowledge. It was against this philosophy that Hsun Tze seems to have

directed his attack in his attempt to rescue philosophy from skepticism, and mankind from fatalism and transmundaneness.

As the above quotation indicates, Hsun Tze's fundamental criticism of Chuang Tze was that the latter had exaggerated the process of Nature and ignored man. Nature (天) had been so much personified by him that evolution had actually come to be identified with Divine Providence. Against this all-sufficient and all-powerful Divine Providence, all human volition and effort is nil. To this philosophy, the Confucianists, who were always humanists, could not possibly acquiesce. Confucius, to whom Hsun Tze acknowledged allegiance, had said, "We have not been able to serve men, how can we serve the gods and spirits?" Hsun Tze went even further. "The wise men," said he, "never seek to know Heaven (or Nature)" (XVII). "The superior man is reverent with regard to what lies in him, and does not care for what lies with Heaven. The little man, on the contrary, is careless with regard to what lies in himself, but cares for what lies with Heaven. Reverent with regard to what lies in himself, and unmindful of what lies with Heaven, the superior man therefore progresses every day. Careless of what lies in himself but anxious about what lies with Heaven, the little man therefore degenerates every day" (XVII).

We have seen how the Tao which originally meant chiefly a way of ordering the world came to mean in the "Taoists" the cosmic reason which underlies all change. And as all change was regarded as the automatic working out of the cosmic reason, the word "Tao" soon became synonomous with "Divine Providence." Hsun Tze accordingly sought to restore the word to its humanistic sense and declared that "the Tao is not the way of Heaven, nor the way of Earth, but the way of man" (VIII). In another place, he says: "What is the Tao? I say it is the way to rule a state. What is to rule a state? I say it is to organize the people" (XII). "Heaven has its reasons, earth has its produces, and man has his ordering activity. It is by this ordering activity that man forms a trinity (參) with heaven and earth. To forget what makes him a member of the trinity and to be anxious about those with which he forms the trinity,—that is stupidity" (XVII). "The course of nature is constant. It does not exist

for the sake of a Yao, nor does it cease to operate for the sake of a Cheh. If responded to with the ordering activity of man, it will produce beneficial results. If responded to with neglect and maladjustment, it will cause disaster. Nature cannot impoverish those who strengthen their own being and know how to be economical. It cannot cause sickness to those who nourish themselves properly and work regularly. Nor can it cause misfortune to befall those who act properly and do not deviate from their right course'' (XVII). Therefore, sings Hsun Tze (for he was also a poet):

"You glorify Nature and meditate on her:
Why not domesticate her and regulate her?

"You obey Nature and sing her praise:
Why not control her course and use it?

"You look on the seasons with reverence and await them:
Why not respond to them by seasonly activities?

"You depend on things and marvel at them:
Why not unfold your own ability and transform them?

"You meditate on what makes a thing a thing:
Why not so order things that you may not waste them?

"You vainly seek the cause of things:
Why not appropriate and enjoy what they produce?

"Therefore, I say: To neglect man and speculate about Nature
Is to misunderstand the facts of the universe'' (XVII).

In addition to his emphatic protest against the passive and deterministic attitude toward Nature, Hsun Tze also directed his attack on the evolutionary view of the origin of species, the view which maintained that species develop into one another through the process of variation in forms. Hsun Tze seems to have maintained that species are immutable. What appear to be signs of mutability are only superficial changes. "Among things," said he, "some have the same form but occupy different spaces, while others assume different forms when occupying the same spaces. These can be distinguished. Two things which have the same

form but occupy different places, though they could be grouped together, should be regarded as two substances. Without changing the substance, a thing may undergo formal changes and appear to be a different thing: that is called 'becoming' (化) or transformation. Two 'forms' which a thing has assumed without substantial differentiation, should be regarded as one substance" (XXII). This brief statement seems to contain a very important doctrine in regard to the evolution of species. It seems to have a direct bearing on a still briefer statement found in Book V which says: "The past and the present are the same. The species are not mutable: they are governed by the same principle, no matter how long they have lasted." (古今一度也. 類不悖, 雖久同理.) This seems to say that all species, after once originated at some immemorial time and in some unknown manner (concerning which the pragmatic Confucians took no interest to speculate), are immutable. All phenomena of apparent transformation are more apparent than real. They are probably like the development of the larva into the insect, the embryo into the child, and the child into the old man. Each of such transformations is limited to the species in which it occurs. Such transformations do not produce new species. As is said above, the two forms which a thing has assumed without changing its substance are to be regarded as "one substance." The changes have only been formal ones.

Did Hsun Tze, then, deny the notion of progress? He was certainly denying the idea of progress when he said that the past and the present are the same. "If you want to know a thousand years, see this day. If you wish to know a million or a ten thousand, see the numbers one and two. If you want to know the antiquity, examine the conditions of the present dynasty." And he criticizes the advocates of the theory of progress in these words: "Some deceptive people have said that the conditions of ancient times differ from those of our own day, and that therefore the causes of good government and misrule differ with the times. The common people are greatly fascinated by this theory. They . . . can readily be deceived even in regard to what they personally observe, not to say with regard to things of a thousand generations ago. And deceptive people are always capable of deceiving others even within their own households, not to say

things that occurred a thousand generations ago. That the wise man cannot be deceived by such a theory is because he is able to judge the past by his own experience. Therefore he judges man by man, conditions by conditions, species by species. . . . The past and the present are the same" (V).

While thus denying the difference of the past from the present, he was compelled, unconsciously perhaps, by the theory of progress to modify the traditional Confucianist position of always upholding the remote past as an ideal of the present. Instead of advising the moderns to "model after the ancient sage-kings," he taught the doctrine of "modeling after the latter-day sage-kings" (法後王). Said he: "If you wish to see the works of the ancient sage-kings, go to those whose works are recorded with the greatest detail. I mean the latter-day sage-rulers. . . . To ignore the latter-day sage-rulers and talk of those of the remote antiquity, is like leaving one's own ruler to serve the king of other people." We have seen that the Neo-Mohists had criticized the advocates of the Golden Age in the remote past on the ground that it had no means of verification. Perhaps it was such criticism that had forced Hsun Tze to modify this Confucian tradition from which even a radical like Moh Tih was not entirely liberated. Hsun Tze justifies his theory of "modeling after the latter-day sages" on the ground that the too remote past left too scanty a record for our study. "No name is left to us of the rulers before the Five Emperors (ca. B. C. 2600 to 2200), not because there were no worthy kings, but because their time was too remote. Nor were the policies of the Five Emperors themselves transmitted to us, not because they had no policies worthy of transmission, but because their time was also too remote from us. King Yu (B. C. 2205–2198) and King Tang (B. C. 1783–1754) have left to us some of their wise policies, but with no such details as we find in the recorded policies of the Chow dynasty (beginning B. C. 1122). This, too, is due to the comparative remoteness of time. In transmissions from the past to the present, things of the remote past contain merely general outlines, and only recent ones have the details. . . . For that reason, civilizations fade away and institutions become extinct in the course of time" (V).

This exaltation of the latter-day sages over those of the remote past does not necessarily imply a belief that the present is richer than the past, but only the belief that, the past being the same as the present, one may know the remote antiquity by examining the works of the present dynasty. In this sense, Hsun Tze's philosophy was a denial of the theory of evolution and progress. Throughout his writings we find an explicit belief in the uniformity of nature. It is the application of this conception of the uniformity of nature that led him to deny the reality of progress. Commenting on the sentence referring to the immutability of species, Yang Liang (whose editorial preface to the *Hsun Tze* was dated A. D. 818) said: "The oxen and horses of our own time do not differ from those of the ancient time. Why should we doubt with regard to men?" This remark is instructive in that it enables us to see why a fruitful theory like that of organic evolution should have been so easily rejected by a thinker like Hsun Tze, and for that matter by most of the Chinese thinkers until its revival in our own age. As I speculate about it, the chief weakness of the evolutionary theory in Ancient China lies in its lack of the support which modern geology and archæology have rendered to the Darwinian theory. These modern sciences have enabled men to think in terms of millions of years, whereas the men of Hsun Tze's time could not think beyond the Five Emperors. So a marvelous theory like the theory of the origin of species contained in the *Chuang Tze* could at best remain as a very bold hypothesis, not sufficiently established by scientific evidences. As such, it was easily dismissed by the common-sense view that the horses and oxen of the ancients do not apparently differ from those of our own day. Thus the theory of the immutability of species was reëstablished.

But, while his theory of "modeling after the latter-day sages" was professedly based on the belief that the past and the present are the same, he did not realize how far he had already departed from traditional Confucianism by advocating this revolutionary doctrine. It unconsciously, if not consciously, implies the idea that, as far as historical evidences are concerned, the present *is* richer than the past. This notion is more clearly implied in his philosophy of education. Consistent with his exaltation of man

over nature, his educational theory begins with a conception of human nature as of no consequence, and of nurture as all important and powerful. 'Man is by nature wicked, his goodness is the result of nurture" (XXIII). "That in man which cannot be learned or made is called human nature (性). That in man which can be acquired through learning or making is called nurture (僞, 爲)." Under nature are classed all instincts,—hunger, thirst, anger, etc.,—and all native faculties,—sight, hearing, taste, smell, etc. "A curved twig needs straightening and heating and bending in order to become straight. A piece of metal needs forging and polishing in order to become sharp. And man who is by nature wicked needs teaching and discipline in order to be right, and requires the influence of *li* and *yi* (禮義, 'Sittlichkeit') in order to be good. The ancient rulers understood the native viciousness of man, . . . and therefore created morals and laws and institutions in order that human instincts and impulses might be disciplined and transformed." "The sages sought to transform human nature and instituted nurture. Nurture originated on account of human nature and gave rise to all *li* and *yi*" (XXIII).

The underlying conception is that, while mankind, like all the other species, has not *essentially* changed ever since its early beginning, it has, however, greatly modified and civilized its primitive, instinctive nature by means of nurture or education. Potentially, man has remained the same throughout the ages. But actually he has improved greatly over his primitive self. *That* is progress. Progress has come about, not through any fundamental mutation of human nature but through the "accumulation" (積) of acquired characteristics. "Mountains are formed by accumulation of earth, seas by accumulation of water, and years by accumulation of mornings and evenings. . . . The ordinary man in the street may, by accumulation of virtues and accomplishments, become a sage. Seek, and you shall find; do, and you shall succeed; accumulate, and you shall achieve the heights; endeavor to perfect yourself, and you shall become a sage. A sage is therefore the ordinary man who has accumulated. Man becomes a farmer by accumulated experience in farming; or a carpenter, in cutting and carving; or a merchant, in buying and selling: or a

gentleman in practicing the moral laws and customs. . . . A man becomes a Chu by living long in Chu, a Yueh by living long in Yueh, and a Sha by living long in Sha (i.e., central China). All this not because his nature is so, but because the gradual influence of accumulated experience has made him so" (VIII).

Progress, then, means the triumph of accumulated nurture over nature. But such progress as mankind has achieved has not come from blind, automatic, and aimless groping. It has been the outcome of conscious effort, and intelligent direction, and is always dependent on leadership and ideas. After describing the essential sameness of all men with respect to instincts, impulses, desires, and native capacities, Hsun Tze asks: "If men all desire happiness, tranquillity, and honor, and all dislike toil, peril, and dishonor, why then are so many people bent on becoming hard laborers, deceptive money-makers, and dishonored rulers, and so few have become sages and virtuous men?" The answer was: Because of short-sightedness (陋). "Shortsightedness is the most universal evil in the world and the greatest disaster to mankind." "A Yao or a Yu is not born in perfection, but is one who begins under difficult circumstances and has succeeded in so improving himself that he finally attains perfection. All men are born common men. Without teachers and ideals (師法), they can only see the immediately gratifying things. . . . He who has never seen fine and delicious food, will always be contented with his swine rations. When some one shows him some best food, he may even stare at it in astonishment. But when he has once experienced the truly gratifying effects of the new food, he will never again be satisfied with his former swine rations. . . . It is the benevolent sages who delight in telling and in enlightening people. By telling and enlightening people, by gradually influencing them, and by constantly reminding them, they will be able to make the biased people open-minded, the shortsighted wise, and the ignorant intelligent" (IV).

Herein lies Hsun Tze's justification of the traditional Confucian method of emphasizing general principles and of setting up Utopias under the disguise of idealized sage-rulers of the remote

past.[1] Progress is possible only under the guidance of leaders and ideals. Nurture, the chief factor in the improvement of the human race, must not be aimless. According to Hsun Tze, the aim of all learning is to know ideal perfection, and ideal perfection is to be found in the sages and sage-rulers (XXI). Mencius, another Confucian, had said, "As the compasses and the carpenter's square are the ideal circles and ideal squares, so are the sages ideals of human relationships." Thus Hsun Tze, like all other Confucians, sought to supply the world with an elaborate set of ideal duties and relations and rules known under the vague name of Li. The Li comprises what the Confucians considered the best standards of conduct and relationship which the sage-rulers of the past had left to mankind. Hsun Tze regarded the Li as the best means which the sage-rulers had devised for the guidance and discipline of the innately wicked nature of men in order that they might become right and good.[2] Said he: "Men are born with desires which they seek to gratify. This seeking to gratify the desires, if not kept within definite limits, will of necessity lead to strife. Strife will lead to disorder and poverty. The sage-rulers, wishing to forestall such disastrous results, therefore instituted the Li as a standard of justice so that one's desires might be satisfied without injuring others" (XIX).

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[1] The Chinese were not the only people that were fond of appealing to the remote past for authority and support of their present advocacies. One can easily recall the numerous theories of "the state of nature" which European thinkers have invented in support of their own divers political ideals.

[2] Mencius, who came shortly before Hsun Tze, and whose philosophy is not treated in this essay, had greatly modified the rigidity of Confucianism by his conception of human nature as essentially good. Because man is by nature good and rational, Mencius's theory of education is opposed to discipline and emphasizes the importance of self-acquisition in learning. Hsun Tze, whose influence on the period immediately following was very great, reëstablished the importance of discipline in education by his theory of the innate wickedness of man.

Chapter IV

Hsun Tze

(*Concluded*)

III

His Logic

The above account of Hsun Tze's philosophy in general is intended to facilitate an understanding of his logical theory. His exaltation of man over Nature, and of nurture over human nature, his denial of the theory of the evolution of species, his conception of social progress as the result of accumulated experience, his doctrine of modeling after the latter-day sages instead of those of remote antiquity, and his institutionalism which upholds the rites and customs and precepts of the past sage-rulers as ideals and as effective instrumentalities for the ordering of society and the state,—all these are necessary preliminaries to our study of his logical theory which, as I understand it, is the Confucian logic greatly modified under the influence of the later and non-Confucian schools.

In our study of the Confucian logic, we have seen that names were regarded as having originated in the transcendental ideas (*hsiang*) which the ancient sage-rulers have made into names by some legislative command; that the doctrine of "rectifying names" consisted in making things and institutions mean what their names indicate they ought to mean; and that names were to be so judiciously used as always to imply moral approval and disapproval. Being an extreme humanist and always demanding historical evidence, Hsun Tze dismissed the mysterious origin of names and substituted for it a theory which derives the names from sense experience and mental activity. But he retained the view that names were first "instituted" by acts of governmental power, although he did not deny that the later governments had the same power to institute new names and to ratify and rectify the names that had arisen from time to time without governmental sanction. Against the old view of upholding the original and ideal meaning of names, he advanced the view that a name is

correct which has become current either through social conventions or by government ratification. The names that the government should ratify are those that have already become current by a sort of tacit convention. All innovation in terminology is to be forbidden by law. And the "rectification of names" simply means the maintenance of the established usages against corruption by time and innovation by the cunning dialecticians.

"The value of names," said Hsun Tze, "consists of the fact that when a name is heard the substance (實) is understood" (Book xxii).[1] It is because Hsun Tze, as well as all Confucians, recognized in names an indispensable instrumentality of knowledge and social intercourse, that he was so anxious about their rectification. They are the sole means of communication, medium of expression, vehicles of culture, tools of education, and instruments for the general ordering of society and the state. Therefore, said Hsun Tze, "the sage-rulers instituted names. When names were fixed and substances were distinguished, when speech could become current and men's motives mutually understood, then the people could be sagaciously guided and unified. Therefore any attempt to create unratified names, thereby causing corruption of the established usages and confusing the minds of the people, was regarded as a crime as great as the private manufacturing of official seals and weights and measurements. . . . Therefore the people of those times were honest and simple and capable of being wisely led. . . . Now that the sage-rulers have been long dead and the guarding of names has laxed, uncanny theories have arisen and names and substances are in hopeless confusion. When there is no standard of right and wrong, even officers of the law and even teachers of truth are in a state of confusion. Should some sage-ruler rise to power to-day, I am sure he would institute a set of new names as well as retaining the established ones." "In thus instituting names, the rulers should adopt the names of penalties of the Shiang dynasty (B. C. 1783–1123), those of titles of the Chow dynasty (beginning B. C. 1122), and those of rites and institutions contained in the books of Li. As to the names of

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[1] Quotations in the present chapter, except where they are otherwise indicated, are taken from Book xxii of the *Hsun Tze*.

the other things in the universe, they should adopt those which have already received the customary sanction and mutual agreement of the civilized peoples of the Middle Kingdom." Hsun Tze then proceeds to consider the three things essential to the rectification of names: (1) Wherefore there should be names, (2) Why there are agreement and difference in names, and (3) What are the fundamental principles on which names are made. These constitute the essence of Hsun Tze s logic.

First, why should there be names? "Different forms, apart from the mind, may be understood to be their opposites; and different things may be called by the names of one another." That is, before names become current, there is no reason why "large" should not mean "small," or black should not be called white. Under these circumstances, "there would be no distinction between what is valuable and what is worthless, nor between those that are similar and those that are different. If so, there would surely be the danger of men misunderstanding one another's meaning and intentions, and also the impossibility of having anything done. Therefore the sages sought to establish distinctions, and instituted the names to indicate the various substances. First of all, names are means to show what is worthy and what is worthless. Secondly, they distinguish the like from the unlike. When worth and worthlessness are indicated and similarity and difference are distinguished, then men will not misunderstand one another's intentions and human activities will be successfully carried on. That is why there should be names."

In this account, two points of importance may be noted. First, the use of the word "*shih*" (實) is worth noting. The Neo-Mohists had defined it as "that about which something is said." It is simply the "subject" in a proposition, and anything or any name or predicable may become a subject. It is not necessary that that to which something is predicated must be a "substance" and have existential reality. With Hsun Tze, and probably with all Confucians, the "*shih*" is a substance in the sense that it has existence before its name is instituted. In the second place, the Confucian view that names should be so used as to imply ethical judgment, is retained by Hsun Tze in his theory that the first use of names lies in indicating worth and worthlessness. That is to

say, there are certain names which signify worth and thereby inspire emulation and endeavor, while there are others which are always associated with vice and disgrace and which therefore call forth disapproval, horror, and avoidance. Names should be such as to make men shun a vice or a dishonor as promptly as they avoid a fire or a poison. The other use of names as means for distinguishing the like from the unlike, which the logicians of the Neo-Mohist school had so much emphasized, is considered by Hsun Tze only as secondary.

Secondly, whence have arisen the agreement and disagreement in names? Hsun Tze said: "They come from the senses. The senses of those of the same kind and having the same feelings react in the same way toward things. So by comparing among themselves, they are enabled by this approximate similarity to understand one another. Thereupon they come to agree on the several names as means for mutual expectation (But) size, shape, color, and texture differ with different eyes; sounds and tones differ with different ears; sweet, bitter, saltiness, sourness, etc., differ with different tongues; fragrance, odor, flavor, etc., differ with different noses; pain, itchiness, heat, cold, etc., differ with different bodies; and joy, anger, sorrow, love, hate, desire, etc., differ with different minds. It is also the mind which receives (徵) the knowledge of the senses. It is because our mind receives knowledge that we may depend on the ear for sounds and the eye for forms. But the reception of knowledge must also depend on the senses for the 'cataloguing' (當簿) or classifying of the objects perceived. If the senses cannot properly place them and the mind has no way to receive them, then there is no knowledge. That is why there are agreement and disagreement in names."

The language of this passage is not very clear. But the main point in it seems to consist in regarding all error and incorrect naming as subjective. That this is probably what is meant in this passage, may be seen from collateral passages from Book xxi, where the mind, the "king of the body, which issues commands and is never commanded by other things," is nevertheless regarded as capable of being deceived by external detractions if it is not so trained as to be always in the state of "receptiveness, concentration, and tranquillity." "When the mind is disturbed, then

external objects will not be clearly perceived. When we are in such a state of mind, then we are not in a position to affirm or deny things. He who walks in darkness sees a rock and thinks it is a sleeping tiger, or meets a tree and thinks it is a man. It is because darkness has blinded his sight. A drunken man crosses a wide stream and thinks it is only a little ditch; he bows his head on entering the city gate, thinking it was a small side-door. It is because wine has confused his soul. . . . Looked at from a hilltop, a cow appears as small as a lamb, . . . distance having diminished the size. Viewed from the valley, all trees on the mountain look like chopsticks, . . . altitude having distorted their tallness. No flowing water can be used as a mirror, because the image will be shifting. Nor do we go to a blind man to find out whether there are stars in the heavens, because he has lost his faculty of seeing. Now, if any man should affirm or deny anything on the testimony of the senses under the aforesaid abnormal conditions, surely he would be considered the greatest fool in the world. Only fools settle a doubt by such doubtful means, and their decision will surely lead them into errors" (xxi). "The human mind is like a basin of water, which when undisturbed, will leave the mud and sand at the bottom and clear water on the top, so that one may see one's image clearly mirrored in it. But let it be agitated, and you will see the clear, mirror-like water beclouded by the mud and sand stirred up from the bottom, and no longer will you find your image in it. The same is true of the mind. Guide it with reason, nourish it with purity, and allow nothing to disturb its equilibrium, and then it will be able to decide on right and wrong or solve difficult and doubtful problems. But if you allow it to be detracted by petty externalities, then its balance will be upset and its judgment will become selfish and will never be competent to decide upon things" (xxi).

The theory contained in the last quotation, it may be noted in passing, has had a tremendous influence on subsequent Chinese thought. It finds expression in such Confucianist texts as the *Ta Hsuoh* in which the rectification of the mind is made the beginning of all human perfections,[1] and the method of its rectification

[1] See Introduction to this essay, p. 1. The *Ta Hsuoh* begins with the extension of knowledge through the investigation of things; but because no method of procedure for such investigation was given, the Sung philosophers, as well as the Ming, found it more convenient to start from the rectification of the mind.

is conceived as consisting in freeing it from anger, fear, joy, and grief. During the Han dynasty (B. C. 206–A. D. 219), when Confucianism or pseudo-Confucianism was ascending to absolute supremacy, Tung Chung-shu, the greatest Confucian of the time, was merely echoing the same doctrine when he advised his emperor that a ruler should first rectify his own mind in order to rectify his court, and then rectify his court in order to rectify all the officials, and then all the officials in order to rectify all the people. Many centuries later when the *Ta Hsuoh* was rediscovered by the Sung Confucians, Chu Hsi (1129–1200), who lived in an age when half of China was in the hands of the *King* Tartars and when the country was in constant danger of foreign invasion, gravely told his sovereign that the root of all trouble was his failure to rectify his own mind!

The remedy for error,—the method for rectifying the mind,—according to Hsun Tze, consists in following expert opinion. "It is man's nature to know, and it is the nature of things to be known. When the knowing nature seeks after that whose nature it is to be known, the pursuit will never end even after generations and ages if it does not set up something as the final goal. One may know a million things and yet be unable to comprehend the complex changes in the universe, just like an untutored mind. To spend one's whole life in pursuing knowledge and to end in being no wiser than an untutored mind,—that is stupidity. Therefore, in learning one must know where the final goal is. Where, then, is the final goal? It is in perfection. Where is perfection? It is in the sage-rulers. A sage is the highest ideal of human relations, and a ruler is the highest authority of human institutions. The combination of the two highest qualities will surely be sufficient to become the final goal of mankind. Therefore all who learn should make the sage-rulers their teachers, and model after their institutions as the ideal forms" (xxi).

The third consideration in the instituting of names is, What are the fundamental principles on which names are made? The first principle naturally is that of similarity: "All that are alike should have the same name, and all that are unlike should have different names." Here follows a discussion on the various kinds of name, such as singular name, collective name, and generic

name. "Although there are multitudes of things in the world, we may group them together under the name 'thing,' which is the most 'inclusive' name (大共名). An inclusive name comprehends everything that can possibly be included therein. We may also set apart a portion of things and call them 'animals' which is one of the 'exclusive' names (大別名). An exclusive name distinguishes one group of things from another and excludes all that can possibly be excluded therefrom."

But the most important principles are these: "Names have no correctness of their own, but are applied to things by conventions. When conventions and customs have been formed on them, they are called correct names. Those which are contrary to conventions are called incorrect names. Nor are names absolutely fixed to the substances of which they are the names. The various substances are so named by conventions. When conventions and customs have grown up on them, they are the names of such-and-such substances." These principles gave a new meaning to the Confucian doctrine of rectifying the names. They recognize the social origin of names, thus rejecting the Confucian theory of "ideas," and also the theory that names should always be understood in the light of their original and ideal meanings. According to the new view, the conventionally accepted meaning is the correct meaning. The "oughtness" depends upon the act by which the sage-rulers ratify the conventionally sanctioned names. After this act of ratification, any attempt at innovation of names becomes as criminal as the private manufacturing of official seals, weights, and measures. It is necessary to note that in this doctrine are contained two dangerous elements. In the first place, there is implied the spirit of conservatism which upholds the conventional and customary as the morally right. In the second place, there is the spirit of intoleration which condemns all innovators as disrupting the harmony and tranquillity of the existing order of things. This latter element of intoleration, as we shall see, comes out most conspicuously in the policies of Hsun Tze's disciple, Li Sze, which culminated in his persecution of all the schools that were adverse to the government.

These three considerations, namely, the use of names, the cause of agreement and disagreement, and the principles for

instituting names, were applied by Hsun Tze to test the several doctrines that had been advanced by thinkers of the time. He classified these doctrines under three principle fallacies. (1) There is the fallacy of "so using names as to cause the confusion of names." The examples he mentioned are: "It is no disgrace to be insulted or assaulted;" "The sage does not love himself;" and "To kill a thief is not killing a man." The first is a doctrine of Sung Tze, a pacifist who taught the doctrine of non-resistance; the second is now found in Book 36 of the *Moh Tze;* and the last is also a doctrine of the Neo-Mohists which we have already discussed in an earlier chapter. To these Hsun Tze applied the first of the three considerations above stated, namely, wherefore should there be names? The value of names, as we have seen, lies first in showing worth and worthlessness, and secondly, in distinguishing the like and the unlike. Hsun Tze did not, however, tell us how this test should be applied. It seems that the doctrine "To kill a thief is not killing a man," would probably be rejected by him on the ground that it works against the use of names as the means to distinguish the like from the unlike. The doctrine, "It is no disgrace to be insulted or assaulted," is elsewhere (Book xviii) discussed in greater detail. The main argument against this doctrine is that it is against common sense. "Now," said Hsun Tze, "Sung Tze cannot prevent men from disliking an insult, but endeavors to persuade them not to regard it as a disgrace. Is not that a futile attempt?" Furthermore, he argues, the sense of honor and disgrace is the means which enables the sage-rulers to govern the people. If this sense is eliminated, the government will be unable to rule the people by means of rewards and punishments.

(2) There is the fallacy of "so regarding the substances as to cause confusion of names." The examples he mentioned are: "Mountains and rivers are on the same level;" "It is the nature of man to seek only a minimum gratification of his desires," etc. The first we have seen to be one of Hui Sze's paradoxes. The second is also Sung Tze's theory. These Hsun Tze subjected to the test of the second of his three considerations, namely, whence have come the agreement and disagreement of names. This, as we have seen, comes from the senses. If common sense agrees to

regard a mountain as something high and rivers as something low, then it is useless to argue that they are on the same level. The other doctrine concerning the minimum gratification of desires is also discussed in Book xviii. "Does Sung Tze hold that it is the nature of the eye not to desire beauty, of the ear not to desire fine music, the tongue not to desire good taste, the body not to desire comfort? . . . If he thinks that, while men do desire these things, they do not want a maximum gratification of these desires, then his argument amounts to saying that it is the nature of man to desire wealth but not great wealth, beauty but not great beauty. The sage-rulers knew better. Realizing that men always want a maximum and not a minimum gratification of their desires, they therefore rewarded them by increasing their means for such gratification, and punish them by decreasing these means. . . . If Sung Tze's theory be true, shall we say then that the sage-rulers reward people with what they dislike and punish them with what they desire?

(3) Finally, there is the fallacy of "so using the names as to cause confusion of substances." The example given is textually so corrupt that we are not certain what the original wording was. From the last four words of the sentence, it seems probable that the example refers to Kung-Sun Lung's paradox that a white horse is not a horse.[1] Hsun Tze proposes to subject this doctrine to the third of his three considerations, namely, what are the principles on which names are made? These principles we have seen to be the principles of similarity and difference and of social conventions as the sanction of names. Hsun Tze holds that such perverse doctrines should be rejected on the ground that they are contrary to what social conventions have accepted. That is to say, if it is conventionally accepted that a white horse is a horse, all arguments to the contrary are idle.

In summing up, Hsun Tze said: "All perverse theories and heretical notions that have been invented in open contradiction to truth, can be dealt with under these three fallacies. The wise rulers realize this, so they do not care to argue about them. They know that the people can be united by the *tao* (the royal way),

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[1] The text is 非而忌馬有牛馬非馬也.
The sixth word is probably an erroneous substitution for 白 (white).

but cannot be expected to reason about things in the same manner. Therefore a wise ruler establishes authority over them, guides them by truths, reminds them from time to time by ordinances, makes truth clear to them by expository treatises, and forbids their deviation by penalties. By these means, the people can be converted to truth as readily as if by the aid of the gods. What use is there for arguments and debates?"

In these words one may readily see the sign of the downfall of the most glorious era of Chinese thought. Chinese philosophy, as I have tried to show in the earlier chapters of the present essay, arose as the outcome of an age of intellectual emancipation, of vigorous thinking, free discussion, relentless criticism, and bold hypotheses. Confucius, who was profoundly impressed by the chaotic conditions of the thought of his time, sought the means for an intellectual reorganization in the rectification of names. But the efforts of Confucius and his successors were insufficient to check the vital and vigorous growth of the thought-systems which gloriously adorn the China of the fifth, fourth, and third centuries before the Christian era. In spite of the exclusively humanistic interest of Confucius and Moh Tih, the thinkers of Ancient China succeeded in producing a truly remarkable era of science and philosophy, of which the Neo-Mohist texts give us abundant though only fragmentary evidence. But the vitality of philosophical and scientific thought was undermined, on the one hand, by the skeptical thinkers such as Chuang Tze. And, on the other hand, the truly anarchistic conditions of thought produced by the numerous rival schools of the time, had once more brought home to the Confucians the necessity for some intellectual organization and standardization. Hence the revival of the doctrine of the rectification of names by a Confucian like Hsun Tze who, in his dislike for the various perverse and heretical doctrines of his time, set up as the ideal of social ordering the wise ruler who "establishes authority over the people, guides them by truths, constantly reminds them by ordinances, makes truth clear to them by expository treatises, and forbids their deviation by penalties." By these means he expected to convert the people to the "royal way" "as readily as if it were by the aid of the gods." "What use," asked he, "is there for arguments and debates?"

Another element in the philosophy of Hsun Tze which has wrought great mischief to the development of science, is contained in his exclusively humanistic conception of philosophical speculation. We have pointed out that his humanism has rendered a great service in rescuing philosophy from the fatalism and other worldliness of the Taoistic school represented by such thinkers as Lieh Tze and Chuang Tze. But in his exaggerated exaltation of man over nature, he has in effect excluded natural science from the realm of philosophy. It is very well to say,

> "You glorify Nature and meditate on her:
> Why not domesticate her and regulate her?
>
> "You obey Nature and sing her praise:
> Why not control her course and use it?"

But it is exceedingly dangerous to say,

> "You vainly seek the cause of things:
> Why not simply appropriate and enjoy what they produce?
>
> "Therefore I say: To neglect man and speculate about Nature
> Is to misunderstand the facts of the universe."

This means that the proper study for mankind is man, and that the attempts to understand "the cause of things" and "what makes a thing what it is,"—problems which seem to have no immediate relation to man,—are to be discouraged. Thus we find Hsun Tze declaring that "all those things which have nothing to do with the distinction of right and wrong, truth and falsehood, good government and misrule, or with the ways of mankind, are things the knowledge of which does not benefit men, and ignorance concerning which does no harm to men. . . . They belong to the speculations of unruling persons of a degenerate age" (xxi). Again, "as to the displacement of body and empty space, or the separation of whiteness and solidity, or the distinction of agreement and difference, they are things beyond the powers of the eye and the ear, and are inexplicable even by the most eloquent dialecticians. Even the wisdom of the sages does not always comprehend them. Not to know them does not make one less of a gentleman; knowing them does not make one less of a little man. Without them, the artisans can be just as good artisans. And the sages can very well govern a state without them" (viii).

Chapter V

The Logic of Law

I

Introductory

In an earlier chapter[1] it was pointed out that Ancient Chinese society was divided into two general classes: the "privileged" class and the "unprivileged" class. The privileged class, comprising all the classes from the knights upward, was exempt from the penal laws and was governed by a vague body of rules of propriety known as the Li. Any offense committed by members of this upper class was not to be punished by the penalties provided in the penal codes, but left to the sense of honor of the offenders themselves which, as history abounds in examples, in most cases compelled them to resort to suicide as means of restoring their blotted honor. It is only the masses that were subject to the various degrees of penalties, from money fines up to capital punishment. This was probably true at least of those centuries when feudalism was at its height, and when the class-distinctions were not obliterated by the rapid changes of political allegiances and family fortunes brought about by the rise of the newer nations and by the frequent wars of conquest and rivalry. But the tradition of a dualistic division of society outlived feudalism for a long time,—indeed we may say it has survived until this day. Any student of the literature of the Confucian school will readily recall the rigid distinction between the "gentleman" or, literally, the "lordly man" and the "little man" or "mean man" (君子小人). As feudalism gradually faded away from the memory of men, the social origin of this division was later replaced by a qualitative distinction such as we find in the works of Mencius who classified those who work with the intellect as "gentlemen" and those laboring with the body as "little men." But the theory of exemption of the formerly "privileged" class from the penalties of the law was retained more or less by the Confucians throughout

[1] Part II, Chap. V, i.

the ages. The doctrine taught in the *Li Ki* (Book i),[1] that no grand officer (大夫) was to be subjected to legal penalties, was practiced to a certain extent by some later dynasties. During the Han dynasty (B. C. 206–A. D. 219), for instance, practically all the Ministers who died under legal sentences (and there were hundreds of them during those 400 years), committed suicide instead of submitting to the penalties of the law.

This feeling that it was not respectable to be governed by laws, was probably unconsciously underlying the traditional Confucian opposition to all advocacy for government by law. Confucius wanted government by virtue ; Mencius wanted government by benevolence; and Hsun Tze wanted government by the Li. And all of them wanted government by sage-rulers or, as Plato would say, "philosopher-kings." But all this opposition did not succeed in preventing China from developing a philosophy of law and a legal system which forms one of the most important systems in the world. The conditions of the States demanded some form of written law, and law grew up in Ancient China in spite of all adverse criticism and opposition by the conservatives and by the extreme individualists of the type of Lao Tze.

The first published codes of law in Ancient China of which we have authentic historical mention, were those of the sixth century B. C.[2] In the *Tso Commentary* on the *Chun Chiu*, we read that in the year 536 B. C., Tze Tsan, the great statesman of Chen, published a code of penal law by engraving it on a great sacrificial caldron. This act was severely criticized by the conservatives of the time as tending to encourage lawsuits and the quarrelsome spirit of the people. In defense of his policy, Tze Tsan said, "I did it to meet the urgent needs of the time." In 513, the state of Ching also caused a penal code to be engraved on a great caldron. This act, which occurred in the lifetime of Confucius, was criticized by him as unwise and tending to cause the ruin of the nation. In both instances, the published law was

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[1] See note 2 in Part II, Ch. V.

[2] The *Chow Li* which purports to be the laws of the early Chow Empire, is surely a Utopian scheme written in a much later age, probably as late as the first century B. C.

confined to a penal code, and was called "Hsin Shu" (刑書) or Code of Penalties. Neither of these codes has come down to us, however.

From that time, there must have been many attempts made in the various states to codify and publish the laws. It was not until the latter half of the fourth century, however, that there were traces of a conscious recognition of the advantages of government by law. About the middle of the fourth century, there arose two statesmen : Wei Yong of Chin (d. 338) and Sun Poh-hai of Han (d. 337). All the later exponents of the philosophy of law went back to these two men as their starting point. Of the two men, Wei Yong was the more important. It was he who made the state of Chin a great power which a century later conquered all the "contending states" and founded the first Empire of China. Both statesmen effected many reforms by means of new laws, and thereby first demonstrated the efficacy of law as a constructive instrument of government. Both Wei Yong and Sun Poh-hai are said to have written books on law and polity. The work now known as the *Book of the Prince of Shiang* (i.e., Wei Yong), in twenty-six chapters, seems to be a later compilation at best based on a few fragmentary chapters or sayings of his own. The *Book of Sun Poh-hai* has been lost and is now known only through a few fragments quoted by early writers.

The time was ripe for the development of radical political thinking, and the latter half of the fourth century and the first three quarters of the third century witnessed the rise of numerous thinkers who devoted much attention to problems of law and polity (法術). In the state of Chi, there was gathered a group of thinkers known as the "Masters of Kih Sha" (稷下先生), of whom only one man, Yin Wen Tze, has left us a little work of two chapters which, however, is not free from later interpolations. A few fragments are preserved of another of this group, named Shen Dao, whose forty-two books mentioned in the Imperial Catalogue of Han have been lost. From these fragmentary works and from the summary of the teachings of Yin Wen Tze, Shen Dao, Tien Pien, and Peng Mung (尹文子, 愼到, 田駢, 彭蒙), given in the epilogue of the *Chuang Tze*, we may still get a glimpse of their speculations on the problems of law and government.

In the northwestern states, there arose another school of political thought which continued the tradition of Wei Yong and Sun Poh-hai, and which had great influence on the practical politics of the time. The best representatives of this school were Han Fei and Li Sze. Both of them, according to tradition, were once pupils of Hsun Tze, the Confucian. But they taught and practiced a philosophy which would most probably have been repudiated by Hsun Tze had he lived to see its culminating success during the first year of the Chin Empire. Han Fei most emphatically renounced the Confucian doctrine of modeling after the ancient sage-rulers, be they of the remote past or of comparatively recent time, and declared that "conditions change with time, and preparations differ with the change of conditions." He criticized the Confucian theory of government by the Li on the ground that it was no longer adequate to meet the needs of the time, and that there was no means of enforcement of the rules of propriety which in consequence were applicable only to the few who would always be good even in the absence of law. He championed the use of law both as an effective check against the caprice of personal government and as a progressive instrument for effecting timely reforms. Han Fei fell victim to the jealousy of Li Sze and committed suicide in the year 233 B. C. The work now collected under his name in fifty-five books is certainly a later compilation and includes many books which could not have been his own writing. But his theories, which were probably shared by Li Sze, were effectively carried out by the latter statesman, who, after the conquest of all the other states, became the first Prime Minister to the First Emperor of the new Empire.

In the following study of the logic of law, I have drawn my material from the works mentioned in the preceding paragraph. They are: *The Book of the Prince of Shiang* (商君書); the fragments of Sun Poh-hai (申子); the *Yin Wen Tze* (尹文子); the *Shen Tze* (of Shen Dao, 愼子); and the *Han Fei Tze*. In addition to these, I have made use of a work entitled *Kwan Tze*, purporting to be the writings of Kwan Chung (d. 643 B. C.), which was probably a compilation of the third century B. C. with even much later additions and interpolations, but which seems to contain fragments that can be used to illustrate the legal and political

theories, not of Kwan Chung the statesman of the seventh century, but of some unknown writer or writers of the third century. Another book which is made use of, is a collection of fragmentary sayings of Sze Kiao (尸佼), who is said to have been a friend and adviser to Wei Yong. His works, said to have been in twenty books, have been lost, and the present collection of the numerous fragments quoted in the various early works, was made by Wang Ki-pei (whose editorial preface was dated 1811).

II

The Logic of Law

The word "law" (*fah* 法) is the same word which in the chapters on Neo-Mohism I have rendered as "form." It originally meant "a model" or "a mold" and, when used as a verb, "to imitate" or "to model after." Etymologically, therefore, it is related to the Confucian "idea" which means "an image" and "to imitate." The Neo-Mohists, as we have seen, had defined the "form" as "that according to which something becomes so." In their theory of deduction, the "form" becomes the formulated cause or the "because" from which the conclusion follows. In scientific classification, the "form" stands for all the attributes essential to a class of things, and is the same as the archetype after which a class of things may be formed. It is not certain how far back the word *fah* came to be used in the sense "law," thus replacing the older word *hsin* ("penalties") which too had the original meaning of "a mold." One thing is clear: the *fah* was first used to mean the standard forms such as weights and measurements. It was in this sense that Moh Tih spoke of the three tests of truth as the "standard forms" (法儀) of reasoning. In the *Kwan Tze* (Book VI), the *fah* is said to include "foot-rules, tape-measures, compasses, carpenters' squares, weights, dry measures, and liquor measures." In the *Yin Wen Tze* (Part II, 2), we find the *fah* is broadened to include four kinds of standard forms: "(1) the permanent forms, such as the relations between ruler and subjects, between a superior and a subordinate; (2) the conventional forms, such as capability and incompetency, wisdom and ignorance, similarity and difference; (3) the forms (laws) for

the ordering of the people, such as rewards and punishments, honors and penalties; and (4) the standards of measurement, such as the measures of area, weight, and volume." In another chapter of the *Kwan Tze*, the *fah* is defined as "that by means of which activities are promoted and aggressions prohibited" (Book 52). That is the end of the law. In form, the *fah* refers only to the published laws of the state. Thus in the *Han Fei Tze*, we find this definition: "A law is that which has been enacted into statute books, kept in the government offices, and proclaimed to the people" (Book 38). In another place we find a slightly different definition: "There is law when enactments are made by the government with penalties which the people feel sure will be carried out, when approbation is attached to its obedience and punishment awaits its violation or disregard" (Book 43).

In these days of government by law, it is difficult for us fully to appreciate the significance of the development of a philosophy of law such as is indicated in the preceding paragraph. But to the student of the history of thought, it was a great advance from the time of Confucius whose political philosophy is summed up in the statement that "he who rules by means of his own virtue is like the North Star which holds its place and the multitude of stars revolve upon it,"[1] to the time of Han Fei who declared: "In governing a state, the wise ruler does not depend on the people's becoming good for his sake, but on their necessity not to do evil. . . . If arrows are to be made only from self-straightened bamboos, there will never be an arrow made in a hundred generations; and if wheels are to be made only out of self-rounded wood, there will never be a single wheel in a thousand years. . . Even though there may be self-straightened bamboo or self-rounded wood, the wise artisan does not set a high value on them, because he does not make arrow and wheel for any one man alone. And even though there may be people who will be good of themselves without the stimulation of reward and punishment, the wise ruler does not set a high value on them, because he does not rule over one or two individuals alone" (Book 50). The difference between these two extreme views of political thought, it seems to me, has

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[1] See note 1 in Part II, Ch. I.

largely been due to a change in the logical method in the philosophical schools. This is not denying the influence of the actual conditions of the time on political thinking. But the fact seems to remain that the conscious and articulate formulation of a philosophy of law and polity such as that of Han Fei, would be impossible without the gradual change in logic which had taken place since the time of Confucius. For that reason, it seems that a study of the logical method which underlies the various theories of law, may be regarded as a fitting conclusion to this essay on the development of logic in Ancient China.

The Confucian doctrine of "rectifying names," as I have elsewhere incidentally pointed out, contained in it certain elements which could be made the beginning, if not the foundation, of a philosophy of law. This doctrine, as we have seen, had held that if names be incorrect nothing will be established and penalties will be unjust and the people will not know where to lay hand and foot. This doctrine seems to have influenced some of the early exponents of the philosophy of law. The *Sze Tze*, which came nearest to Confucianism, says: "That the world can be governed is because there are natural relations which always obtain. That right and wrong can be distinguished is because there are names which are fixed." "That the sage-ruler can have his commands obeyed without much ado, is because he has rectified the names. If a ruler can rectify the names, . . . he will have grasped the *one* for the ordering of the many. Let the names rectify themselves and let the activities take their own course, but let approbation and punishment be attached to the names. Then no people will be irreverent to you." "Speech," said the *Sze Tze*, "is the 'trigger' of all activities. The wise ruler rectifies the speech in court, and the four corners of his country will be well governed. Therefore it is said, 'Rectify the names in order to remove falsehood, and all activities will be achieved as if they were naturally transformed. Check the names by their substances, and all will be well.'"

In this we can see apparent traces of the relationalism of Confucius and the Confucians. The ideal government is that which is able to standardize the names in such a manner that, in the words of the *Sze Tze*, "right and wrong naturally follow from the relation between the name and the substance, and approbation

and punishment naturally follow upon right and wrong." This seemingly subtle theory is in reality very simple. It means that right and wrong depend upon whether or not the names agree with the substances. A son who neglects his "filial" duties, is an "unfilial son," and all unfilial sons are to be punished automatically. The name itself suggests a wrong which must be accompanied by condemnation or punishment. It is just as much a wrong for a son to be "unfilial" as for a square not to be square or a foot-rule to measure only half of its nominal length.

In *Yin Wen Tze*, we find a more fully developed and more clearly stated theory of the relation between names and substances. "A name," says the *Yin Wen Tze*, "is a name of a substance, and a substance is that which answers to a name." "There must be names to check (檢 or 驗) the substances, and substances to determine the names. And there must be names to determine activities, and activities to check the names." This is a summary statement of the relation between names and substances and activities. The underlying principle may be stated as a desire to make names the objective standards of right and wrong, value and worthlessness, which should call forth in men a proper response in the form of approbation or condemnation, pursuit or avoidance. "Names belong to things, but our attitudes toward them are subjective. I love white and detest black, like quiet music but dislike exciting tunes, enjoy sweet things but repel bitter tastes. White and black, quiet and exciting, sweet and bitter, are names of things. But the loving and detesting, the enjoying and repelling, are our subjective attitudes. When the relations between the names and our attitudes toward them are determined, then there will be no disorder among the things and activities in the universe."

So far we are still dealing with the Confucian doctrine of rectifying names. The departure from Confucianism begins with the problem as to the means of "determining the relations between the names and our attitudes toward them." The Confucians insisted on their theory of the Li as the effective means for such determination, and believed in the final efficacy of the gradual moralizing influence of personal virtue and institutional control. From this the advocates of law differed. "Therefore," says the

Yin Wen Tze, 'mankind has sought to determine length, quantity, weight, and tone by means of rulers, bushels, balances, and tonal regulators, respectively. It tests reality and unreality by means of names, and determines order and disorder by means of the law. It controls the complex and the perplexing by means of the simple, and governs the difficult and precipitous by means of the easy. Therefore the multifarious activities are comprehended in the one, and all standards are standardized by the law. To comprehend the manifold in the one, is the greatest simplicity; and to standardize all by the law is the greatest easiness. It is by this means that the stupid and the defective may be governed as well as the clever and the intelligent."

The first element in the logic of law, therefore, is the principle of universality. The law is no longer to be the "ideas" or even the ideal relations held up for the admiration and approximation of the world, but the standard "forms" or "molds" out of which a uniform class of particulars must necessarily result. As Shen Dao says: "He who has the balances cannot be deceived with regard to weight; he who has the foot-rule cannot be deceived with regard to length; and he who has the laws and standards cannot be deceived by craft and dissimulation." The laws are to be applied to all classes without distinction, the rich as well as the poor, the virtuous as well as the wicked. "The iron-barred cage is not intended to keep rats, but to enable even the timid and feeble people to control the tigers. The laws are not intended to interfere with the virtuous, but to enable even a mediocre ruler to control the outlaws" (*Han Fei Tze*, 26).

Closely related to the principle of universality is the principle of objectivity. As the last sentence indicates, laws are intended to enable both the able and the mediocre rulers to carry on their government. Moreover, government by law relieves the ruler from the grave responsibilities of personal government. "If the ruler abandons the laws and rules by his own personal will," says Shen Dao, "then all reward and punishment, all promotion and deprivation, will proceed from his own mind. If so, those who receive rewards, though justly rewarded, will always hope for more and greater honors; and those who are punished, though justly punished, will always plead for more leniency. And if the ruler

yields to his personal inclinations in the determination of rewards and punishments, it is likely that there may be cases of equal merit unequally rewarded, or of equal offense unequally punished. That is the cause of hatred and discontent among the people. The common practice of men drawing lots in dividing certain things among themselves is not because lottery is wiser or more just than human judgment, but because men wish to avoid any complaint of partiality and any cause for discontent. Therefore it is said that the great rulers govern the people not by their own persons but by law, and all things are judged according to the law. Thus whatever the law decides upon, be it reward or punishment, is accepted by all without any grudge toward the ruler. In this way all discontent is eliminated and harmony is maintained" (Frag. 5). This, needless to say, is a theory of constitutional government. It seeks to safeguard the nation from the personal caprice of the ruler and at the same time to shield the ruler from popular discontent and hatred by relieving him from the responsibilities of personal rule.

But the most important point in the logic of law, it seems to me, lies in the insistence on consequences which is implied in the idea of enforcement of the law. The Confucian doctrine of names was seriously marred by the traditional disregard for results, and the theory of government by Li was futile because the Li, being a loose and vague collection of traditional rites and rules, has no means of enforcement. The exponents of law, on the other hand, always emphasized results. Consciously or unconsciously, they were under the influence of the logic of Mohism and Neo-Mohism. As I have already pointed out, the word "law" was the same as the "form" of the Neo-Mohists. The "forms," as we have seen, are the known and formulated causes from which certain conclusions necessarily follow. In the Neo-Mohist theory of induction and deduction, the generalizations of induction are to be tested by their fitness to become the premises or "becauses" of deduction. It is the same logic which underlies the familiar formula of the exponents of law: "Hold the name and demand the substance" (控名責實). Names and other universals are useful only because they are the instruments for the control of the manifold particulars. Laws are formulations of foreseen consequences. And if such

foreseen consequences fail to realize, as in the case of failure of enforcement, then they are no longer laws. For that reason, the exponents of law in Ancient China incurred much unpopularity and opposition by their strong advocacy for rigid enforcement of the law. History tells us that, when Wei Yong had completed his new laws, he wanted first to prove to the people that he meant to enforce them. So he erected a pole at the South Gate, and ordered that anyone who moved it to the North Gate would be rewarded with a certain amount of gold. The order appeared so unreasonable that the people ignored it. The government continued to increase the reward, until finally some bold citizen moved the pole and received the reward. This sensational advertising of the government's intention to enforce its laws had the desired effect, and the new laws when proclaimed were obeyed. But there were many complaints about the severity of the law. These Wei Yong silenced by punishing the Crown Prince who happened to violate one of the new laws. After that, he had his own way.

But the most eloquent teacher of the doctrine of emphasizing practical consequences was Han Fei, whose theory went beyond the notion of enforcement of laws. It seems that, ever since the time of Lao Tze, the political thinkers of Ancient China were more or less influenced by the ideal of government by non-assertion which Lao Tze so enthusiastically preached. Confucius referred to this ideal more than once in the *Lun Yu*, and his own ideal ruler who "is like the North Star which holds its place and the multitude of stars revolve about it," is precisely an ideal ruler who rules by non-assertion. Even the advocates of government by law were not free from this ideal of non-assertion. They realized that government by non-assertion could not be brought about by beginning with non-assertion. Accordingly, they sought first to perfect a system of laws, which, when once perfected, is expected to go on automatically for the permanent direction and ordering of the state. That they seem to have sought to realize the ideal of government by non-assertion by this means, may be seen in such familiar expressions as "Let the names rectify themselves and let the activities take their own course," or "Rectify the names in order to remove falsehood, and all activities will be achieved as if

they were naturally transformed," or "When names are rectified and laws are perfected, the sage-ruler will have nothing to do" (*Kwan Tze*, Book 38). It was the common ideal among the advocates of law that through the instrumentality of law a stage will be reached when "laws stand unused, and penalties are never actually imposed on the people" (*Kwan Tze*, Book 53).

It is apparent that such a static conception of law would lead to a kind of conservatism equally dangerous as that of the institutionalism of the Confucians. It was against this that Han Fei's theory was especially valuable. Han Fei was greatly inspired by the notion of progress which, since the latter half of the fourth century, had long been influencing the thought of the time. In a very interesting chapter (Book 49), he tells the history of human progress throughout the stages of "early antiquity," when mankind had constantly to combat against the wild beasts and a cruel nature; of "middle antiquity," when the founders of the Shia dynasty had to fight against the great deluge; and of "late antiquity," when dynasties were founded and ruined by armed revolutions. He points out that each stage of development accomplished the work most necessary to the life of that period; and that for a later age to repeat the crudities of an earlier age is to commit a folly which would surely have been ridiculed by our primitive forefathers had they lived to witness it. "Therefore," says Han Fei, "a wise man never expects to follow the ways of the ancients, nor does he set up any principle for all time. He studies the conditions of his time and then devises the remedies therefor."[1] "Conditions," said he, "differ with time, and accordingly preparations differ with the change of conditions." It was because he believed in the notion of progress that he could not accept the static conception of law.[2] Said he: "There is no constant method for the government of men. That which works is the

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[1] Han Fei also had a very interesting theory of the "economic interpretation of history" which attributes most of the social evils to overpopulation and the limitation of economic supplies. His ratio for the increase of population, like that of Malthus, is one of geometrical progression.

[2] This view is found in several chapters of the *Han Fei Tze*. But I believe they are most probably later interpolations, because they not only differ from the best chapters of the book in point of style, but are contradictory to them in point of content.

law. When laws are adjusted to the time, there is good government. When a government is adapted to the present generation, it will succeed. . . . When laws are not modified to meet the changing times, there is misrule " (Book 54) !

The test, therefore, of a law lies in its ability or inability to meet the practical needs of the time. This is Han Fei's experimental method. It is not confined to the realm of law. "All theories and all practices should aim at practical utility (功用). Now any man may take a bow and arrow and shoot at random. It is quite possible that he may by chance hit a hair-tip. But we do not call him a good archer, because he has no constant target to aim at. Now if a small target is set up and a distance of ten yards is fixed, then no one can with certainty hit the target every time except the trained archers. . . . Now if we do not set up practical utility as the 'target' of theory and practice, then a theory may be very fine and an act may be very admirable and yet they may both belong to the class of blind shooters who hit a certain point by chance" (Book 41; cf. Bk. 32 : ii, 3). Han Fei never was tired of emphasizing and illustrating this method throughout those chapters which are undoubtedly the genuine writings of his own. "If all men," said he, "are in sleep, no blind man will be noticed. And if all men remain silent, no dumb man will be detected. But try to ask each man to see, and let every man speak, and then the blind and the dumb cannot escape detection. . . . Therefore, when a wise ruler hears one man talk, he demands of him to practice what he talks about. When he sees one man act, he seeks to find out what results are produced thereby " (Book 46).

This doctrine had far-reaching effects. In the first place, as we have already pointed out, it has made law and government the living and progressive instruments for the better adjustment of social and political conditions. In the second place, it repudiated the conservative and reactionary doctrine of "modeling after the sage-rulers of the past" on the ground not only that these rulers lived in ages radically different from our own (Book 49), but also that their policies which the conservatives championed had no historical evidence to prove their reality. "To be sure of anything without corroborating evidences, is stupidity. To base one's argument on anything of which one cannot be sure, is perjury.

Therefore, those who openly base their argument on the authority of the sage-rulers of antiquity, and who are dogmatically certain of the age of Yao and Shun, are men either of stupidity or of willful perjury" (Book 50). This view, as we have seen, goes back to Hsun Tze who advocated the theory of "modeling after the latter-day sages" instead of the sages of the remote past also on the ground that the remote past left too little evidence to enable us to study the details of its works and policies.

But the pragmatic method of Han Fei, which harks back to the pragmatism of Moh Tih as well as the exclusive humanism of Hsun Tze, contained in it the cause of the downfall of the most glorious era of Chinese philosophy. This cause, as I have repeatedly said before, was a too narrow construction of the practical or the practically useful (功用). There was in Han Fei, as in Hsun Tze and even in Moh Tih, the spirit of impatience and intoleration for what was not immediately practical. This spirit found the most outspoken expression in Han Fei when he declares: "What are mutually incompatible, should not coexist. To reward those who kill their enemies in battle, and at the same time praise the acts of mercy and benevolence ; to honor those who capture cities, and at the same time believe in the doctrine of universal love ; to improve the arms and armies of the nation as preparations for emergency, and at the same time admire the deportment of those who go about in flowing robes and ornamented girdles ; to depend upon agriculture for supplying the nation and upon the army for national defense, and at the same time encourage the men of letters:—how can an efficient and strong state result from such self-contradictory acts? The state feeds the 'scholars' and 'cavaliers' (儒俠) in time of peace, but it has to rely on the soldiers in time of war. Those whom the government benefits are not those whom it uses, and those whom it uses are not those whom it benefits. Therefore those who ought to serve the state have gone to the schools. That is why the states are in such disorder. . . . What is now called wisdom consists of subtle and speculative theories which even the wisest men do not understand. . . . When you have not even coarse rice to eat, think not of wine and meat. When you have

not even rags to wear, think not of silk and embroidered garments. And in ordering a state, when the most urgent needs are not met, one has no business to undertake things which have no immediate bearing on the needs of the time. Nothing is more detrimental to good government than to encourage what even the wisest do not quite understand when the actual need is common sense. Therefore subtle and speculative theories are no business of the people" (Book 49).

I do not say that there was no justification for such a theory. He was speaking to his own country, the State of Han, which had fallen into a position of impotency and was losing territory and suffering defeat almost every year at the hands of the powerful armies of the State of Chin. The urgent demand of his country was for military geniuses and practical statesmen, and science had not yet been able to prove itself to be an indispensable factor in military efficiency and social well-being. His words, therefore, were truly those of a patriotic statesman, seeking to save his country from humiliation and ruin. Unfortunately his advice for consistency and efficiency was ignored by his own country, but, as if by the irony of fate, was read with great enthusiasm by the enemy of his fatherland, the King of Chin, who later became the First Emperor of the Chin Empire. What Han Fei prescribed for a weakened and decaying nation, was actually carried out with a vengeance by the newly founded Empire under the First Emperor and his iron-handed Prime Minister, Li Sze, the one-time pupil of Hsun Tze and fellow student of Han Fei. Intoxicated with their unprecedented success and grown impatient with the spirit of criticism most natural in an age of vigorous thinking, Li Sze and the First Emperor literally put into practice Han Fei's doctrine that "nothing is more detrimental to good government than to encourage what even the wisest do not quite understand when the actual need is common sense," and that therefore "subtle and speculative theories are no business of the people." And this led to the persecution of all schools of thought and the burning of books in the year 213 B. C.

EPILOGUE

I quote the following from Book VI of Sze-Ma Chien's *Records of a Historian* as the epilogue to my brief history of the development of logical method in ancient Chinese philosophy :

In the thirty-fourth year of the First Emperor (B. C. 213), the Emperor held a feast in the Hsien Yang Palace. . . . Huen-Yu Yueh, one of the seventy Doctors of the Imperial Court, said to the Emperor : " That the Shiang and Chow dynasties lasted over a thousand years, was because both had created their generals and members of the royal family as vassal lords who acted as the outposts and supporters of the central government. Now that your majesty has united the whole empire, your children and members of your household possess no titles nor land.[1] In case of usurpation of power by some of the ministers, how can the dynasty maintain itself without outside help? Actions which are not modeled after the wise ancients, can never last long. . . ."

The Emperor thereupon ordered this advice to be considered by his counselors.

Prime Minister Li Sze presented this reply: " The Five Emperors did not exactly copy one another, nor did the Three Dynasties mold their policies each after its predecessor. Yet each dynasty achieved its own success, not because they wanted to differ from one another, but because they had to deal with entirely different times and conditions. . . . What Huen-Yu Yueh said belonged to the Three Dynasties, and may not necessarily be worthy of imitation by the present dynasty."

But the Prime Minister went on to say : " In the former days, the several contending states greatly encouraged private teaching and traveling scholars. Now that the Empire is settled down and laws and ordinances proceed from a unitary source, the common people should devote themselves only to

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[1] The new empire had put an end to the feudal system by dividing the empire into thirty-six departments, and by abolishing the class of nobility with land possessions.

farming and the crafts, and the scholars need only to know the laws and government orders in order to avoid things that are forbidden. But the scholars of to-day refuse to study the present and devote themselves to the ancients on whose authority they dare to criticize the government and mislead the people.

"Your majesty's servant, the Prime Minister, therefore ventures to say this. In olden times when the world was in great disorder, and without a unifying authority, there arose numerous schools of thought, each upholding the ancients to block the policies of the present, each cunningly adorning its empty speculations to the confounding of reality, and each praising its own teaching with which to criticize the actions of the government. Now that your majesty has united the whole empire, and established a unitary authority for the judgment of right and wrong (literally, of black and white), therefore, all those who uphold their own teaching and criticize the laws, who entertain secret opposition to the government and even openly deliberate upon its acts and policies, who take pride in disobedience and rebelliousness, who lead the people in creating complaints against the government,—all these, if not prohibited, will tend to lower the prestige of the government and create parties and partisanship among the people. It is expedient that these be prohibited.

"Your majesty's servant therefore recommends that all histories not kept by the Imperial Historian be burned; that, outside of the documents in the Imperial Doctorate College, all literature and all books of the various schools in the possession of private individuals should be delivered to the magistrates of the several localities to be burned in their presence; that hereafter all those who dare to hold open discussions on the forbidden books should be held liable to capital punishment; that all who uphold the ancients to criticize the present government should be punished by death together with their whole family; that all officers of the law who fail to report any such offenses within their knowledge should be punished with the same penalty as the offenders themselves; and that anyone who fails to burn his books

within thirty days after the date of the ordinance, should be sentenced to periods of hard labor. Only books on medicine, divination, and horticulture are exempt from this law. Hereafter, the people who wish to know the laws and orders of the government, should go to the officers of the law."

And the Emperor decreed: "Let it be done."

THE END.

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(191)

Vita

Hu Shih (*Suh Hu* in an earlier and less standardized form of transcription) was born in Shanghai, China, on December 17, 1891. In 1894, he returned with his mother to his ancestral village in Chi Ki, in the southern mountains of Anhui. He began his Chinese lessons at home, and in 1895 entered a school conducted by his uncle. From 1895 to 1904, his studies were entirely Chinese.

In 1904, he was sent to seek a "new education" in Shanghai, where he went through three native schools without graduating from any of them. In 1909, he did some teaching and magazine-editing to support himself. In 1910, he took the American Scholarship Examination in Peking and entered Cornell University in September of the same year.

He studied five years at Cornell University, took the degree of B.A. in February, 1914, and was in the Graduate School of Philosophy from 1913 to 1915. He was elected to the *Phi Beta Kappa* in 1913 and held a Sage Scholarship of Philosophy for the year 1914-15. In 1915, his essay *In Defence of Browning's Optimism* was awarded the Hiram Corson Prize for the study of the poetry of Robert Browning.

From 1915 to 1917, he studied at Columbia University. He returned to China in 1917 and was appointed Professor of Philosophy at the National University of Peking.

Before the publication of this dissertation, he published the following works in Chinese:—

History of Chinese Philosophy, Vol. I. (1919); *Experiments* (a volume of verse, 1919); and *Collected Essays*, Series I (4 vols., 1921).

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